ifii(.].j)fi  y.'i'^":[''J'^-) 


ersity  of  Califc 
Duthern  Region^ 
Library  Facility] 


•^^.^A^ 


>^'es' 


?w' 


A 


'7. 


THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 


' 


BY  THE  SAME  AUTHOR 

THE  POEMS  OF  PAUL  MARIETT 

Edited  with  an  introduction 

A  PREFACE  TO  POLITICS 
DRIFT  AND  MASTERY 


THE    STAKES    OF 
DIPLOMACY 


BY 


WALTER  LIPPMANN 


"  It  is  the  great  amount  of  unexploited  raw  material 
in  territories  politically  backward,  and  now  imper- 
fectly possessed  by  the  nominal  owners,  which  at  the 
present  moment  constitutes  the  temptation  and  the 
impulse  to  war  of  European  States." — Rear-Admi- 
RAL  A.  T.  Mahan  :  Force  in  International  Relations. 


SECOND  EDITION 


IS 

ifc  fitm^mSmm 


NEW  YORK 
HENRY  HOLT  AND  COMPANY 


COPTRIOHT,    1915,    1917, 
BY 

HENRY  HOLT  AND  COMPANY 


Published  November,  1915 


THI  ouiNN  a  aoDEN  CO.  press 

RAHWAr,    N.  J. 


r>,V  V 


.1     '    ^      *  rftt 

L5  •       :',..>i=,;v.«i'^ 


-t    •■  *.  oA»«" 


'^ 


TO  THE  STAFF 
OF 

The  JVew  MeimbliG 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER 


Preface.     At  the  Tutining  Point  of  Amer- 
ican Foreign  Policy 

Introduction 


PAGE 

ix 
3 


PART  I. 

I.  A  Discovery  for  Democrats 

II.  The  Uses  of  a  King 

III.  Foreigners  and  Frontiers    . 

IV.  The  Line  of  Least  Resistance 
V.  Patriotism  in  the  Rough 

VI.  Patriottism,  Business,  and  Diplomacy 


15 
23 
38 
47 
58 
71 


VII. 

VIII. 

IX. 

X. 

XI. 


XII. 

xin. 

XIV. 
XV. 


PART  II. 

Arenas  of  Friction 87 

A  Little  Realpolitik Ill 

A  Proposal 127 

Algeciras:   a   Landmark 136 

The  Core  of  Imperialism 150 

PART  III. 

The  Reaction  at  Home 163 

The  Future  of  Patriotism 172 

A  Broader  Base  for  Diplomacy  ....  189 

Public  Opinion  in  Foreign  Affairs  .       .       .  196 


PART  IV. 

Epilogue  » 

XVI.     The  Strategy  of  Peace 207 

Index 231 


vu 


PREFACE   TO   THE    SECOND   EDITION 

AT  THE  TURNING  POINT  OF  AMERICAN 
FOREIGN  POLICY 

In  President  Wilson's  circular  note  of  Decem- 
ber 18,  1916,  he  used  one  sentence  which  brought 
forth  a  storm  of  anger  from  the  people  of  the 
Allied  nations.     The  unhappy  passage  said  that: 

"  He  takes  the  Uberty  of  calling  attention  to  the 
fact  that  the  objects  which  the  statesmen  of  the  bellig- 
erents on  both  sides  have  in  mind  in  this  war  are 
virtually  the  same,  as  stated  in  general  terms  to  their 
own  people  and  to  the  world. " 

On  second  thought  it  was  obvious  enough  that 

what  the  President  meant  to  write  was  something 

like  this :    When  the  statesmen  on  both  sides  state 

in  general  terms  to  their  own  people  and  to  the 

world  what  they  have  in  mind  they  use  virtually 

the  same  words.    The  biting  truth  of  the  passage 

is  evident  enough.     It  says  not  that  the  German 

Emperor  and  the  King  of  the  Belgians  have  the 

same  objects  in  mind,  but  that  every  statesman, 

angel  or  devil  if  you  like,  is  quoting  the  same 

scripture. 

is 


X  THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

It  is  a  queer  and  very  important  fact,  the  per- 
sistence with  which  hypocrisy  continues  to  be  the 
homage  vice  pays  to  virtue,  j  Governments  will 
send  armies  forth  to  turn  nations  into  ash  heaps 
and  shambles,  but  they  always  proclaim  they  are 
doing  it  to  enhance  civilization,  safeguard  liberty, 
and  fulfill  the  wishes  of  the  all-highest.',  German 
officials  did  commit  two  bits  of  frankness  before 
the  invasion  of  Belgium,  the  one  containing  the 
phrase  about  a  scrap  of  paper,  the  other  stating 
that  the  violation  of  an  inoffensive  neutral  was  a 
wrong.  But  the  candor  proved  too  costly,  not 
only  with  the  outer  world  but  with  the  German 
people,  and  ever  since  there  has  been  a  persistent 
propaganda  to  blur  and  confuse  the  matter.  In 
spite  of  the  supposed  efficiency  of  the  German 
state  education,  in  spite  of  the  supposed  prussian- 
ization  of  the  people,  their  stomachs  were  not 
strong  enough  for  the  truth  about  the  minds  of 
their  rulers.  The  whole  ghastly  business  had  to 
be  overlaid  with  buncombe  even  for  the  greatest 
military  people  in  the  world.  They  had  to  be 
told,  in  fact  they  insisted  upon  being  told,  they 
were  knights  without  fear  and  above  reproach. 

This  book  is  primarily /an  analysis  of  that  pop- 


PREFACE  xi 

ular  gullibility  which  makes  democracy  the  victim 
of  its  diplomacy/)  It  attempts  to  show  how  patri- 
otism and  idealism  are  subtly  entangled  in  impe- 
rialist politics,  how  they  are  unconsciously 
exploited  for  purposes  which  rarely  appear  on  the 
surface  of  public  opinion.  It  goes  on  to  say  that 
these  purposes  are  not  as  so  many  pacifists  im- 
agine a  mere  conspiracy  against  democracy.  The 
struggle  for  the  possession  of  backward  terri- 
tories, the  giddy  oscillations  of  the  balance  of 
power, (the  conflict  of  armaments  are  due  at  bot- 
tom to  two  great  facts :  first,  the  profound  and 
tempting  disorganization  of  practically  all  the 
territory  of  Asia,  Africa,  the  Near  East  and 
Latin- America ;  and  second,  the  weakness,  the  in- 
efficiency and  the  sloth  of  liberalism  which  has 
ignored  that  problem  and  left  it  as  a  field  of  in- 
trigue. Until  liberalism  is  triumphant  at  home, 
powerful  and  intelligent  abroad  to  create  a  work- 
able organization  for  the  weak  states,  it  will  be 
used  and  abused  by  governments  and  cliques  at 
infinite.  cost.\  It  will  continue  to  be  the  lamb's 
skin  which  the  wolf  wears. 

This  book  contains  some  harsh  criticism  of  the 
League  to  Enforce  Peace.    It  was  written  before 


xii  THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

,,  the  idea  had  gained  currency,  before  any  govern- 
ment had  declared  in  favor  of  it.  But  the  success  of 
the  propaganda  has  been  so  great,  President 
Wilson  has  committed  the  country  so  deeply  to 
the  idea,  that  no  one  who  is  seeking  for  material 
out  of  which  to  build  a  better  international  struc- 
ture can  now  dismiss  the  fact  of  its  success  be- 
cause the  idea  is  v/eak  and  inadequate.  To  do 
that  is  to  be  guilty  of  pride  of  opinion  and  to 
waste  an  opportunity. 

Although  the  idea  of  such  a  league  has  existed 
for  centuries,  its  popularity  just  now  is  due  to 
the  feeling  that  "  this  thing  must  never  happen 

^  again."  "  This  thing  "  is  the  indecent  haste  with 
which  Germany  precipitated  Europe  into  war. 
The  object  of  the  league  is  to  have  all  nations 
banded  together  against  another  such  assault. 
The  feeling  behind  it  is  that  longing  for  order  and 
security  for  which  the  bulk  of  the  people  in  Britain 
and  France  are  fighting.  The  plan  is  liked  by  the 
democracies,  distrusted,  half-heartedly  accepted 
or  altogether  rejected  by  the  insiders.  Mr. 
Roosevelt,  for  example,  is  an  insider  in  interna- 
tional affairs,  trained  to  think  of  them  much  as 
Bismarck,  Disraeli  and  Delcasse  have  thought  of 


PREFACE  xiu 

them.  In  the  early  months  of  the  war  Mr.  Roose- 
velt was  caught  in  the  sweeping  tide  of  humani- 
tarianism  and  was  the  first  American  of  promi- 
nence to  advocate  a  league  to  enforce  peace.  He 
called  it  a  posse  comitatus  of  nations.  But  as 
time  went  on,  Mr.  Roosevelt  recovered  his  balance 
and  began  to  run  true  to  form.  He  has  since  ex- 
pressed the  insider's  dislike  for  the  scheme. 

Much  of  this  distrust  would  disappear,  I 
imagine,  if  the  plan  were  looked  at  in  its  relation 
to  the  practical  political  situation  at  the  close  of 
this  war  and  the  period  that  will  follow.  It  is  not 
one  of  those  paper  schemes  which  will  automat- 
ically bring  peace  to  the  world.  On  paper  it  is  a 
poor  scheme  from  a  pacifist  point  of  view  because 
it  ignores  the  roots  of  international  disorder.  The 
real  value  of  the  idea  is  generally  concealed,  but 
can Jbe  stated  bluntly  and  roughly  as  follows: 

/There  are  now  and  will  probably  be  for  some 
time  to  come  at  least  two  and  perhaps  three 
serious  trouble-makers  in  the  world,  Germany, 
Japan,-  and  Russiguj  Britain,  France,  and  the 
United  States  are  not  saints  but  they  have  gone  so 
far  towards  liberalism,  and  they  are  so  well  sated 
in  territory,  that  they  desire  a  peaceful  world. 


xiv  THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

Around  them  cluster  the  American  Republics,  the 
small  neutrals  of  Europe,  and  China,  the  supreme 
danger  spot  of  the  world's  future.  /Britain, 
France,  America  must  draw  together  because 
their  interests  are  at  bottom  the  same.  But  in 
drawing  together  they  are  confronted  with  the 
possibility  of  a  coalition  between  Germany, 
Austria,  Russia,  and  Japan.  That  is  the  night- 
mare which  today  haunts  the  secret  thought  of 
the  western  world,  for  it  opens  up  an  indefinite 
vista  of  armament  and  dread  and  agony.  That 
the  danger  is  not  imaginary  is  shown  by  many 
signs :  by  the  Russo-Japanese  treaty,  the  very  open 
hostility  in  Japan  to  Britain  and  the  hearty 
admiration  for  Germany,  the  existence  in  Russia 
of  a  powerful  pro-German  party,  and  in  Germany 
of  a  powerful  pro-Russian  party. 

I  The  keystone  of  the  coalition  is  Germany,  and 
thefundamental  problem  of  the  coming  peace  is 
whether  Germany  will  become  an  eastern  or  a 
western  power.  If  she  can  be  attached  to  the 
west,  the  world  is  fairly  safe  for  a  long  time  to 
come.]  For  many  years  Russia  could  not  think  of 
aggression  which  the  Occident  opposed,  and  Japan 
would  be  isolated.  '  But  with  Germany  and  Japan 


PREFACE  XV 

in  alliance,  with  all  Russia's  resources  to  organize, 
the  liberal  powers  would  be  almost  helpless.! 

This  struggle  for  Germany  exists  within  Ger- 
many. It  is  reflected  roughly  in  the  conflict  be- 
tween  the  Foreign  office  and  the  conservatives,  be- 
tween semi-liberal  Germany  and  those  who  follow 
von  Tirpitz  and  Falkenhayn.  These  two  groups 
are  sharply  distinguished  in  Germany,  but  from 
the  western  point  of  view  not  sharply  enough.  It 
is  clear  that  Bethmann-Hollweg,  for  example, 
represents  a  Germany  which  is  far  better  than 
that  of  his  opponents.  It  is  not  clear  that  he  is 
strong  enough,  or  at  least  liberal  enough,  to  force 
Germany  into  the  western  group  to  which  America 
inevitably  belongs. 

The  thing  for  which  France  and  Britain  are 
fighting  is  called  the  destruction  of  Prussian  mili- 
tarism. What  they  mean  is  that  they  are  fighting 
to  discredit  and  destroy  the  prestige  of  the  con- 
servative military  party.  They  believe  quite 
rightly  that  if  they  can  ido  this  a  democratic 
Germany  will  shake  itself  free,  and  with  that  Ger- 
many they  can  live  in  some  harmony.  This  is  the 
reason  Americans  could  not  be  neutral  in  thought 
or  impartial  in  act  during  the  war.     The  main 


xvi  THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

object  of  the  Allies  is  essential  to  the  safety  of  the 
western  world.  And  if  we  should  be  drawn  into 
the  war,  as  is  not  altogether  improbable,  that 
too  would  be  our  chief  purpose. 

But  all  along  another  danger  has  existed.  It 
was  that  aggressive  groups  in  the  Entente  na- 
tions would  talk  about  carrying  the  war  or  would 
^  actually  try  to  carry  the  war  to  a  point  where  the 
German  people  would  find  themselves  helpless  for 
the  future.  A  vindictive  policy  instead  of  destroy- 
ing German  militarism  would  almost  surely  con- 
firm it.  There  is  nothing  that  strengthens 
(despotism  so  much  as  fear.  /What  liberal  friends 
of  the  Allies  have  dreaded  is  that  violent  and  self- 
ish forces  would  wish  to  prolong  the  war  so  hid- 
eously, would  advocate  so  harsh  a  peace,  that  the 
people  of  the  Central  Empires  would  come  to 
think  of  Prussian  leadership  as  their  one  perma- 
nent means  of  protection.]  Roughly  speaking  what 
liberals  must  wish  for  is  a  fearful  jar  on  the  bat- 
tlefield which  will  lower  the  German  army's  pride, 
and  then  a  generous  policy  towards  the  German 
nation  to  show  it  that  life  is  possible  without  ex- 
treme militarism.  So  far  as  Germany  is  to  be 
**  taught  a  lesson  "  this  seems  to  be  about  all  that 


D 


PREFACE  xvii 

warfare  can  teach  her.  For  the  more  delicate  task 
of  reforming  her  government,  her  morals,  and  her 
manners,  we  must  trust  to  the  memories  of  this 
agony,  the  failure  to  accomplish  anytliing  by  it, 
and  the  immense  burden  of  debt  which  will  gener- 
ate class  struggles  within  Germany.]  The  Allies 
can  show  that  the  military  leadership  is  neither 
profitable  nor  invincible;  the  rest  they  must  leave 
to  the  evolution  of  democracy.  Having  taught 
what  they  could  to  Germany  they  will  have  to 
look  within  their  own  hearts  and  wash  out  the 
Pharisee's  taint. 

In  all  this  America  inevitably  plays  an  im- 
mense role,  though  silently  and  undramatically. 
Our  neutrality'  has  been  so  benevolent  to  the  Allies 
that  it  is  difficult  to  conceive  what  the  course  of 
the  war  would  have  been  had  we  enforced  our 
"  rights  "  impartially  on  both  sides.  One  thing  is 
clear.  An  unflinching  assertion  of  American  com- 
mercial rights  against  allied  sea  power  would 
have  brought  us  into  collision  with  Britain  and 
France  iong  before  the  submarine  brought  us  to 
the  edge  of  a  collision  with  Germany.  We  hardly 
dare  to  imagine  the  full  consequences,  but  the  net 
effect  would  have  been  to  make  us  the  virtual 


xviii         THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

ally  of  Germany.  We  chose  instead,  and  chose 
wisely  I  think,  to  become  what  the  Germans 
rightly  describe  as  the  tacit  partner  of  the 
Entente.  We  have  not  been  impartial,  we  have 
not  meant  to  be,  because  we  could  not  afford  to 
aid  the  aggressor.  Within  the  limits  which  the 
American  people  would  approve,  our  government 
has  thrown  its  weight  against  Germany. 

We  have  wished  to  see  the  liberal  purposes  of 
the  Allies  achieved.  With  the  more  aggressive 
purposes  which  emerge  now  and  then  the  American 
people  have  had  no  sympathy.  They  have  no 
desire,  for  example,  to  help  Russia  to  Constanti- 
nople or  Rumania  to  Transylvania.  It  is  only  in 
the  main  purposes  of  the  Allies  that  we,  or  for 
that  matter  the  democracies  of  England  and 
France,  have  any  vital  interest.  By  a  benevolent 
neutrality,  perhaps  even  by  entrance  into  the  war, 
we  would  help  them  realize  those  ends.  But  we 
cannot  give  sympathy  or  aid  to  a  policy  which 
becomes  illiberal  and  overshoots  the  mark. 

/Our  part  is  to  act  as  a  stabilizing  influence  upon 
the  European  system.  We  have  consciously  to 
exert  our  influence  against  aggression  and  undue 
power.  •  Our  resources  give  us  a  weight  in  world 


PREFACE  xix 

politics  which  it  is  impossible  to  ignore.  There  is 
no  such  thing  as  "  staying  out."  To  do  nothing 
is  in  the  condition  of  Europe  just  as  positive  an 
act  as  to  do  something.  The  real  choice  is  not 
between  isolation  and  partnership,  but  between  a 
partnership  which  will  create  security  and  one 
which  will  encourage  trouble.  How  best  to  use 
the  power  which  we  possess  is  the  problem  of  our 
diplomacy. 

To  join  the  Allies  by  an  unlimited  pledge  would 
not  accomplish  our  objects.  Inevitably  it  would 
encourage  tory  influences  to  use  the  strength  we 
would  add  for  aggressive  purposes.  To  join  the 
Central  Empires  is  of  course  out  of  the  question. 
/The  policy  which  we  are  looking  for  is  one  which 
associates  us  with  the  Allied  democracies  and  still 
acts  as  a  moderating  influence  on  their  imperial- 
ism. This  means  that  in  case  we  entered  the  war 
we  did  so  on  a  basis  of  limited  liability,  and  that 
after  the  war  our  power  was  a  conscious  factor 
against  aggression.  More  concretely  this  means 
that  we  would  be  ready  to  fight  in  this  war  or  in 
the  future  to  guarantee  a  public  law  under  which 
small  nations  were  sheltered  and  all  nations  pro- 
tected against  the  refusal  to  submit  quarrels  to 


XX  THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

legal  adjustment  and  the  opinion  of  the  world. 

This  is  still  merely  a  formula,  but  a  very  valu- 
able one  at  the  moment.  What  it  actually  docs 
is  to  offer  France  and  Britain  a  defensive  alliance, 
and  to  the  German  nation  a  reason  for  abandon- 
ing militarism  as  the  chief  method  of  diplomacy. 
It  is  a  method  of  using  our  influence  so  that  the 
people  of  Europe  are  not  forced  to  put  their 
whole  faith  in  armies.  It  is  a  way  of  strengthen- 
ing the  democracies.  If  it  is  taken  seriously,  and 
skillfully  pressed,  it  may  help  to  ensure  that  mod- 
erate settlement  by  which  alone  the  better  objects 
of  the  war  can  be  realized. 

Looked  at  this  way  the  League  to  Enforce 
Peace  is  something  more  than  pacifist  sentiment. 
It  is  a  fairly  accurate  reflection  of  a  new  American 
foreign  policy.  It  expresses  in  idealistic  terms 
our  relationship  to  the  balance  of  power  in 
Europe.  The  idea  has  been  welcomed,  let  us  say 
mildly,  by  the  liberals  of  western  Europe.  It  has 
been  taken  up  with  something  like  real  enthusiasm 
in  America.  Tliis  is  not  an  accident.  It  is  due  at 
bottom,  I  believe,  to  the  fact  that  the  plan  of  the 
league  actually  grows  out  of  our  present  position 
in  the  world. 


PREFACE  xxi 

This  interpretation  will  shock  many  who  have 
subscribed  to  the  idea.  Its  realistic  basis  has  been 
discussed  very  little,  and  on  that  basis  it  might 
never  be  accepted  by  the  American  people.  It  is 
not  a  popular  way  of  stating  the  theory,  and  if 
the  plan  is  to  be  popular  it  will  not  be  preached 
widely  as  practical  world  politics.  Nevertheless 
tlie  unattractive  truth  can  not  be  shirked,  and  it 
would  be  folly  to  pretend  that  a  league  of  peace 
would  by  its  mere  existence  keep  the  peace  perma- 
nently. What  it  may  do  is  to  keep  Europe  in 
equilibrium  for  a  generation,  create  a  certain 
atmosphere  of  security  and  internationalism;  it 
may  allay  fear  and  distrust. 

It  is  two  things.  It  is  an  expression  of  Ameri- 
can interest  in  foreign  politics,  and  it  is  a  tem- 
porary shelter  after  the  storm.  Under  that 
shelter  the  real  work  can  perhaps  begin.  That 
work  is  to  create  international  tissue  and  a  safer 
national  structure.  The  League  might  become  the 
administrative  center  of  that  considerable  web  of 
political,  legal,  economic,  social,  and  cultural 
organization  which  existed  before  the  war  and  will 
continue  to  be  essential  after  it.  The  League 
might  become  the  means  of  adjusting  tariffs,  of 


O 


xxii  THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

O  maintaining  the  open  door  in  backward  territories. 
It  might  even  become  the  trustee  of  disputed 
areas.  There  is  no  difficulty  in  inventing  machin- 
ery if  the  forces  that  operate  it  are  fairly  stable. 
The  League  might,  for  example,  administer  the 
Dardanelles,  might  control  railroads  and  ports 
that  several  nations  claim  and  no  nation  should 
monopolize.  It  might  appoint  the  United  States 
or  a  European  neutral  trustee  for  some  contested 
territory,  or  it  might  set  up  the  international 
commissions  which  are  suggested  in  this  book. 

There  is  a  wide  choice  of  instruments  once  a 
morale  exists.  So  far  as  one  can  judge  now  the 
only  method  of  creating  that  morale  is  to  intro- 
duce American  influence  in  Europe  through  a 
League  to  Enforce  Peace.  It  is  only  a  beginning 
to  be  sure,  but  it  appears  to  be  the  right  one.  A 
little  stability  will  encourage  a  little  more 
democracy,  and  democracy  in  its  turn  by  reducing 
aggression  will  add  to  stability.  The  immediate 
tactics  of  peace  are  to  establish  enough  order  for 
a  few  decades  at  least  in  order  to  release  some  of 
the  more  generous  forces  of  mankind. 

January  first,  1917. 


Q 


INTRODUCTION 

An  antarctic  explorer  once  told  me  that  while  he 
was  in  the  polar  regions  his  dreams  by  night  and 
his  fancies  by  day  were  concerned  almost  exclu- 
sively with  the  dinner  he  would  order  at  his  club 
in  London.  His  mind  reached  out  lovingly  for 
complicated  meals,  polished  silverware,  and  fine 
linen,  for  large  high-ceilinged  rooms,  thick  soft 
carpets,  and  the  shining  shirt-fronts  of  perfectly 
ordered  men.  That  for  the  time  being  had  been 
his  notion  of  paradise,  and  I  dare  say  the  vision 
was  what  all  true  visions  are.  They  tell  us  what 
we  should  like  to  have  but  haven't,  what  we  should 
have  liked  to  do  but  didn't,  what  we  intend  to  do 
but  can't. 

In  all  the  diplomatic  dispatches  which  preceded 
the  war,  there  is  nothing  more  pathetic  than  Sir 
Edward  Grey's  despairing  effort  at  the  very  last 
moment  to  picture  a  better  European  system. 
With  great  caution,  while  the  armies  were  mobiliz- 
ing,  he   suggested   a   European   concert,   "  some 

3 


4  THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

more  definite  rapprochement  between  the  Powers," 
a  plan  "  hitherto  too  utopian  to  form  the  sub- 
ject of  definite  proposals."  What  was  it  that  had 
made  a  plan  "  hitherto  utopian  "  suddenly  com- 
mend itself  to  this  diplomat?  It  was  the  immedi- 
ate prospect  of  a  war  which  every  well-informed 
person  has  been  expecting  for  a  decade.  But  so 
long  as  the  war  was  not  an  immediate  menace,  the 
diplomatic  imagination  regarded  its  thin  vision  of 
a  concert  as  utopian.  It  was  only  when  the  chan- 
celleries were  refusing  to  agree  at  all  that  the  idea 
of  agreement  seemed  a  practical  vision.  It  was 
as  if  the  emotion  which  had  formerly  animated  the 
intricate  game  of  diplomacy,  and  had  starved  the 
vision  of  another  and  better  game,  was  suddenly 
deflected  from  all  its  other  preoccupations  into  the 
more  single  idea   of  European   harmony. 

But  the  fact  is  that  the  European  concert  was 
more  utopian  when  Sir  Edward  Grey  embraced 
it  than  "hitherto"  when  he  had  rejected  it.  In 
the  last  days  of  July  it  was  indeed  a  half-baked 
scheme.  Why  was  it  a  half-baked  scheme.''  What 
do  we  mean  by  "  half-baked  ".'*  We  mean,  it  seems 
to  me,  that  the  idea  has  never  grown  in  the  warmth 
of  our  interest.     It  is  an  idea,  rather  cold  and  a 


INTRODUCTION  5 

little  stale,  because  it  has  lain  neglected  upon  the 
top  layers  of  the  mind.  A  really  mature  idea  is 
saturated  with  our  experience ;  it  is  an  idea  which 
we  have  lived  with,  our  love  and  fear  have  wrought 
it.  Around  it  have  clustered  great  strains  of  asso- 
ciation; it  has  been  weathered  by  time.  But  Sir 
Edward  Grey's  plan  was  the  mere  ghost  of  an  idea, 
conjured  up  by  despair. 

The  war  has  produced  many  such  visions,  which 
when  analyzed  turn  out  to  be,  like  the  antarctic 
explorer's  dinner,  a  pathetic  feeling  that  what  we 
haven't  got  is  what  we  most  need.  Of  course,  there 
was  .this  much  obvious  truth  in  it :  Europe  at  war 
most  needed  peace.  But  the  feeling  that  the  oppo- 
site was  desirable  went  further  than  that.  It 
dominated  the  thoughts  of  liberals  and  gave  life  to 
a  number  of  plans  for  permanent  peace. 

I  was  in  Europe  when  the  war  broke  out,  and  I 
can  recall  vividly  that  two  of  the  outstanding  im- 
pressions of  the  last  days  of  negotiation  were  the 
secrecy  of  the  diplomats  and  the  swiftness  of 
events.  It  all  seemed  like  a  terrific  plunge,  let 
loose  by  a  few  men  who  consulted  nobody.  On  top 
of  that  came  the  sense  that  Germany  was  the  ag- 
gressor against  small  nations  like  Belgium  and 


6  THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

against  the  French  Republic.  In  the  heart  of 
Europe  lay  democratic  Switzerland  at  peace.  Be- 
yond the  ocean  men  saw  America  outside  the  broil. 
Was  it  any  wonder  that  liberals  jumped  to  the 
conclusion  that  the  enemy  of  peace  was  secret 
diplomacy,  the  refusal  to  arbitrate,  and  that  the 
remedy  for  war  was  the  preservation  of  small  na- 
tions, the  downfall  of  dynasties,  and  the  spread  of 
democracies?  Those  were  the  opposites  of  the 
forces  which  seemed  to  have  precipitated  Europe 
into  war,  and  liberal  emotion  flowed  to  them.  Eu- 
rope was  fighting;  fighting  is  monstrous.  Europe 
was  armed ;  let  us  work  for  disarmament.  Europe 
was  undemocratic;  let  us  insist  on  democracy. 
Small  nations  were  trampled;  they  must  be  pre- 
served. One  nation  refused  to  arbitrate;  arbitra- 
tion should  be  made  compulsory.  The  peace  pro- 
grammes most  current  in  England  and  America 
to-day  were  the  inevitable  reaction  to  what  the 
lovers  of  peace  knew  and  felt  in  the  early  days  of 
August.  They  were  born  of  that  pain  which  is  at 
once  their  honor  and  their  bias. 

As  the  war  has  dragged  on,  other  ideas  have 
made  themselves  felt.  There  has  been  a  vague  but 
grudging  recognition  that  trade  and  finance  are 


INTRODUCTION  7 

involved  in  diplomacy,  and  there  has  appeared  a 
mass  of  literature  interested  not  so  much  in  the 
machinery  of  peace  as  in  dealing  with  the  provoca- 
tions to  war.  But  the  chief  effect  of  strain  has 
been  the  eruption  of  a  great  uncertainty  within  the 
minds  of  men,  followed  by  a  rushing  to  cover.  I 
do  not  refer  alone  to  the  agitation  for  "  prepared- 
ness." I  refer  to  the  renascence  of  very  old  loyal- 
ties— a  kind  of  world-wide  retreat  to  the  father- 
land. For  it  is  not  the  German-Americans  alone 
whose  loyalty  has  become  hyphenated.  Every- 
where men  are  reviving  their  oldest  associations — 
turning  back  to  their  origins — searching  for  a 
pride  in  what  they  came  from  which  obscures  the 
hopes  of  their  goal.  For  origins  are  a  haven  in 
distress.  They  are  our  mother's  arms,  and  they 
are  more  friendly  in  time  of  danger  than  the  open 
country  of  a  future.  "  There,"  we  say,  "  is  our 
identity.  Let  us  cling  to  that  lest  we  be  sub- 
merged. Adventure  must  wait  for  more  prosperous 
times." 

Like  sheep  in  a  shower  we  huddle  about  the 
leader.  Whatever  seems  firm  and  established  we 
turn  to  instinctively.  A  procession  of  reaction- 
aries has  returned  from  exile ;  men  whom  we  hoped 


8  THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

never  again  to  see  in  public  life  are  with  us  once 
more,  feeling  more  certain  of  themselves  than  they 
have  felt  for  fifteen  years.  The  old  shibboleths 
are  uttered  without  a  blush,  for  all  old  things  are 
congenial  to  us  now.  They  promise  rest  in  a 
world  at  war.  And  though  the  assurance  they 
offer  is  disheartening,  it  is  assurance,  and  panic 
is  in  the  air. 

A  subtle  analyst  might  follow  the  effects  of  this 
apprehensiveness  into  the  intimacies  of  our  souls. 
He  might  show,  I  imagine,  that  we  are  less  flexible 
in  our  thinking,  at  once  more  dogmatic  and  more 
capricious.  It  is  no  longer  surprising  to  find 
pacifists  non-resistant  in  one  breath  and  eager 
to  annihilate  Germany  in  the  other.  There  has 
been  such  a  loss  of  liberal  ease  that  all  of  us  take 
our  ideas  with  an  animal  loyalty.  For  the  time 
being  we  have  identified  our  opinions  with  our 
safety ;  whoever  attacks  them  attacks  us.  There 
is  more  intolerance  abroad  than  we  have  been  used 
to,  and  the  humane  capacity  for  playing  with  ideas 
and  speculating  freely  has  almost  disappeared. 
We  take  thought  seriously,  perhaps  the  worst  way 
there  is  of  taking  thought.  For  the  life  which 
ideas  are  intended  to  control  is  tumbled  and  varied 


INTRODUCTION  9 

and  flowing,  alive  with  curiosity,  and  exhaustingly 
subtle.  Even  in  our  surest  moments,  thought  has 
always  plodded  along  behind  clumsily  enough ;  but 
now  with  the  grimness  of  war  to  weigh  us  down 
and  panic  to  make  us  uncertain,  we  are  more 
heavy-footed  than  ever.  We  are  hardly  in  the 
temper  to  see  facts  lucidly  or  to  be  inventive  about 
our  problem. 

These  difficulties  are  made  more  acute  by  the 
fact  that  the  things  we  have  to  think  about  are  so 
unreal  to  us.  We  are  feeding  on  maps,  talking  of 
populations  as  if  they  were  abstract  lumps,  and 
tuning  our  minds  to  a  scale  unheard  of  in  history. 
To  how  many  of  us  does  the  word  Slovak  convey 
the  picture  of  fathers  and  mothers  and  children, 
of  human  beings  with  habits  and  personalities  as 
intimate  as  our  own?  Even  to  highly  cultivated 
people  the  word  Slovak  probably  calls  up  the  as- 
sociation of  "  light  pink  patches  with  diagonal 
shading "  somewhere  in  bewildering  Austria- 
Hungary.  How  many  people  have  ever  heard  of 
the  Szekels  of  Transylvania.^  Yet  there  are  over 
800,000  of  them,  all  entitled  to  a  place  in  the  sun 
and  all  capable  of  making  trouble  if  it  is  denied  to 
them.     When  you  consider  what  a  mystery  the 


10  THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

East  Side  of  New  York  is  to  the  West  Side,  the 
business  of  arranging  the  world  to  the  satisfaction 
of  the  people  in  it  may  be  seen  in  something  like 
its  true  proportions. 

It  is  no  wonder  that  we  have  taken  refuge 
in  abstractions  like  Nationality,  Race,  Culture. 
They  are  easier  to  think  about  than  men.  They 
introduce  that  simplicity  into  the  mind  which  it 
longs  for  so  ardently.  Nor  is  it  any  wonder  that 
we  have  embraced  thin  solutions  of  intricate  ques- 
tions, that  Mr.  Bryan  banks  on  arbitration  treaties, 
that  a  section  of  American  socialists  asks  for  a 
referendum  on  declarations  of  war,  that  others 
have  decided  they  will  never  fight,  or  that  many 
women  are  refusing  to  buy  lead  soldiers  for  their 
children.  We  hesitate  in  bewilderment  between 
those  who  advise  us  to  be  too  weak  to  fight 
and  those  who  wish  us  to  be  too  strong  to 
fight. 

The  man  who  claimed  that  he  was  not  bewildered 
would  write  himself  down  a  fool.  We  are  chal- 
O  lenged,  every  one  of  us,  to  think  our  way  out  of 
the  terrors  amidst  which  we  live.  That  challenge 
is  an  excuse  for  adding  to  the  endless  books  in- 
spired by  the  war.     I  have  been  told  that  this  is 


INTRODUCTION  11 

a  time  for  deeds,  not  words.  There  Is  no  lack  of 
deeds  in  the  world.  They  happen,  however,  to  be 
monstrous  deeds. 

W.  L. 

f\       New  York  City. 

September,  1915. 


PART  I 


CHAPTER  I 

A  DISCOVERY  FOR  DEMOCRATS 

The  day  after  the  Lusitanla  was  destroyed,  we 
realized  that  one  man  had  it  in  his  power  to  send 
this  country  to  war.  The  responsibility  and  the 
power,  so  tremendous  that  it  might  decide  the 
world  war,  so  far-reac"hing  that  it  might  alter  our 
whole  history,  turned  for  a  few  dizzy  days  on  the 
judgment  of  one  man.  Had  Mr.  Wilson  wished 
war  with  Germany  he  could  have  had  it.  We  were 
in  his  hands,  and  no  amount  of  elections,  or  con- 
stitutional reservations  about  the  right  of  Congress 
to  declare  war,  can  alter  the  fact  that  the  real 
war-making  power  in  the  United  States  is  the 
President. 

Americans  have  never  intended  to  give  any  one 
man  such  importance.  They  have  always  believed 
they  possessed  that  democratic  control  of  foreign 
affairs  for  which  European  liberals  are  agitating. 
The  United  States  makes  no  secret  treaties ;  the 

treaties  it  does  make  have  to  be  ratified  by  the 

15 


16  THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

people's  representatives  ;  and  Congress  has  to  agree 
before  war  can  be  declared.  Yet  the  real  power  is 
with  the  President,  and  all  this  constitutional  ma- 
chinery counts  for  practically  nothing  in  a  crisis. 
When  Mr.  Wilson  decided  to  seize  Vera  Cruz,  he 
had  to  go  to  Congress  for  permission.  I  am  told 
on  good  authority  that  a  large  number  of  the  Con- 
gressmen were  against  the  expedition.  But  they 
"  supported  "  the  President ;  "  politics  ceased  at 
the  water's  edge " ;  the  people's  representatives 
voted  Mr.  Wilson  the  power  he  asked. 

Congress  was  not  in  session  in  May,  1915,  when 
affairs  with  Germany  were  strained  to  the  break- 
ing point.  There  was  some  discussion  as  to 
whether  Congress  ought  to  be  summoned,  and  I 
suppose  it  would  have  been  difficult  to  find  a  per- 
son in  the  country  anxious  for  peace  who  didn't 
also  wish  Congress  to  stay  at  home.  It  was  a 
curious  paradox  for  those  of  us  who  would  like 
to  believe  that  democratic  institutions  make  for 
peace.  Instead  of  shouting  for  the  people's  repre- 
sentatives to  assemble  and  restrain  the  autocrat, 
we  knew  that  the  mere  act  of  summoning  Congress 
would  be  a  threat  of  war.  So  certain  were  we  that 
Congress  would  aggravate  the  situation  that  many 


A  DISCOVERY  FOR  DEMOCRATS        17 

of  us  debated  whether  the  calling  of  Congress 
might  not  be  the  best  way  of  threatening  Germany. 
We  never  assumed  that  Congress  would  make 
things  calmer,  or  that  it  would  force  the  Presi- 
dent to  take  a  milder  course.  For  as  one  genial 
cynic  remarked :  "  It  is  easier  to  summon  Congress 
than  to  adjourn  it;  it  is  easier  to  open  the  flood- 
gates of  heroic  patriotism  than  to  close  them." 

The  picture  of  Congress  upholding  the  Presi- 
dent's hands  when  the  situation  required  that  the 
President  should  lower  them  a  bit;  the  prospect 
of  lavish  rhetoric  and  lavish  appropriation,  of  reso- 
lutions calling  on  the  Secretary  of  State  to  ex- 
plain this  and  furnish  information  about  that,  the 
inten'iews,  proposals,  and  speeches  which  might  be 
let  loose,  the  heat  which  would  be  engendered,  made 
those  of  us  who  hoped  for  peace  prefer  to  trust 
the  cool  intentions  of  Mr.  Wilson. 

But  it  was  a  curious  choice  for  democrats  to 
make,  a  choice  about  which  we  can  hardly  feel 
very  comfortable.  What  if  Mr.  Wilson  had  hap- 
pened to  believe  that  an  occasional  war  was  good 
for  a  country,  or  that  the  United  States  ought  to 
seize  a  decent  excuse  to  intervene  in  Europe?  It  is 
useless  to  pretend  that  the  people  in  electing  the 


18  THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

President  take  care  not  to  choose  a  man  with  such 
views.  They  don't  inquire  about  a  candidate's 
philosophy  of  war,  or  even  about  his  notions  of 
foreign  policy.  So  far  as  I  can  recall,  Mr.  Wil- 
son's campaign  speeches  made  almost  no  reference 
whatever  to  international  affairs,  and  even  if  they 
did,  the  views  he  expressed  probably  did  not  influ- 
ence two  hundred  votes.  Our  Presidents  are  elected 
by  various  means ;  the  deliberate  choice  even  of 
domestic  policies  plays  a  small  part ;  the  choice  of 
foreign  policies  enters  practically  not  at  all. 

To  be  sure  there  are  certain  traditional  views 
on  which  the  parties  are  supposed  to  agree  and  to 
divide.  They  are  supposed  to  render  equal  hom- 
age to  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  the  Open  Door; 
the  Republicans  are  supposed  to  be  for  a  "  strong  " 
foreign  policy  with  a  tendency  to  "  expansion  " ; 
the  Democrats  are  said  to  stand  for  a  mild  foreign 
policy  with  a  passion  for  isolation.  But  as  a 
matter  of  fact  each  administration  makes  its  own 
interpretation,  and  fills  catch  phrases  like  the 
"  Monroe  Doctrine  "  with  a  meaning  of  its  own. 
Thus  the  Democrats  may  deplore  the  "  dollar 
diplomacy  "  of  Mr.  Knox  and  the  Taft  adminis- 
tration, but  Mr.  Wilson  has  proposed  a  treaty 


A  DISCOVERY  FOR  DEMOCRATS        19 

with  Haiti  which,  whatever  its  merits,  is  built  on 
the  most  approved  model  of  modern  economic  im- 
perialism. 

Traditional  American  policy  is  so  vague  that 
the  administration  may  subscribe  to  it  and  still 
do  pretty  much  whatever  it  pleases.  It  is  no  real 
check  on  the  power  of  the  President.  In  reality 
it  is  the  great  bulwark  of  his  power.  A  phrase  like 
the  "  Monroe  Doctrine  "  may  mean  everything  or 
nothing  in  the  actual  affairs  of  Central  and  South 
America,  but  it  means  for  the  American  people  a 
cluster  of  loyalties  which  can  be  summoned  to  ac- 
tion. As  to  all  phrases  which  are  sanctioned  by 
our  habits,  the  reaction  to  "  Monroe  Doctrine  "  Is 
almost  automatic.  It  may  cover  a  totally  new 
course  of  action.  In  the  last  ninety  years  or  so 
it  has  covered  many  courses  of  action.  But  it  has 
covered  them.  Because  the  covering  was  familiar, 
the  action  has  been  palatable.  We  have  been  ready 
to  fight  in  defense  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  leaving 
it  for  the  President  to  decide  what  it  means. 

It  doesn't  follow  that  there  is  no  such  thing  as 
American  public  opinion  in  regard  to  foreign 
affairs,  or  the  making  of  war  and  peace.  It  does 
follow   that   we   have   certain   conventional  ways 


20  THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

of  reacting,  certain  habitual  associations  about 
phrases,  and  a  number  of  set  loyalties  which  are 
easily  aroused.  It  would  be  sheer  hypocrisy  to 
pretend  to  more  than  that,  to  suppose  that  any 
large  section  of  the  American  people  is  informed, 
or  interested,  or  thoughtful  about  international 
relations.  Our  opinion  about  foreign  affairs  is 
hardened  into  a  number  of  molds,  named  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine,  the  Open  Door,  No  Entangling  Alli- 
ances, and  I  suppose  one  should  add  Peace-if- 
possible.  Into  these  molds  patriotism  is  ready  to 
flow;  into  these  molds  patriotism  can  be  made  to 
flow.  The  President  has  enormous  power  of  direct- 
ing that  flow.  His  decision  as  to  what  shall  be 
published  and  what  concealed  is  one  of  the  su- 
preme attributes  of  his  office.  He  has  no  legal 
power  of  censoring  the  news.  But  often  he  alone 
knows  what  the  news  is,  he  can  publish  it  when 
and  how  it  seems  best  to  him.  The  rest  of  us 
have  to  make  up  our  minds  as  well  as  we  can  on 
the  information  which  he  furnishes  us. 

We  had  trouble  with  Japan  over  Califomian 
land  laws.  The  correspondence  was  published  after 
the  negotiations.  We  had  some  discussion  with 
Japan  and  China  over  the  situation  created  by  the 


A  DISCOVERY  FOR  DEMOCRATS        21 

fall  of  Tsing-tao.  As  I  write,  the  nature  of  that 
discussion  has  not  been  revealed.  We  have  been 
bickering  for  two  years  on  the  edge  of  Mexican 
intervention,  but  the  real  facts  about  conditions  in 
Mexico  have  been  carefully  censored  and  concealed. 
Mr.  Wilson  has  not  wished  to  intervene,  and  so  he 
has  not  published  the  alarming  reports  which  must 
have  come  to  him  from  day  to  day.  But  suppose 
he  had  decided  to  intervene.  What  would  have 
been  easier  than  to  arouse  feeling  in  the  United 
States  by  publishing  the  news.'' 

Moreover,  the  real  facts  of  any  diplomatic  situ- 
ation are  not  contained  in  the  official  notes.  Al- 
most always  there  is  a  personal  conference  between 
the  ambassador  and  the  Secretary  of  State ;  some- 
thing is  done  to  give  a  human  tone  to  the  guarded 
language  of  the  document.  Diplomats  do  not 
mumble  and  stutter  as  much  as  their  written  dis- 
patches make  them  seem  to.  They  add  something 
in  conversation  intended  to  lead  or  mislead.  But 
they  do  not  rely  on  the  inexpressive  language  they 
use  when  they  write  to  each  other.  I  do  not  know 
what  Mr.  Bryan  said  to  the  Austrian  Ambassador 
after  the  "first  note  to  Germany  about  the  Lusi- 
tania.    But  he  seems  to  have  said  something  whicH 


22  THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

Ambassador  Dumba  told  the  German  Foreign 
Office  so  as  to  help  the  German  diplomats  under- 
stand what  the  Wilson  administration  really  in- 
tended to  do.  This  personal  side  of  diplomacy 
cannot  be  published.  It  may  consist  merely  of  an 
inflection  in  the  voice  or  a  gesture  of  the  hand, 
which  nevertheless  gives  the  real  meaning  of  a 
document. 

Then,  too,  every  document  which  is  to  be  pub- 
lished is  written  with  an  eye  to  its  publication. 
The  diplomat  has  to  consider  not  only  what  he 
means,  but  what  different  people  will  think  he 
means,  and  how  they  will  feel  about  what  they 
think  he  means.  All  this  sounds  very  Machiavellian 
and  not  at  all  democratic,  but  there  is  no  use  pre- 
tending that  it  doesn't  occur.  When  Mr.  Wilson 
said  that  he  was  waiting  for  the  American  people 
to  speak,  he  undoubtedly  meant  what  he  said.  He 
knew  that  the  first  note  to  Germany  must  express 
American  feeling  about  the  Lusitania.  His  first 
note  was  a  kind  of  national  work  of  art  which  re- 
lieved our  feelings  immensely.  By  the  time  the 
second  note  had  to  be  written  we  were  cooler  and 
we  had  counted  the  cost  of  war.  The  second  note 
certainly  retracted  much  of  the  first,  but  it  ex- 


A  DISCOVERY  FOR  DEMOCRATS        23 

pressed  our  feeling  at  the  time  it  was  written,  and 
public  opinion  was  satisfied.  Mr.  Wilson  may  not 
have  managed  the  situation  consciously.  It  may 
be  .that  he  himself  went  through  the  same  change 
of  feeling  that  the  rest  of  us  did.  But  had  he  set 
out  to  control  opinion,  he  could  not  have  done  it 
more  skillfully.  He  controlled  it,  not  by  dominat- 
ing it,  but  by  absorbing  it. 

It  is  possible  to  say  that,  after  all,  American 
public  opinion  has  governed  in  the  crisis  with  Ger- 
many. I  should  not  deny  that.  But  the  point 
I  am  making  is  that  it  was  an  accident  that  Mr. 
Wilson  felt  with  a  majority  rather  than  a  minority 
of  the  American  people.  Had  he  belonged  to  that 
powerful  group  in  this  country  who  would  like  to 
fight  on  the  side  of  the  Allies,  he  could  have  used 
the  Lusitania  incident  to  make  war  inevitable. 
Nothing  would  have  been  easier  than  to  dramatize 
the  issue,  to  close  the  door  of  negotiation,  to  in- 
flame the  press  by  publishing  the  whispered  rumors 
about  many  of  the  undoubted  provocations  which 
German  diplomacy  has  offered  us.  The  ra^  ma- 
terial of  war  existed,  and  the  power  to  work  upon 
it  was  in  the  hands  of  the  President. 

It  is  true  that  we  have  had  no  President  re- 


24  THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

cently  who  used  his  power  to  make  war.  Those 
wars  wliich  the  United  States  has  fought  have 
been  forced  upon  an  unwilHng  President.  Mr.  Mc- 
Kinley  not  only  did  not  foment,  he  actually 
opposed  the  Spanish-American  War,  and  Mr. 
Roosevelt,  for  all  his  reputation,  kept  an  unbroken 
peace  for  the  whole  term  of  his  office.  How,  then, 
does  it  matter  that  the  Executive  has  this  supreme 
power,  if  in  actual  fact  he  has  never  used  it? 
Isn't  the  question  a  rather  unreal  one.'* 

I  think  not.  The  question  seems  to  me  impor- 
tant not  only  because  it  is  part  of  our  preparation 
for  future  emergencies,  but  because  it  reveals  with 
a  good  deal  of  suggestion  the  problem  of  a  democ- 
racy and  its  relation  to  war.  If  we  can  under- 
stand why  in  our  republic  such  great  power  has 
gravitated  to  one  man,  why  in  spite  of  all  our  pre- 
tensions to  democracy  we  have  happened  to  give 
over  the  greatest  question  of  all  to  the  decision  of 
one  man,  if  we  can  explain  the  curious  fact  that 
those  of  us  who  believe  in  democracy  preferred  to 
trust  Mr.  Wilson  in  the  Lusitania  crisis,  we  shall, 
I  believe,  have  learned  something  of  considerable 
value. 

We  have  just  passed  through — indeed  at  the 


A  DISCOVERY  FOR  DEMOCRATS   25* 

moment  it  is  still  optimistic  to  say  that  we  have 
passed  through — one  of  the  gravest  episodes  of 
our  history.  In  a  way  it/ illuminated  as  nothing 
else  would  have  done  the  question  of  how  democ- 
racies face  the  issue  of  war.J  To  our  surprise  and 
humiliation  some  of  us  discovered  that  our  desire 
for  peace  and  our  faith  in  democratic  institutions 
conflicted.  We  had  to  choose  between  them,  and 
if  we  have  won  peace,  it  is  by  an  abandonment  of 
the  pretense  that  the  people  could  control  their 
foreign  relations  in  any  positive  way.  We  trusted 
a  President  who  was  elected  before  the  submarine 
war  was  dreamed  of,  and  as  it  happened  he  turned 
out  to  be  a  man  who  wanted  peace.  But  it  was 
such  a  hair-raising  escape,  so  replete  with  accident 
that  we  are  compelled,  in  self-respect,  to  search 
out  the  meaning  of  the  discovery  that  on  the  issue 
of  our  national  existence  we  are  not  a  self-govern- 
ing people.  I 


CHAPTER  II 

THE  USES  OF  A  KING 

The  reason  why  we  trust  one  man,  rather  than 
many,  is  because  one  man  can  negotiate  and  many 
men  can't.  Two  masses  of  people  have  no  way 
of  dealing  directly  with  each  other.  They  have 
to  deal  thrqugh  representatives.  It  is  a  pure  fic- 
tion to  speak  of  negotiations  between  the  United 
States  and  Germany.  For  when  you  look  around 
to  find  the  "  United  States  "  you  discover  a  hun- 
dred million  people  spread  over  vast  territory, 
with  certain  common  habits,  ideas,  and  loyalties, 
but  nowhere  do  you  find  anything  called  the 
"  United  States  "  which  can  strike  a  bargain  with 
*'  Germany."  The  American  people  cannot  all 
seize  the  same  pen  and  indite  a  note  to  sixty-five 
million  people  living  within  the  German  Empire. 
They  cannot  say :  We  ask  for  this,  but  if  you  will 
grant  that,  we'll  do  so-and-so,  and  then  we'll  both 
be  satisfied.     Each  man  may  know  what  he  thinks 

(a  tremendous  assumption),  but  what  "we  the 

26 


THE  USES  OF  A  KING  27 

American  people  "  think  is  one  of  the  most  diffi- 
cult matters  in  the  world  to  find  out. 

We  all  try  to  find  it  out.  The  papers  print  edi- 
torial comment  from  different  parts  of  the  coun- 
try, they  interview  leaders  of  opinion,  publish  let- 
ters from  correspondents,  take  straw  ballots,  and 
ask  questions  in  the  smoking-room  of  the  club,  on 
the  street  car,  and  at  the  quick-lunch  counter. 
They  may  throw  some  light  on  the  general  reaction 
to  a  particular  event.  But  more  accurate  than 
this  it  is  hardly  possible  to  be.  The  "  will " 
and  "  mind  "  and  "  voice  "  of  a  great  people  are 
not  the  same  thing  as  the  will  and  mind  and  voice 
of  a  single  man.  When  an  individual  thinks  out  a 
course  of  action,  he  goes  through  a  delicate  mental 
operation,  a  good  part  of  which  is  unconscious. 
But  a  whole  people  can  no  more  think  in  unison 
than  it  can  make  love  in  unison.  The  individual 
thinks,  and  you  may,  if  you  are  fond  of  abstrac- 
tions, say  that  the  common  thoughts,  or  the  domi- 
nating thoughts  of  a  mass  of  individuals,  are  their 
will  and  mind. 

But  in  saying  it  you  are  opening  the  door  to 
great  self-deception.  The  moment  you  assume 
that  there  is  a  collective  soul,  a  collective  heart, 


28  THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

and  a  collective  mind,  you  are  falling  into  that  old 
error  of  statecraft  which  obsesses  men  like  Bern- 
hardi.  It  is  the  error  of  treating  a  nation  as  an 
individual,  rather  than  as  a  group  of  people.  I 
call  it  an  error  because  as  a  matter  of  observation 
that  which  we  call  the  thought  of  a  nation  is  very 
different  from  the  thought  of  a  person.  The 
nation  has  no  eyes,  ears,  or  mouth.  Its  "  will "  is 
compounded  of  many  wills,  and  when  it  speaks  it 
speaks  through  a  person.  That  person  may  have 
taken  into  account  what  other  persons  think  and 
feel,  but  the  words  he  utters  are  at  the  utmost 
somebody's  notion  of  what  most  people  would  like 
to  have  said. 

It  is  often  stated  that  the  public  is  "  fickle  " ; 
that  its  interest  fades  quickly,  or  is  easily  diverted. 
This  is  natural  enough,  for  a  great  people  is  very 
diverse;  it  has  innumerable  interests  which  com- 
pete for  the  attention,  and  it  cannot  give  itself 
as  devotedly  to  one  object  as  the  individual  may. 
But  from  the  point  of  view  of  diplomatic  negotia- 
tion, it  is  far  truer  to  say  that  a  mass  of  people 
is  really  much  too  inflexible  for  successful  dealing. 
One  diplomat  can  find  out  that  he  was  wrong,  and 
change  his  mind;  a  whole  people  unlearns  very 


THE  USES  OF  A  KING  29 

slowly.  One  diplomat  may  see  what  is  in  the 
other  diplomat's  mind,  and  tune  his  utterance  ac- 
cordingly; a  whole  people  cannot  see  quickly  into 
another  people's  mind,  and  its  utterance  is  inevi- 
tably crude.  The  very  qualities  which  are  needed 
for  negotiation — quickness  of  mind,  direct  contact, 
adaptiveness,  invention,  the  right  proportion  of 
give  and  take — are  the  very  qualities  which  masses 
of  people  do  not  possess.  This  isn't  entirely  due 
to  the  ignorance  of  masses ;  it  is  a  question  of 
inertia.  A  large  body  of  highly  trained  scientists 
by  the  sheer  fact  of  its  size  would  show  much  the 
same  heaviness  of  movement.  This  inertia,  which 
means  a  tendency  to  stay  where  you  are  put,  or 
to  keep  moving  when  you  start,  is  natural  to  all 
large  bodies.  It  is  as  much  a  problem  for  the  . , 
traffic  policeman  as  for  the  statesman. 

The  only  large  groups  of  people  which  have  real 
mobility  are  highly  trained  troops.  They  come  as 
near  to  the  ideal  of  one  heart,  one  mind,  and  one 
movement,  as  masses  of  people  ever  do.  They 
achieve 'it  by  automatic  obedience,  by  as  complete 
an  annihilation  of  the  individual  as  discipline  can 
produce.  But  even  years  of  training  and  subordi- 
nation will  not  give  to  an  army  anything  like  the 


so  THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

resourcefulness  of  a  clever  group  of  free-moving 
bandits. 

An  army,  however,  is  the  outside  limit  of  uni- 
formity for  masses.  It  has  something  of  a  common 
mind  and  will,  because  it  has  sacrificed  almost 
completely  individual  mind  and  will.  There  are 
few  freethinkers  in  well-drilled  armies,  and  they 
are  likely  to  be  shot.  But  a  civil  population,  even 
with  the  most  vigorous  school  system  and  press 
censorship,  is  a  straggling  and  varied  collection 
of  people.  And  in  our  democracy,  where  the  fron- 
tier tradition  is  not  yet  dead,  there  is  no  possibility 
of  anything  like  drilled  and  concerted  action. 

Even  if  there  were,  it  would  not  enable  a  whole 
people  to  negotiate.  We  might  all  think  alike 
when  we  thought,  but  it  is  a  physical  impossibility 
that  we  should  all  know  the  same  facts  at  the  same 
moment.  ^The  best  we  can  do  is  to  express  gen- 
eral sentiments,  allow  a  leader  or  a  President  to 
translate  them  into  action,  and  then  see  whether 
most  of  us  like  what  he  has  done  for  us.  We  are 
a  little  like  the  customer  who  can  say  yes  or  no  to 
what  is  offered  by  the  salesman,  but  who  cannot  de- 
scribe exactly  what  he  wants. 

The  whole  difficulty  can  be  visualized  by  imagin- 


THE  USES  OF  A  KING  31 

ing  the  situation  between  two  nations  which  had  no 
diplomats  and  no  government.  One  nation  tries 
to  tell  the  other  that  it  is  outraged  by  the  sinking 
of  the  Lusitania.  The  American  newspapers  print 
editorials  which  are  telegraphed  to  the  German 
newspapers  and  reprinted.  The  German  writers 
then  proceed  to  write  their  thoughts.  One  of  them 
— perhaps  Count  von  Reventlow — says  proudly : 
"  Damn  the  Americans."  Another  who  has  just 
read  the  Evening  Telegram  says :  "  My  God,  what 
liars  those  Americans  are."  Another  reads  a  de- 
fense of  the  sinking  in  the  Fatherland  and  says : 
"  They  are  a  reasonable  people,  those  Americans. 
Gott  strafe  England."  Another  editor  discovers 
that  most  Americans  are  angry,  and  writes  a  long, 
reasonable  editorial  asking :  "  What  does  America 
want?"  All  this  is  cabled  back  to  us,  slightly 
mangled  in  translation.  Our  editors  proceed  to 
answer.  Some  tell  von  Reventlow  what  they  think 
of  him;  others  tell  the  New  York  Evening  Tele- 
gram what  they  think  of  it.  Some  say  the  Ger- 
mans are  in  a  compromising  frame  of  mind ;  others 
say  we  have  been  insulted. 

It  would  not  be  long  before  the  sensible  people 
in  both  countries  wero  shouting  that  if  only  each 


32  THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

nation  could  appoint  somebody  who  really  was 
fitted  to  speak  for  it,  there  would  be  some  pos- 
sibility of  getting  somewhere.  The  sheer  problem 
of  exchanging  ideas,  formulating  demands,  and 
making  compromises  would  have  demonstrated 
more  clearly  than  any  amount  of  theorizing  that 
the  "  national  mind  and  will "  must  negotiate 
through  some  person.  It  was  a  recognition  of  this 
that  made  the  most  democratic  among  us  prefer 
"  trusting  the  President "  to  summoning  Congress 
in  the  Lusitania  crisis.  We  believed  he  could  do 
for  us  what  we  wanted  done  better  than  we  could 
tell  him  what  we  wanted  done.  It  was  a  situation 
in  which  the  people  desired  certain  results — abate- 
ment of  submarine  warfare  and  peace,  but  for  the 
intricate  business  of  obtaining  those  results  they 
saw  that  the  flexibility  of  one  mind  was  superior  to 
the  inertia  of  many.  It  was  the  explanation  of 
the  paradox  that  a  democracy  was  willing  to  grant 
one  man  plenary  power  over  war  and  peace. 

In  the  diplomatic  exchanges  at  the  end  of  July, 
1914,  there  was  a  very  illuminating  example  of 
the  danger  to  all  negotiation  when  a  nation  has  not 
granted  its  diplomats  full  power.  It  will  be  remem- 
bered that  Sir  Edward  Grey  was  asked  repeatedly 


THE  USES  OF  A  KING  33 

bj  Sazonof  and  Cambcn  to  state  where  England 
would  stand  in  case  of  war.  He  replied  that  he 
could  not  promise  intervention  without  a  grant 
from  Parliament.  That  hesitancy  of  his  was  un- 
doubtedly sincere,  but  it  made  all  the  negotiations 
immensely  difficult.  No  one  was  certain  what  Eng- 
land would  do,  and  the  complaint  of  Germans  that 
England  fell  upon  them  has  that  much  foundation. 
Sir  Edward  Grey  represented  a  somewhat  uncer- 
tain democracy  dealing  with  powers  governed  by 
men  who  had  full  authority.  They  knew  what 
they  could  do;  he  didn't.  They  could  threaten, 
promise,  and  bargain;  Sir  Edward  Grey  never 
knew  how  much  he  could  count  upon  the  support 
of  his  nation.  He  was,  in  other  words,  a  limited 
delegate  negotiating  with  plenipotentiaries.  The 
full  force  of  the  Empire  was  not  behind  him,  and 
he  was  not  the  equal  of  the  men  he  was  dealing 
with. 

I  don't  mean  to  suggest  that  war  could  have  been 
avoided  if  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  been  freer  to  com- 
mit himself  at  the  end  of  July.  I  think  it  is  argu- 
able that  Germany  would  have  hesitated  had  she 
known  as  an  absolute  certainty  that  England  would 
be  drawn  in.    But  it  is  clear  at  least  that  the  com- 


34  THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

plete  power  of  England  could  not  be  exerted  in 
the  negotiations,  because  the  ultimate  power  lay 
with  Parliament. 

Some  such  reasoning  as  this  is  what  mates  the 
traditional  diplomat  shy  of  democratic  control  of 
foreign  affairs.  His  idea  is  to  wield  the  power  of 
his  nation  as  a  rapier.  He  does  not  wish  foreign 
affairs  made  the  subject  of  party  politics.  He 
prefers  secrecy ;  he  desires  above  all  other  things 
to  face  foreign  diplomats  with  the  assurance  that 
a  united  people  is  behind  him.  We  in  America 
have  accepted  this  diplomatic  ideal.  For  us  "  poli- 
tics ceases  at  the  water's  edge  " ;  we  announce  in 
"  one  "  voice  that  we  shall  act  as  "  one  "  man ; 
and  in  a  crisis  we  resent  with  peculiar  intolerance 
the  opposition  of  anybody  to  the  government's 
policy.  It  is  called  "  rocking  the  boat,"  and  the 
epithet  "  treason  "  trembles  on  the  tip  of  the  edi- 
torial pen.  We  feel  that  division  at  home  is  weak- 
ness abroad.  Though  there  are  a  hundred  million 
of  us  with  differing  opinions,  though  we  profess  to 
value  liberty  of  thought  and  action,  we  are  deeply 
hostile  to  any  use  of  this  liberty  when  the  question 
of  war  and  peace  is  at  issue. 

In  other  words,  it  is  not   only  politics  which 


THE  USES  OF  A  KING  35 

ceases  at  the  water's  edge,  but  democracy  too.l 
tChe  moment  we  are  dealing  with  a  foreign  people, 
a  totally  new  conception  of  government  appears. 
We  ask  to  be  led  by  a  man  to  whom  we  give  su- 
preme power.  We  form  behind  him  and  obey.  We 
try  to  forget  all  our  differences ;  we  drop  conten- 
tious issues,  declare  a  truce,  and  make  every  effort 
to  be  unanimous.  We  believe  that  unanimity 
should  be  purchased  at  almost  any  price — if  neces- 
sary at  the  price  of  our  deepest  convictions.  "  My 
country  right  or  wrong,"  and  no  reservations  al- 
lowed. Free  criticism  disappears,  a  great  same- 
ness descends  upon  the  minds  of  men.  In  it  we  feel 
the  premonition  of  war — that  hardening  of  nerve 
and  body,  that  awful  concentration  which  is  a  na- 
tion's power.  ^ 

It  is  deeper  than  all  reason.  [Th^  sense  of  an 
enemy  makes  us  huddle  together  for  defense  and 
offense.  The  psychologists  of  war  are  right.  We 
forget  ourselves,  our  ambitions,  our  ideas,  our  lives. 
No  one  in  time  of  peace  can  imagine  the  change 
which  external  danger  brings.  That  is  why  no  one 
can  understand  how  commonplace  is  courage. 
Clerks  who  were  timid  about  asking  for  a  half- 
holiday  face  machine-guns.    War,  or  the  sense  of 


36  THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

war,  does  indeed  bring  that  simplification  of  the 
spirit  which  its  eulogists  glorify.  It  almost  ob- 
literates personality,  and  throws  us  back  into  a 
herd  with  animal  loves  and  animal  hates.  Some 
call  it  an  unimaginably  great  experience.  A  young 
German  girl  whose  husband  fell  at  Ypres  wrote  to 
me  of  "  Zeiten  unendlich  gross."  She  had  forgot- 
ten herself,  him,  her  baby,  her  future.  She  was 
welded  into  the  power  of  Germany,  as  the  fingers 
are  welded  into  a  clenched  fist. 

Our  instincts  are  not  different  from  hers.  In 
every  essential  respect  we  believe  that  external 
danger  requires  complete  and  submissive  unity. 
Patriotism,  then,  means  that  a  hundred  million 
people  shall  fuse  so  that  no  division  is  visible  from 
the  outside.  We  secure  external  strength  by  inner 
harmony.  That  is  the  diplomatic  and  military 
value  of  unanimity.  Danger  requires  us  to  be  as 
"  one  man."  But  it  obscures  with  a  horrible 
shadow  the  differences  of  many  men  out  of  which 
is  born  the  curiosity  of  civilized  life. 

'  External  danger  makes  us  revert  from  the  demo- 
cratic to  the  dynastic  conception  of  the  state^ 
When  we  become  "  one  man,"  we  become  so  in  the 
same  sense  that  Germany  personifies  itself  in  the 


THE  USES  OF  A  KING  37 

Emperor,  or  England  in  the  Crown.  The  "  one 
man  "  that  danger  fuses  us  into  is  not  a  living 
person  named  William  Hohenzollern,  but  it  serves 
the  same  purpose.  For  when  sovereignty  passed 
from  the  monarch  to  the  people,  it  did  not  lose  its 
character.  The  sovereign  people  in  its  dealing  with 
foreign  powers  has  not  ceased  to  be  dynastic.  The 
virtue  of  kings,  their  morality,  their  honor,  and 
many  of  their  ambitions  remain  in  this  new  sov- 
ereign— the  people  acting  as  "  one  man."  Foreign 
affairs  are  in  fact  the  last  stronghold  of  court 
etiquette  and  royal  tradition.  In  their  dealings 
with  foreign  powers,  even  republics  act  as  mon- 
archs,  because  they  have  enthroned  the  people  in- 
stead of  destroying  the  throne. 


CHAPTER  III 

FOREIGNERS  AND  FRONTIERS 

When  a  family  quarrels,  the  hostilities  are  not 
regarded  as  worthy  of  public  notice  until  there  is 
what  people  call  a  "  break."  The  husband  rushes 
off  to  his  saloon  or  his  club,  slamming  the  door 
behind  him ;  the  wife  takes  to  her  room,  slamming 
the  door  behind  her.  Then  lawyers  can  be  engaged, 
the  friends  and  relatives  can  line  up,  and  disorderly 
friction  is  turned  into  an  orderly  battle.  When 
civil  war  breaks  out  in  a  country,  no  real  fighting 
is  possible  until  the  contending  factions  are  or- 
ganized on  separate  territory.  The  more  compact 
the  two  territories  are,  the  more  cleanly  they  divide 
a  country,  the  better  for  the  fighting,  the  nearer 
the  whole  business  is  to  a  real  war.  Two  popula- 
tions cannot  fight  successfully  if  they  are  entirely 
inteflaced.  Our  own  Civil  War  was  one  of  the 
completest  wars  in  history  because  the  North  and 
the  South  were  not  only  pretty  clearly  divided  in 
territory,  they  were  separate  in  their  culture  and 

38 


FOREIGNERS  AND  FRONTIERS         39 

tradition.     Unless  you  can  find  some  territorial 
division  upon  which  to  base  political  differences,  it 
is  impossible  to  turn  civil  war  into  anything  more 
than  a  riot.     A  frontier  is  necessary  to  organized  .^ 
fighting. 

Experience  with  the  industrial  struggle  bears 
this  out.  The  strikes  which  have  produced  large 
violence  always  take  place  in  regions  where  labor 
and  capital  can  really  pair  off.  In  the  bloody  West 
Virginia  struggle,  the  miners  were  in  gullies  and 
on  the  slopes  of  the  mountains ;  the  operators  and 
their  agents  did  not  live  in  the  same  community 
with  them.  When  you  find  a  town  or  a  county 
completely  devoted  to  one  industry,  with  the  own- 
ers living  in  another  city,  there  you  have  the  mak- 
ings of  civil  war.  This  was  the  case  in  Colorado 
and  in  Calumet.  The  segregation  of  the  two 
sides  makes  possible  a  real  line-up  of  fighting 
forces.  But  in  a  highly  complicated  city  each 
side  is  diluted  by  the  presence  of  those  neutrals  who 
constitute  what  is  called  the  public,  and  a  long, 
bitter,  lighting  strike  is  far  less  possible.  There 
are  no  frontiers  behind  which  to  organize  a  class 
war. 

That  is  why  governments  can  indulge  in  supreme 


40  THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

violence.  The  opponent  is  an  alien,  and  the  ter- 
ritorial division  is  as  strategically  perfect  as 
diplomacy  can  make  it.  Two  nations  don't  have 
to  "  break  "  as  a  family  does ;  they  are  already 
"  broken  "  and  proud  of  it.  They  don't  have  to 
improvise  frontiers  as  revolutionists  do.  They 
don't  have  to  contend  with  the  same  amount  of 
corrosive  neutral  opinion.  When  you  start  a  civil 
war,  you  never  know  how  much  the  interlacing 
of  classes  and  interests  will  spoil  your  plans ;  but 
in  an  international  war  every  impulse  of  patriot- 
ism works  to  cut  the  cross-frontier  loyalties  and 
solidify  the  populations.  The  more  perfect  the 
spiritual  division  of  the  two  nations  the  better  is 
their  military  morale. 

It  is  no  accident  that  the  eulogists  of  war,  the 
jingoes,  the  aggressive  nationalists,  and  pug- 
nacious people  generally,  are  at  the  same  time  the 
devotees  of  Pure  Races,  and  the  implacable  enemies 
of  mixed  populations,  or  loose  and  tolerant  states. 
A  varied  population  is  a  weakness  in  war,  espe- 
cially if  it  lives  in  a  country  free  enough  to  allow 
the  different  peoples  civil  equality.  Once  you  fill  a 
territory  with  a  population  mixed  in  its  sympathies 
you  destroy  that  unity  which  successful  war  re- 


FOREIGNERS  AND  FRONTIERS  41 

quires.  It  would  be  easier  for  the  United  States 
to  fight  Japan  than  Germany ;  it  was  a  very  ticklish 
business  for  the  British  Empire,  with  its  large  Mo- 
hammedan population,  to  fight  the  Turks.  The 
great  variety  of  the  Empire  makes  war  difficult, 
for  the  enemy's  friends  and  spiritual  relations  are 

likely  to  be  its  own  citizens.    That  is  why  military 

C 
men  are  not  fond  of  tolerance.     They  are  almost 

always  ready  to  sanction  racial  oppression — to 
Russify,  Germanize,  Magj'^arize,  or  Anglicize  if 
possible.  I  don't  mean  to  say  that  the  military 
authorities  always  initiate  racial  intolerance.  The 
causes  of  that  lie  deeper.  But  they  will  generally 
support  it  for  the  best  of  professional  reasons. 
To  them  an  alien  culture  is  a  potential  enemy 
within  the  gates,  and  so  offensive  power  abroad  is 
likely  to  be  accompanied  by  intolerance  and  op- 
pression at  home. 

I  once  heard  the  most  important  officer  in  the 
American  army  argue  for  military  preparedness. 
He  addressed  us  as  young  men  of  a  "  class  which 
had  something  to  lose,"  and  before  he  had  finished 
his  speech  had  referred  to  the  need  for  troops  who 
could  "  shoot  to  kill "  in  a  strike,  had  described 
EUis  Island  as  a  "  human  sewer,"  and  laid  some 


42  THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

pretty  insult  upon  the  "  niggers."  He  is  regarded 
as  an  unusually  cultivated  officer,  and  he  was  ap- 
pealing to  us  as  good  Americans.  It  never  oc- 
curred to  him  that  he  was  a  traitor  to  the  very 
Americanism  for  which  a  civilized  person  might 
lay  down  his  life.  I  understood  Zabern  then, 
and  the  revolt  of  the  British  army  officers  in 
Ulster;  I  understood  why  liberals  the  world  over 
are  so  much  afraid  of  militarism. 

The  true  ideal  of  the  military  man  is  necessarily 
a  solidified  population.  If  he  advocates  anything 
else,  it  is  because  his  democratic  citizenship  has 
weakened  him.  For  his  whole  training  prejudices 
him  in  favor  of  obedience  and  uniformity,  making 
him  instinctively  unfriendly  to  tolerant  govern- 
ments and  varied  populations.  The  military  tradi- 
tion is  also  suspicious  of  commercial  life.  No  se- 
verer denunciation  of  sordid  business  can  be  read 
than  in  the  utterances  of  officers.  They  often  in- 
sist that  commerce  is  ignoble;  they  will  contrast 
the  sacrifice  of  the  soldier  with  the  selfishness  of  the 
trader,  and  many  of  them  say  that  war  is  a  holy 
thing  just  because  it  calls  out  so  many  non-com- 
mercial qualities. 

This  feeling  appears  most  candidly  in  a  book  by 


FOREIGNERS  AND  FRONTIERS         43 

the  German  Crown  Prince  called  Deutschland  in 
Waff  en — (Germany  in  Arms).      He  writes: 

"  Since  the  last  big  war  Germany  has  passed 
through  a  period  of  economic  development,  which  has 
something  disconcerting  about  it.  The  standard  of 
living  has  risen  so  much  for  all  classes  of  our  peo- 
ple, that  the  demands  for  necessities  "and  luxuries 
have  grown  considerably.  Certainly  one  ought  not 
imgratefully  to  deny  that  a  higher  economic  de- 
velopment does  much  good.  But  the  dark  sides  of 
this  too  quick  development  appear  painfully  and 
threateningly  in  many  ways.  Already  the  desire 
for  money  has  taken  hold  of  us  with  such  strength, 
that  one  can  only  contemplate  it  with  anxiety.  .  .  . 
The  old  ideals — even  the  pride  and  the  honor  of  the 
nation  may  be  sympathetically  affected;  for  to  make 
money  without  disturbance,  peace  is  required,  peace 
at  any  price." 

A  democrat  might  say  that  to  cure  the  evils  of 
commercialism  by  precipitating  war  was  like  burn- 
ing down  the  house  to  roast  the  pig.  But  he  had 
better  reserve  his  comment,  and  try  to  understand. 
The  opposition  of  the  military  idealist  is  not  alone 
to  the  evils  of  commercialism;  it  governs  all  his 
social  theories.  Fighting  men  are  not  only  afraid 
of  confused  populations;  they  are  inclined  to 
oppose  the  specialization  of  international  trade. 


44.  THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

The  J  would  prefer,  for  obvious  military  reasons, 
to  have  a  country  self-sufficient  within  its  own 
borders.  Thus  the  military  party  in  Germany 
has  been  in  alliance  with  the  agrarians  in  their 
long  struggle  against  industry.  These  men  saw 
truly  according  to  their  lights.  The  Germans  are 
a  better  fighting  people,  better  able  to  withstand 
British  sea  power  because  the  Junkers  dominated 
their  domestic  pohcy.  The  more  a  country  de- 
velops its  export  trade,  the  more  it  lives  by  ex- 
change with  other  nations,  the  greater  is  the 
difficulty  of  waging  war.  And  if  there  must  be 
export  trade,  the  war  party  will  clamor  for  a  mer- 
chant marine  to  carry  it  and  a  navy  large  enough 
to  protect  it. 

To  men  who  think  in  terms  of  national  conflict, 
the  plight  of  the  United  States  with  its  shipping 
controlled  by  England  is  an  actual  menace  to  our 
"independence."  We  have  given  a  hostage  to 
fortune,  as  all  cooperators  must.  And  every  time 
these  people  read  that  New  York  is  becoming  the 
money  center  of  the  world  their  hearts  rejoice. 
They  are  indefatigable  separatists,  and  the  spec- 
tacle of  nations  so  bound  together  that  war  is 
almost  an  impossibility  is  a  vision  which  frightens 


FOREIGNERS  AND  FRONTIERS         45 

them.  They  know  that  world-wide  markets  are 
corroding  frontiers,  creating  supcmational  group- 
ings, and  mixing  the  populations.  But  their  ideal 
calls  for  a  "  pure "  race,  a  single  nationality, 
strategic  frontiers,  a  unanimous  people,  and  a  self- 
sufficing  industrial  system.  No  wonder  they  shake 
their  heads.  The  process  of  fusion  has  gone  so  far 
that  war  itself  has  ceased  to  be  a  national  enter- 
prise. The  separate  sovereignties  have  been  partly 
merged  into  alliances. 

It  would  be  a  great  mistake,  however,  to  over- 
estimate either  the  intermixture  of  people  or  the 
erosion  of  frontiers.  The  process  is  very  young 
to-day,  and  it  has  not  gone  very  deep.  On  the 
whole,  nations  still  live  on  their  own  territory,  sur- 
rounded by  frontiers  over  which  few  people  ever 
look.  Inside  those  frontiers  they  have  abolished 
many  smaller  ones  and  ended  many  old  sacred 
states'  rights.  Within  these  areas  some  democ 
racy  can  prevail.  But  when  two  organized  lands 
deal  with  each  other,  they  are  dealing  with  for- 
eigners, each  focused  into  a  sovereignty  and  there- 
fore run  not  on  the  democratic  but  on  the  dynastic 
principle.  They  settle  differences  by  negotiation 
or  by  war. 


46  THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

For  these  their  internal  democracy  is  an  actual 
weakness,  and  so  the  most  advanced  republics  are 
autocratic  in  the  management  of  foreign  affairs. 
They  are  autocratic  because  democracy  can  never 
deal  with  an  affair  that  is  "  foreign."  _ 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE  LINE  OF  LEAST  RESISTANCE 

Because  a  whole  people  clamors  for  a  war,  and 
gets  it,  there  is  no  ground  for  calling  the  war 
democratic.  One  might  just  as  well  call  the  sub- 
jection of  negroes  democratic  because  the  whole 
white  South  desires  it,  or  acquiesce  in  the  oppres- 
sion of  Slavs  because  the  Magyars  are  united  in 
its  favor.  The  mere  fact  that  a  whole  mass  of 
people  is  unanimous  doesn't  make  their  decision  a 
democratic  one.  This  isn't  because  democracies 
are  not  capable  of  evil,  or  because  I  as  a  democrat 
would  prefer  to  call  whatever  I  don't  like  undemo- 
cratic. It  is  because  a  thing  can  be  popular  and 
still  lack  the  very  essence  of  democracy.  Kings, 
lynchings,  and  crusades  can  be  popular,  but  they 
are  not  democratic  because  the  interests  of  all 
groups  concerned  have  not  entered  into  the  making 
of  them.    Democracy  is  a  meaningless  word  unless 

it  signifies  that  differences  of  opinion  have  been 

47 


48  THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

expressed,  represented,  and  even  satisfied  in  the 
decision. 

But  in  the  relation  of  governments,  the  opposi- 
tions live  on  two  sides  of  a  frontier.  When  there 
is  an  issue  to  be  settled,  each  side  formulates  its 
demands — expresses  what  it  regards  as  its  vital 
interest — and  calls  that  its  sovereign  will.  The  two 
diplomats  who  actually  speak  for  the  sovereign 
will  start  with  the  infatuation  that  whatever  they 
say  has  a  peculiar  sanctity.  To  be  tentative,  ex- 
perimental, flexible,  to  be  human  and  sensible  in 
their  dealings,  is  not  compatible  with  complete  sov- 
ereignty. They  are  haunted  by  the  ghost  of  a 
king,  who  held  his  power  by  divine  grace  and  was 
inclined  to  regard  his  opinions  as  infallible.  These 
older  habits  of  mind  survive  in  the  relations  of 
governments  long  after  they  have  perished  in  the 
relations  of  men.  Within  our  borders  we  may  be 
a  commonwealth;  we  try  to  face  the  world  as  a 
sovereign.  That  is  why  international  morality  is 
so  unlike  private  morality.  Nations  hold  to  the 
theory  that  they  are  sovereign — which  comes  pretty 
close  to  meaning  that  they  can  do  no  wrong.  They 
have  a  "  right  "  to  organize  violence,  a  "  right  '* 
to  refuse  arbitration,  a  "  right  "  to  follow  their 


THE  LINE  OF  LEAST  RESISTANCE       49 

own  "  interests."  There  may  be  a  few  conventions 
of  honor  or  expediency  which  they  won't  violate, 
but  their  obedience  is  part  of  their  sovereign  will, 
an  accidental  decency  in  the  midst  of  their  supreme 
pretensions. 

In  other  words,  there  are  sections  of  the  globe 
marked  off  by  frontiers.  Within  those  sections 
live  masses  of  people  organized  in  governments. 
Some  of  these  governments  exist  by  consent,  others 
by  choice,  others  by  hereditary  power.  In  theory 
these  governments  are  all  of  them  sovereign,  and 
anything  they  desire  or  ask  for  is  judged  not  on 
its  merits  alone.  The  opinions  of  a  sovereign  have 
a  mystical  importance.  They  are  easily  identified 
with  the  opinions  of  God,  and  it  is  hard  for  God  to 
back  down. 

The  curious  thing  is  that  the  inhabitants  of  a 
country  rarely  dispute  the  external  sovereignty  of 
their  government.  They  may  know  as  a  matter  of 
bitter  experience  that  their  rulers  are  a  corrupt, 
stupid,  reactionary  group  of  men.  But  when  those 
rulers  "speak  to  a  foreign  people,  these  opinions 
acquire  an  almost  supernatural  importance.  They 
become  the  "  national  will,"  and  men  will  be 
maimed,  and  starved,  and  frozen,  and  killed  for 


50  THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

them.  It  seems  as  if  foreign  politics  tapped  deeper 
levels  of  habit  and  instinct  than  domestic  affairs. 
They  are  notoriously  less  reasonable,  more  touchy, 
and  more  inflammable.  Men  think  less  about  them 
and  sacrifice  more  for  them.  They  blur  personality 
and  education,  and  evoke  buried  loyalties  and  an- 
cient pugnacity. 

Now  in  a  consideration  of  the  differences  between 
the  psychology  of  domestic  and  of  foreign  politics, 
the  most  striking  difference  appears  to  be  this: 
/in  domestic  affairs  we^  live  with  and  know  the  men 
who  disagree  with  us ;  in  foreign  affairs  the  oppo- 
sition lives  behind  a  frontier,  and  probably  speaks 
a  different  language.  Simple  and  obvious  as  this 
sounds,  the  consequences  are  enormous.  Thus  when 
a  nation  crystallizes  its  feelings,  it  does  so  prac- 
tically unopposed.  The  average  man  meets  al- 
most nobody  who  disagrees  with  him.  It  is  like 
being  in  the  old  solid  South  where  men  lived  and 
died  without  ever  having  met  anyone  who  wasn't  a 
Democrat.  The  people  all  know  what  their  gov- 
ernment permits  them  to  know,  and  the  habit  of 
imitation  is  uncorrected — ^the  state  of  feeling 
grows  by  its  sheer  unanimity  until  disagreement 
becomes  positively  dangerous.     All  the  people  we 


THE  LINE  OF  LEAST  RESISTANCE       51 

know  think  alike — people  who  disagree  about  every- 
thing else  agree  about  our  relation  to  the  for- 
eigner. Of  course,  such  an  opinion  acquires  sanc- 
tity, seems  supreme,  and  takes  on  the  airs  of  a 
sovereign.  It  is  like  the  opinion  of  an  only  child — 
being  the  only  opinion  in  his  universe,  he  defies 
anyone  to  thwart  it.  And  the  person  who  does 
thwart  it  seems  very  wicked  indeed.  All  our  pas- 
sion runs  freely  into  our  demands,  is  "  let  loose  " 
because  it  is  not  civilized  by  opposition. 

In  fact,  opposition  is  about  the  only  incentive 
we  have  to  practice  reason  and  tolerance.  Unless 
our  ideas  are  questioned,  they  become  part  of  the 
furniture  of  eternity.  It  is  only  by  incessant 
criticism,  by  constant  rubbing  in  of  differences, 
that  any  of  our  ideas  remain  human  and  decent. 
The  easy  way  is  when  we  are  not  opposed.  That 
enables  us  to  be  dogmatic,  and  to  regard  whatever 
we  happen  to  believe  as  of  sovereign  value. 

To  keep  a  faith  pure,  man  had  better  retire  to  a 
monastery.  Where  all  think  alike,  no  one  thinks 
very  much.  But  whatever  he  does  think,  he  can 
think  with  all  his  soul.  It  is  at  the  cross-roads 
that  skepticism  is  born,  not  in  a  hermitage.  With- 
out contact  and  friction,  without  experience,  in 


52  THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

short,  our  animal  loyalties  are  supreme.  Thought 
is  not  made  in  a  vacuum,  nor  created  out  of  like- 
ness. It  requires  travel  and  shipping  and  the  com- 
ing and  going  of  strangers  to  impregnate  a  civiliza- 
tion. That  is  why  thought  has  flourished  in  cities 
which  lie  along  the  paths  of  communication. 
Nineveh,  Athens,  Alexandria,  Rome,  Venice,  the 
Hansa  towns,  London,  Paris — they  have  made 
ideas  out  of  the  movement  and  contact  of  many 
people.  Men  are  jostled  into  thought.  Left  alone 
they  spin  the  same  thread  from  the  same  dream. 
''a  community  which  is  self-contained  and  homo- 
geneous and  secluded  is  intellectually  deaf,  dumb, 
and  blind.  It  can  cultivate  robust  virtue  and  sim- 
ple dogmatism,  but  it  will  not  invent  or  throw  out 
a  profusion  of  ideas. 

In  places  where  men  are  used  to  differences 
they  inevitably  become  tolerant.  Within  modem 
communities  this  rubbing  together  of  differences 
has  gone  far  enough  to  cover  most  political  strife 
with  a  decent  humanity.  But  there  are  some 
clashes  even  within  a  country  which  are  fought 
upon  a  different  plane.  Where  workingmen  are 
new  immigrants  and  live  almost  completely  shut 
off  from  the  rest  of  the  people,  wherever  class 


THE  LINE  OF  LEAST  RESISTANCE       53 

division  is  very  acute,  there  the  industrial  struggle 
is  fought  with  special  bitterness.  Each  side  is 
dogmatic  and  simple-minded;  there  is  not  enough 
contact  and  experience  to  produce  much  thought. 
Each  side  attributes  sovereignty  to  its  opinions, 
and  feels  very  exalted  about  them. 

When  we  deal  with  a  foreign  people,  our  passion 
is  not  diluted  by  opposition.  We  are  consequently 
not  in  the  least  sicklied  o'er  by  the  pale  cast  of 
thought,  and  neither  conscience  nor  consciousness 
makes  cowards  of  us.  Ideas  which  are  agreed  to  by 
everyone  we  know,  ideas  which  are  sanctioned  by 
all  the  authorities  we  have  ever  followed,  are  sov- 
ereign ideas.  They  have  a  weight  which  no  do- 
mestic opinion  can  have.  Just  because  we  have 
had  no  incentive  to  doubt  them,  we  cannot  see  why 
they  should  be  contradicted.  To  disagree  with 
them,  then,  is  to  attack  us,  to  deny  our  right  to 
sovereignty.  In  this  sense  all  wars  are  defensive. 
They  defend  our  desire  to  be  unopposed. 

What  is  called  "  jingoism  "  finds  a  butt  In  the 
foreigner  simply  because  a  *'  foreigner  "  is  a  per- 
son you  don't  live  with,  don't  meet,  about  whom 
you  are  naive,  who  remains  alien  and  opaque,  who 
doesn't  stimulate  different  ideas  or  create  the  com- 


54  THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

plexlty  of  feeling  which  is  the  atmosphere  of  rea- 
son. Nobody  pleads  the  foreigner's  cause  very 
strenuously.  It  is  difficult,  requiring  much  in- 
formation and  much  courage.  Moreover,  it  is  a 
thankless  task  which  almost  always  evokes  tribal 
suspicion.  The  peacemaker  is  easily  identified 
with  the  alien,  as  Lord  Haldane  has  been  identified 
with  the  Germans.  He  is  "  against  his  own  coun- 
try," which  means  that  he  is  trying  to  correct  the 
passionate  trend  of  his  fellow-citizens.  His  ideas 
are  rarely  judged  on  their  merits,  because  they 
rest  on  knowledge  with  which  the  community  is 
not  at  home. 

It  is  small  wonder  that  newspapers  are  in  the 
main  instruments  of  irritation  between  peoples.  I 
leave  out  of  account  here  the  deliberately  pacifist 
press  as  well  as  the  reptile  press  of  the  war  parties. 
It  is  the  ordinary  middle-class  newspapers  which  I 
have  in  mind,  the  papers  run  as  commercial  enter- 
prises. With  all  their  faults  admitted,  no  one  can 
possibly  assert  that  their  owners  are  criminal 
enough  to  provoke  war.  Yet  in  almost  every  crisis 
the  tension  is  increased  by  the  newspapers. 

The  reason  is  in  part  that  war  is  more  sensa- 
tional than  peace — the  possibility  of  conflict  is  a 


THE  LINE  OF  LEAST  RESISTANCE       55 

cheaper  and  more  obvious  form  of  news.  It  is 
hard  to  conceive  of  a  newspaper  breaking  out  into 
lurid  headlines  to  announce  in  time  of  peace  that 
"  good  will  between  Japan  and  the  United  States 
is  on  the  increase."  It  would  sound  silly.  The 
press  cannot  shout  about  the  aggression  that  will 
not  take  place,  or  announce  with  joy  the  markets 
that  are  not  coveted.  Indeed,  any  attempt  to  do 
it  would  be  regarded  as  suspicious.  Men  would 
say  that  the  news  was  intended  to  conceal  some- 
thing. No  one  has  discovered  a  way  of  making 
good  will,  harmony,  reasonableness,  easily  dra- 
matic. In  overwhelming  measure  the  news  of 
the  day  is  the  news  of  trouble  and  conflict.  Those 
journals  which  devote  themselves  to  telling  of 
the  real  advances  of  mankind — the  technological 
progress,  the  administrative  triumphs,  the  con- 
quests of  prejudice — are  not  popular.  They  lack 
the  "  punch." 

To  this  condition  of  news-reporting,  interna- 
tional affairs  have  to  conform.  As  the  negotia- 
tions of  governments  are  conducted  with  loaded 
weapons  at  hand,  and  with  the  pretension  to  sov- 
ereignty by  both  sides,  almost  any  international 
situation  contains  news  of  trouble.     At  the  same 


56  THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

time  the  editor  is  publisliing  his  paper  for  a  com- 
munity in  which  the  opposition  is  probably  not 
represented.  It  is  easy  and  natural  for  him  to  take 
a  "  strong  "  stand.  A  "  strong  "  stand  is  the 
least  dangerous,  for  it  flatters  everybody,  produces 
an  exhilarating  sense  of  importance,  risks  no  of- 
fense to  any  significant  section  of  his  readers.  A 
*'  weak  "  stand,  a  reasonable,  complicated  desire 
for  adjustment,  is  a  costly  and  thankless  task  for 
an  editor.  It  means  that  he  appeals  to  thought 
which  is  pale  rather  than  to  lusts  which  are  strong. 
He  appears  academic,  mugwumpish,  unmanly. 
And  though  it  requires  the  highest  kind  of  courage 
to  run  against  patriotic  sentiment,  he  is  likely  to 
be  called  a  coward. 

Sympathy  for  foreigners  is  the  most  disinter- 
ested and  civilized  form  of  sympathy.  It  is  not 
difficult  to  understand  why  editors  display  so  little 
of  it.  There  is  almost  no  incentive  to  understand 
foreign  peoples.  They  are  distant.  They  speak 
a  foreign  language.  They  do  not  often  reward 
their  friends  in  another  land.  At  home,  the  editor 
faces  the  fact  that  ignorance  and  distrust  of  the 
alien  is  the  most  natural  and  the  cheapest  channel 
into  which  high  passion  and  united  feeling  can 


THE  LINE  OF  LEAST  RESISTANCE       57 

flow.  It  is  the  greatest  object  of  uncorrected  en- 
thusiasm, the  greatest  drama  in  which  the  villain  is 
neither  an  advertiser  nor  a  reader  of  the  news- 
paper. It  is  one  field  of  interest  where  people  are 
at  once  unanimous  and  excited,  and  not  many  edi- 
tors have  the  strength  to  resist  cultivating  that 
field.  Then,  too,  the  editor  is  himself  a  member 
of  the  community  subject  to  the  same  influences. 
He  is  a  good  American  or  a  good  Britisher,  some- 
times a  somewhat  professionally  good  patriot.  In 
following  the  easiest  way,  which  is  the  way  of  irri- 
tation, he  is  not  guilty  of  any  malevolent  plan. 
He  does  it  with  a  good  conscience,  for  the  human 
conscience  is  never  so  much  at  ease  as  when  it 
follows  the  line  of  least  resistance.  Only  saints, 
heroes,  and  specialists  in  virtue  feel  remorse  be- 
cause they  have  done  what  everybody  was  doing 
and  agreed  with  what  everybody  was  thinking. 


CHAPTER  V 
PATRIOTISM  IN  THE  ROUGH 

"And  the  man  removed  from  his  country  has  torn 
from  his  shoulders  the  net  of  human  relationship 
wherein  he  might  have  learnt  love,  which  so  greatly 
fortifies  the  will  to  live.  Never  will  he  be  knit  to 
many  people  by  laughter  over  local  jokes,  never 
will  he  join  with  strangers  in  the  shamelessly  un- 
tuneful  singing  of  old  songs  about  past  national 
glories.  .  .  .  Only  in  one's  own  country  is  the  rose 
of  life  planted  where  one  would  have  it,  shaped  as 
far  as  could  be  by  the  will  of  one's  own  people, 
nourished  by  one's  own  blood."— From  an  article  on 
"Redemption  and  Dostoevskv,"  by  Rebecca  West— 
published  in  The  New  Republic,  July  10,  1915. 

"  And  yet,  when  one  attempts  to  define  '  a  nation,' 
one  finds  the  definition  impossible.  Language,  race, 
geographical  area,  past  history,  manners  and  customs, 
origins,  religions,  ideals,  all  enter  into  its  realization. 
But  ultimately  one  is  obliged  to  fall  back  upon  the 
assertion  that  a  nation  exists  where  its  component 
atoms  believe  it  to  be  a  nation;  where  they  are  will- 
ing to  live  for  and  to  die  for  a  mystical  entity  whose 
life  includes  the  lives  of  all  the  individuals,  but  whose 
life  transcends  the  lives  of  those  individuals."— TAe 
Nation  (London),  June  26,  1915. 

To  Robert  E.  Lee  the  mystical  entity  was  not 

the  United  States  but  Virginia  ;  to  many  Canadians 

and   Australians    to-day    the    mystical    entity    is 

that  quarter  of  the  human  race  which  is  organized 

58 


PATRIOTISM  IN  THE  ROUGH  59 

in  the  British  Empire.  Once  there  were  about 
three  hundred  mystical  entities  on  German  terri- 
tory, each  with  its  local  jokes  and  old  songs  sung 
out  of  tune.  But  the  local  jokes  have  of  late  em- 
braced the  railway  to  Bagdad,  and  the  old  songs 
were  heard  in  Kiao-Chow.  Men  lived  and  died  for 
that  mystical  entity  known  as  the  fortress  of 
Tsing-tao  with  its  hinterland  of  coal  mines.  And 
yet  I  take  it  that  this  inflated  national  sentiment 
is  in  origin  the  same  as  the  love  of  Mecklenburg- 
Schwerin  or  the  intense  pride  of  the  inhabitants  of 
Kokomo,  Indiana. 

There  is  a  famous  piece  of  practical  wisdom  fre- 
quently offered  to  young  men  from  small  towns. 
"  It  is  better,"  the  saying  goes,  "  to  be  it  in  Mid- 
dleburg  than  nit  in  New  York."  It  is  also  easier, 
not  only  because  there  are  less  people  in  Middle- 
burg,  but  because,  as  Rebecca  West  says  in  the 
passage  quoted  at  the  head  of  this  chapter,  only 
in  Middleburg  is  the  rose  of  life  planted  where 
one  would  have  it,  shaped  as  far  as  could  be  by  the 
wiU  of  one's  own  people,  nourished  by  one's  own 
blood. 

Nationality  is  a  word  from  the  Latin.  It  de- 
notes  birth.     But  quite  naturally  it  has  come  to 


60  THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

mean  something  more  than  physical  birth.  It 
covers  our  first  loyalty,  our  first  impressions,  our 
earliest  associations.  It  is  at  bottom  a  cluster  of 
primitive  feelings,  absorbed  into  a  man  and  rooted 
within  him  long  before  conscious  education  begins. 
The  house,  the  street,  the  meadow  and  hill  upon 
which  he  first  opened  his  eyes,  the  reactions  to 
family  and  strangers  which  remain  as  types  of 
his  loves  and  hates,  the  earliest  sounds  which 
brought  fear  and  pleasure — these  are  the  stuff  out 
of  which  nationality  is  made.  They  constitute  the 
ultimate  background  of  the  mind,  its  first  culture 
and  the  most  tenacious  one.  What  comes  after  is 
a  compromise  with  this  infantile  accumulation.  It 
modifies,  and  is  modified  by  it.  But  in  the  open- 
ing environment  the  directions  of  taste  and 
prejudice  are  given,  each  person  takes  on  his  "  na- 
tional "  character.  His  subtlest  bents  are  deter- 
mined, a  pervasive  flavor  is  given  to  his  spirit,  he 
learns  loves  and  hates  that  are  never  altogether 
forgotten.  His  childish  prayers  are  always  a 
little  nearer  to  his  heart  than  any  other;  the  lan- 
guage of  his  nursery  is  the  speech  of  his  soul.  It 
may  be  buried  under  much  later  experience,  forgot- 
ten perhaps  beyond  easy  recall.     But  it  does  not 


PATRIOTISM  IN  THE  ROUGH  6l 

perish.    It  is  the  form  of  his  most  obscure  impulse, 
the  original  quality  of  his  mind. 

In  time  of  easy  prosperity  we  are  very  little 
aware  of  it.  We  seem  to  live  in  the  superficial 
layers  of  character.  But  when  war  breaks  out,  or 
threatening  uncertainty,  there  is  a  swift  retreat 
into  our  origins.  We  become  intensely  aware  of 
the  earliest  things  with  which  we  were  associated; 
we  love  the  security  where  we  were  bom,  we  huddle 
to  the  people  with  whom  we  played  as  children ;  the 
gods  grown  old  in  our  skeptical  maturity  live  again 
to  comfort  us,  the  ancient  battles  we  thrilled  over, 
the  old  pretensions  that  made  us  exalt,  become  once 
more  the  active  substance  of  our  minds.  The  past 
that  is  warm  with  our  childish  loyalty,  the  alleys 
and  the  rookeries  where  we  first  met  the  world, 
are  transfigured  in  memory.  They  are  us,  more 
poignant  than  recent  attachments,  deeper  than  all 
later  theories.  Whatever  conflicts  with  thera 
breaks  down.  We  cannot  imagine  anything  to  be 
right  or  worthy  which  these  dumb  aff'ections  do  not 
sanction.' 

"  We  can  see  for  the  first  time,"  said  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  recently,  "  the  fundamental  things  that 
matter  in  life  and  that  have  been  obscured  from  our 


62  THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

vision  bj  the  tropical  growth  of  prosperity."  The 
fundamental  things  in  life  are  just  these  earliest 
loyalties,  for  they  seem  to  survive  the  breakage  of 
everything  else.  When  they  go  in  some  over- 
whelming panic,  man  disintegrates  into  an  animal 
striving  to  preserve  a  life  that  his  deepest  loyalties 
will  prevent  him  from  enjoying.  That  is  what 
cowardice  is,  a  kind  of  brute  disavowal  of  those 
early  associations  which  no  man  can  have  dis- 
avowed and  live  at  ease.  Lord  Jim  did  it  in  Con- 
rad's novel,  and  he  suffered  as  all  people  do  who 
have  poisoned  the  sources  of  their  being. 

What  is  called  pride  of  race  is  the  sense  that 
our  origins  are  worthy  of  respect.  It  is  hard  for 
a  freed  slave  to  be  happy ;  it  is  hard  for  a  bastard 
to  avoid  that  furtiveness  which  dogs  the  soul.  Man 
must  be  at  peace  with  the  sources  of  his  life.  If 
he  is  ashamed  of  them,  if  he  is  at  war  with  them, 
thej'  will  haunt  him  forever.  They  will  rob  him  of 
the  basis  of  assurance,  leave  him  an  interloper  in 
the  world.  When  we  speak  of  thwarted  nationality 
like  that  of  the  Irish,  the  Jews,  the  Poles,  the 
Negroes,  we  mean  something  more  intimate  than 
political  subjection.  We  mean  a  kind  of  homeless- 
ness  upon  the  planet,  a  homelessness  which  houses 


PATRIOTISM  IN  THE  ROUGH  63 

of  brick  can  obscure  but  never  remedy.  We  mean 
that  the  origins  upon  which  strength  feeds  and 
from  which  loyalty  rises — that  the  origins  of  these 
denationalized  people  have  been  hurt.  They  are 
the  children  of  a  broken  household,  and  they  are 
never  altogether  free.  They  are  never  quite  sure 
of  themselves.  This  uncertainty  may  take  many 
forms.  It  may  issue  in  futile  dreams  and  high- 
sounding  visions  of  a  past  that  is  irrevocable  or  of 
a  future  that  is  impossible.  It  may  issue  in  that 
over-assurance  which  is  so  often  the  mask  of 
shyness. 

Since  the  war  began,  the  Germans  in  America 
have  suffered  acutely  the  pains  of  denationaliza- 
tion. Almost  overnight  a  burst  of  hate  was  let 
loose  upon  the  Fatherland.  The  place  where  they 
were  bom  was  proclaimed  to  be  barbarous.  They 
were  practically  called  upon  to  denounce  Germany 
or  to  be  denounced  themselves.  The  country  to 
which  their  earliest  memories  were  attached  had 
become  a  moral  outlaw.  Of  course,  they  couldn't 
believe  it.'  It  was  the  scene  of  their  childhood.  It 
was  the  home  of  their  parents  and  childish  games ; 
reason  and  evidence  could  make  no  impression  upon 
what  their  hearts  told  them  was  warm.     At  the 


64  THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

same  time  they  had  a  newer  attachment  to  America, 
the  scene  of  their  ambitions.  A  more  cruel  choice 
was  never  offered  to  any  body  of  people.  The 
result  we  know — an  instinctive  devotion  to  Ger- 
many and  a  theoretical  devotion  to  America.  The 
hyphen  was  a  cut  between  their  dumb  but  deepest 
affections  and  their  conscious  duties.  Their 
spiritual  life  has  been  a  terrible  torment  to  them, 
and  their  efforts  to  find  a  decent  compromise  be- 
tween their  childhood  patriotism  and  their  mature 
citizenship  has  been  grotesque  when  it  wasn't 
pathetic. 

They  have  tried  every  kind  of  ingenuity.  They 
have  tried  to  twist  the  British  Lion's  tail,  and 
evoke  in  Americans  the  memory  of  conflicts  with 
England.  They  have  exalted  Germany  to  the 
heavens,  for  if  any  part  of  their  claims  were  be- 
lieved Germany  would  not  be  condemned  so  much. 
Their  loud,  persistent  declamation  about  German 
greatness  was  really  a  way  of  saying  to  Americans : 
"  You  should  not  look  down  upon  us.  We  are  the 
scions  of  a  noble  race.  Our  father's  house  is  a 
good  one,  and  you  mustn't  ask  us  to  despise  it." 

German- Americanism  might  be  described  as  a  re- 
treat into  an  earlier  piety.     The  strain  of  great 


PATRIOTISM  IN  THE  ROUGH  65 

events  resulted  in  a  sort  of  rush  of  blood  from  the 
head  to  the  heart,  from  mature  interests  to  childish 
memories.  It  wasn't  a  reasoned  study  of  the  causes 
of  the  war  which  produced  the  German  propa- 
ganda. It  was  something  far  deeper  and  much  less 
understood  than  that.  The  motives  were  not  in 
the  least  simple.  They  were  in  part  a  defensive 
movement,  an  attempt  to  save  the  social  standing 
of  German  things  in  America.  They  were  in  part 
a  desire  to  enhance  the  German  name  here  by  as- 
sociating it  with  a  mighty  empire.  I  know  one  of 
the  German-American  "  leaders  "  too  well  to  have 
any  serious  doubts  on  this  point.  The  discovery 
of  the  hyphen  was  the  making  of  him.  He  was 
interviewed,  talked  about,  cheered,  hissed,  and  if 
he  suffered  at  all,  he  endured  a  noble  public  pain, 
a  tragedy  enacted  on  a  dazzling  stage.  Such  sor- 
row many  men  enjoy  hugely. 

The  real  hurt  was  not  among  the  advertised 
figures  against  whom  the  editorials  were  written. 
It  was  among  the  voiceless  men  and  women  whose 
relatives  were  dying  in  Europe,  whose  standing  in 
America  was  threatened.  There  were  good  Amer- 
icans who  Increased  the  hurt ;  who  stopped  trading 
with  German  butchers,  who  discharged  German 


66  THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

servant  girls,  who  turned  around  and  scowled  when 
thej  heard  the  German  language  spoken.  They 
were  cutting  the  bonds  of  loyalty — they  were  help- 
ing to  hyphenate  our  population.  By  their  lack  of 
understanding,  irritated  no  doubt  by  the  vocifera- 
tions of  men  like  Mr.  Viereck,  these  Americans  were 
putting  an  unbearable  cross  upon  those  of  German 
speech  and  habit.  They  were  attacking  the  Ger- 
mans in  America  for  being  what  they  could  not 
help  being,  and  with  the  cruelty  of  the  incipient 
mob  they  were  indicting  a  whole  race.  Inevitably, 
large  masses  of  German-Americans  drew  into  them- 
selves, became  defensive,  and  tried  to  defend  the 
name  they  bore.  For  the  surest  way  to  arouse  na- 
tionalism is  to  attack  it,  and  by  nationalism  I  mean 
the  loyalties  of  childhood,  not  the  education  of 
maturity.  Turkish  oppression  exasperated  Balkan 
/  nationalism  to  a  fanatic  pitch.  Jew-baiting  pro- 
duced the  ghetto  and  is  compelling  Zionism;  the 
bad  economic  habits  of  many  Jews,  their  exploit- 
ing of  simpler  people,  have  often  caused  the  victims 
to  assert  their  own  nationalism. 

The  fierce  power  of  national  feeling  is  due  to  the 
fact  that  it  rises  from  the  deepest  sources  of  our 
being.     It  is  the  primitive  stuff  of  which  we  are 


PATRIOTISM  IN  THE  ROUGH  67 

made,  our  first  loyalties,  our  first  aggressions,  the 
type  and  image  of  our  souls.  It  is  fixed  in  the 
nursery,  and  the  spell  of  it  is  never  lost.  The 
things  we  knew  as  children,  the  standards  we  re- 
ceived, the  tones  we  heard,  the  pictures  we  stored 
in  our  minds,  the  scenery,  the  houses,  the  gestures, 
the  prayers,  the  rhymes,  the  games,  shape  us  and 
color  us.  They  are  our  nationality,  that  essence 
of  our  being  which  defines  us  against  the  back- 
ground of  the  world. 

Life  would  be  a  drj^,  thin  business  without  it. 
A  civilization  made  out  of  intellect  and  grown-up 
ambitions  would  have  cut  itself  off  from  that  rich 
fund  of  dumb  meanings  which  we  drag  behind  us 
from  our  childhood.  A  fine  art  is  unthinkable 
among  a  people  which  knew  no  color  and  music  in 
its  infancy.  Bring  up  children  in  the  gray  and 
muddy  sanctions  of  a  modern  city,  in  the  sterilized 
morality  of  desolate  country  towns,  let  them  listen 
only  to  bad  hymns  and  cheap  jingles,  let  them  wear 
cjothes  that  are  dull  uniforms,  and  handle  only 
lifeless  machine-made  furniture  and  trappings,  and 
you  starve  art  at  its  source.  You  produce  what 
we  have  got  in  America,  an  art  made  out  of  fads 
at  the  top  of  the  mind,  conventionalized  by  prac- 


o 


68  THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

tice,  and  averting  its  gaze  from  any  passion  that 
stabs  at  reality.  It  is  deeply  true  that  a  new  coun- 
try cannot  produce  an  art,  for  it  has  not  had  the 
time  to  become  saturated  with  memory  and  weather- 
beaten  with  experience. 

This  congeries  of  memories  and  emotions  gives 
us  standing  and  distinction  in  the  world.  If  the 
nationality  to  which  we  belong  is  honored,  we  feel 
honored ;  we  swell  up  perceptibly  at  bearing  a  name 
that  is  great  in  the  world.  The  American  abroad 
is  almost  a  specialist  in  this  field.  He  feels  lonely 
traveling  through  cities  where  men  speak  a  lan- 
guage he  doesn't  understand  and  are  preoccupied 
with  affairs  in  which  he  takes  no  part.  He  feels 
lost  and  unimportant.  And  then  perhaps  he  sees  a 
sign — "  American  Bar  "  or  "  American  Shoes  " ;  he 
finds  a  place  where  American  Ice  Cream  Soda  is 
sold,  he  sees  the  American  Consul's  shield  over  a 
doorway,  he  hears  "  Dixie "  at  a  cabaret,  and 
purrs.  A  friend  of  mine  told  me  once  that  the 
deepest  emotion  he  experienced  while  exploring  in 
Thibet  was  the  sight  of  an  American  sewing- 
machine.  Under  no  other  circumstances  could  he 
have  been  passionate  about  a  sewing-machine.  But 
in  Thibet  it  was  the  nucleus  of  his  love. 


PATRIOTISM  IN  THE  ROUGH  69 

The  American  abroad  will  defend  everything  in 
America,  will  draw  a  picture  of  it  that  would  make 
him  roar  with  laughter  at  home.  An  individual 
feels  instinctively  that  his  own  importance  is  asso- 
ciated with  the  importance  of  his  group.  "  I've 
got  a  big  brother  at  Harvard,"  says  the  small  boy 
to  his  admiring  companions.  "  I've  got  an  uncle 
who  has  an  automobile  that  can  go  sixty  miles  an 
hour,"  and  the  other  small  boys  look  upon  him  as 
one  who  can  himself  go  sixty  miles  an  hour.  "  Our 
export  trade  is  three  hundred  million  dollars  a 
year,"  says  the  fifteen-dollar-a-week  clerk,  and  he 
feels  rich.  The  sisters,  cousins,  and  aunts  of  a 
champion  are  looked  upon  as  great  athletes ;  who 
does  not  feel  that  Jess  Willard's  wife  must  be  a 
leader  among  women?  When  the  German  talks 
about  his  Luther,  Kant,  and  Goethe,  he  is  perhaps 
not  without  a  sneaking  suspicion  that  he  belongs. 
to  the  same  breed. 

t^Np  wonder  men  speak  of  a  "  mystical  entity 
whose  life  includes  the  lives  of  all  the  individuals, 
but  whose  life  transcends  the  lives  of  those  Indi- 
viduals." When  most  intense,  nationality  turns  a 
group  of  people  Into  one  super-person.  The  group 
lives,  the  individual  is  lost  In  its  greater  glory,    j 


70  THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

.  I  This  union  with  the  sources  of  one's  birth  is  the 
^^  most  powerful  factor  in  all  politics.  Its  mani- 
festations are  innumerable. '_  It  may  appear  as  a 
desire  to  see  the  American  flag  waving  over  Costa 
Rica,  as  a  desperate  defense  of  American  cooking 
against  the  world,  or  as  a  readiness  to  sacrifice 
love,  home,  business,  and  life  itself  for  the  "  honor  " 
of  the  nation.  But  whatever  the  form  it  takes, 
patriotism  is  the  offensive  and  the  defensive  reac- 
tion to  our  first  experience  of  the  world.  It  is  the 
desire  to  have,  to  hold,  to  increase,  to  fortify 
whatever  can  be  identified  with  our  earliest  hates 
and  loves. 


CHAPTER  VI 

PATRIOTISM,  BUSINESS,  AND 
DIPLOMACY 

In  Thorstein  Veblen's  new  book  ^  there  is  an  inter- 
esting description  of  the  American  country  town: 

"  The  nucleus  of  its  population  is  the  local  busi- 
ness men,  whose  interests  constitute  the  municipal 
policy  and  control  its  municipal  administration. 
These  local  business  men  are  such  as  the  local  bank- 
ers, merchants  of  many  kinds  and  degrees,  real  estate 
promoters,  local  lawyers,  local  clergymen.  .  .  .  The 
business  men  who  take  up  the  local  traffic  in  merchan- 
dizing, litigation,  church  enterprise  and  the  like,  com- 
monly begin  with  some  share  in  the  real  estate  specu- 
lation. This  affords  a  common  bond  and  a  common 
ground  of  pecuniary  interest,  which  commonly  mas- 
querades under  the  name  of  local  patriotism,  public 
spirit,  civic  pride,  and  the  like.  This  pretense  of 
public  spirit  is  so  consistently  maintained  that  most 
of  these  men  come  presently  to  believe  in  their  own 
professions  on  that  head.  Pecuniary  interest  in  local 
land    values    involves    an   interest    in   the    continued 

*  Imperial  Germany  and  the  Industrial  Revolution,  Sup- 
plementary Note  IV,  p.  317. 

71 


72  THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

growth  of  the  town.  Hence  any  creditable  misrepre- 
sentation of  the  town's  volume  of  business  traffic, 
population,  tributary  farming  community,  or  natural 
resources,  is  rated  as  serviceable  to  the  common  good. 
And  any  member  of  tliis  business-like  community 
will  be  rated  as  a  meritorious  citizen  in  proportion 
as  he  is  serviceable  to  this  joint  pecuniary  interest 
of  these  '  influential  citizens.'  " 

There  Is,  it  seems  to  me,  one  serious  fault  to  be 
found  with  this  satirical  analysis.  It  Is  the  use  of 
the  phrases  "  masquerades "  and  "  pretense  of 
public  spirit."  Had  Professor  Veblen  analyzed  the 
origin  of  patriotism,  he  would  have  found,  I  think, 
that  It  Is  not  an  Ideal  In  a  vacuum,  but  at  bottom  a 
primitive  tendency  to  protect  a  home  and  satisfy 
ambitions.  He  would  not  have  found,  as  he  as- 
sumes, that  patriotism  Is  a  disinterested  passion 
which  can  be  contrasted  sharply  with  commercial 
motives.  There  are  no  separate  compartments  of 
the  human  spirit  labeled  respectively  the  "  eco- 
nomic "  and  the  "  patriotic  "  interest. 

The  attachment  of  a  child  to  Its  toys,  to  candy, 
its  preempting  of  trees  and  caves  and  alleys.  Its 
desire  to  be  part  of  the  best  gang  in  town,  are  not 
regarded  as  "  economic  "  because  they  do  not  in- 
volve the  use  of  money.    But  the  pursuits  of  later 


PATRIOTISM,  BUSINESS,  DIPLOMACY    73 

life  are  not  a  break  with  these  childlike  ambitions. 
They  are  a  development  of  them — the  doll's  house 
turns  into  a  suburban  villa,  the  dolls  are  babies,  the 
leader  of  the  gang  becomes  president  of  the  cham- 
ber of  commerce.  The  transition  from  the  wants 
of  childhood  to  the  wants  of  maturity  is  main- 
tained. There  is,  to  be  sure,  great  modification  in 
them.  But  essentially  we  seek  as  men  what  we 
sought  as  children,  and  there  is  no  point  at  which 
one  can  say:  here  the  economic  motive  enters. 
From  suckling  at  the  breast  and  reaching  for  the 
moon  to  speculation  in  stocks  and  the  purchase  of 
a  motor-car,  there  is  an  unbroken  stream  of  appe- 
tite, which  for  some  purposes  we  describe  as  eco- 
nomic. But  in  the  most  accurate  sense,  that  is  to 
say,  in  the  most  human  sense,  the  motive  is  almost 
always  mixed.  We  buy  a  house,  not  only  to  gather 
future  increments  of  value,  but  because  we  like 
the  neighbors  and  the  scenery  and  are  attached  to 
the  "  old  place.'*  We  desire  promotion,  not  only 
because  the  pay  is  higher,  but  because  the  job  is 
more"  interesting,  the  prestige  is  greater,  because 
it  will  enable  us  to  travel,  it  will  make  the  wife 
happier,  and  permit  us  to  play  golf  on  Saturday 
afternoon. 


'"> 


74  THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

If  you  look  at  a  human  being  as  he  lives  in  the 
world,  instead  of  treating  him  as  an  abstraction, 
^there  is  simply  no  way  of  isolating  what  is  called 
the  economic  or  the  patriotic  motive.  They  are 
both  aspects  of  the  business  of  life,  the  business  of 
getting  on.  That  is  why  I  should  quarrel  with  the 
tone  of  Professor  Veblen's  analysis.  He  implies 
that  patriotism  is  something  other-worldly,  some- 
thing sharply  distinguished  from  the  ordinary  con- 
duct of  life.  Now  the  local  pride  of  the  real  estate 
men  may  be  a  narrow  patriotism,  an  uneducated 
patriotism,  but  it  certainly  isn't  a  masquerade. 
When  a  king  speaks  of  the  glory  of  his  dominions, 
you  may  picture  him,  if  you  like,  as  a  magnified 
real  estate  owner.  When  men  resist  armed  inva- 
sion, they  are  protecting  their  real  estate.  You 
can  say  that  in  this  war  the  Germans  have  cap- 
tured a  great  many  parcels  of  French,  Belgian, 
and  Polish  real  estate.  The  fixing  of  frontiers  is 
a  real  estate  operation.  Because  real  estate  is  in- 
volved, you  can  call  the  patriotism  which  sur- 
rounds it  a  masquerade. 

But  the  truer  thing  to  say,  it  seems  to  me,  is 
that  patriotism  envelops  the  real  estate  because  the 
real  estate  nourishes  the  lives  and  careers  of  the 


PATRIOTISM,  BUSINESS,  DIPLOMACY    75 

patriots.  Professor  Veblen's  small  town  magnates 
dote  upon  real  estate  rather  than  geometry,  be- 
cause real  estate  Is  their  way  to  the  protection 
and  enhancement  of  themselves.  If  religion  offers 
such  opportunity  there  will  be  many  churches ;  if 
the  army  offers  them  there  will  be  many  soldiers ; 
if  inheritance  offers  them,  there  will  be  many  idle 
sons.  The  emotions  of  loyalty  and  value  congre- 
gate about  the  "  vital  interests  "  of  our  lives. 
When  they  don't,  we  regard  them  as  insane.  And 
yet  the  local  patriots  will  fight  for  their  real  estate, 
and  some  of  them  will  die  that  others  may  keep  it. 
That  is  the  riddle  about  patriotism  in  its  relation 
to  economics. 

The  riddle,  I  fancy,  may  perhaps  be  read  in 
some  such  way  as  this :  out  of  our  childhood  rises 
a  stream  of  appetite,  colored  by  our  earliest  at- 
tachments. It  seeks  to  satisfy  itself,  to  magnify 
its  importance,  to  protect  what  statesmen  call  its 
prestige  and  satirists  call  its  vanity.  This  stream 
flows  into  the  channels  of  business  opportunity. 
By  real  estate  or  selling  shoes  our  appetites  search 
for  their  food.  But  in  the  process  the  forms  of 
business  are  overlaid  with  our  emotion.  We  wrap 
ourselves   around  our  money-making,   and  trans- 


76  THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

figure  it.  It  is  identified  then  with  all  that  is  most 
precious.  The  export  of  bicycles  or  steel  rails  is 
no  longer  the  cold-blooded  thing  it  looks  like  in 
statistical  reports  of  commerce.  It  is  integrated 
with  our  passion.  It  is  wife  and  children  and  being 
respected.  So  when  trade  is  attacked,  we  are 
attacked.  The  thing  whicli  was  a  means  to  an  end 
has  become  part  of  ourselves.  We  are  ready  to 
fight  and  die  for  it  because  it  taps  the  loyalties 
which  are  what  we  are. 

Passion  is  not  an  abstraction.  It  Is  what  makes 
us  move  and  act  and  feel.  Passion  must  take  some 
form,  must  have  something  to  feed  upon.  And  it 
seems  to  be  able  to  feed  upon  almost  anything  from 
the  thinnest  dreams  to  the  export  of  copper.  But 
whatever  it  does  feed  upon  is  for  the  time  being 
the  passion  itself.  When  copper  exports  are  at- 
tacked, it  isn't  reasoned  calculation  alone  which 
makes  the  decision  for  action.  It  is  the  feeling  of 
the  people  whose  passion  is  fused  with  the  copper 
trade. 

How  does  it  happen,  though,  that  the  people 
not  concerned  in  a  special  interest  are  so  ready  to 
defend  it  against  the  world.''  Plain  men  who  have 
no  financial  interest  in  copper  will  feel  aggrieved  if 


PATRIOTISM,  BUSINESS,  DIPLOMACY    77 

American  copper  interests  in  a  foreign  land  are 
attacked.  The  German  people  felt  "  humiliated  " 
because  German  trade  was  thwarted  in  Morocco. 

The  most  obvious  reason  for  this  is  that  the  pri- 
vate citizens  are  in  the  main  abysmally  ignorant  of 
what  the  real  stakes  of  diplomacy  are.  They 
do  not  think  in  terms  of  railroad  concessions, 
mines,  banking,  and  trade.  When  they  envisage 
Morocco  they  do  not  think  of  the  Mannesmann 
Brothers,  but  of  "  German  prestige  "  and  "  French 
influence."  When  the  Triple  Entente  compelled 
Germany  to  recede  in  the  Moroccan  aifair  of  1911, 
the  rage  of  the  German  people  was  not  due  to  a 
counting  of  their  economic  losses.  They  were  furi- 
ous, not  that  they  had  lost  Morocco,  but  that  they 
had  lost  the  dispute.  There  is  small  doubt  that  the 
masses  of  people  in  no  country  would  risk  war  to 
secure  mining  concessions  in  Africa.  But  the 
choice  is  never  presented  to  them  that  way.  Each 
contest  for  economic  privileges  appears  to  the  pub- 
lic as  a  kind  of  sporting  event  with  loaded  weapons. 
The  people  wish  their  team,  that  is,  their  country, 
to  win.  Just  as  strong  men  will  weep  because  the 
second  baseman  fumbles  at  the  crucial  moment,  so 
they  will  go  into  tantrums  of  rage  because  corpora- 


78  THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

tions  of  their  own  nationality  are  thwarted  in  a 
commercial  ambition. 

They  may  have  nothing  tangible  to  gain  or  lose 
by  the  transaction ;  certainly  they  do  not  know 
whether  they  have.  But  they  feel  that  "  our " 
trade  is  their  own,  and  though  they  share  few  of 
its  profits  they  watch  its  career  with  tender  solici- 
tude. Above  all,  they  feel  that  if  "  our  "  German 
traders  are  beaten  in  Morocco,  the  whole  value  of 
being  a  German  has  been  somewhat  lessened.  This 
is  where  business  and  national  prestige  flow  to- 
gether. Business  is  the  chief  form  which  competi- 
tion between  nations  can  assume.  To  be  worsted  in 
that  competition  means  more  than  to  lose  money ; 
it  means  a  loss  of  social  importance  as  well. 
Trademarks  like  "  Made  in  Germany "  were  a 
constant  humiliation  to  Englishmen,  even  though 
they  were  glad  to  buy  the  goods  because  they  were 
cheaper  and  better.  But  when  from  all  over  the 
world  Englishmen  came  home  beaten  by  a  greater 
vitality  and  more  modem  organization,  their  dam- 
aged pocketbooks  were  only  the  smallest  part  of 
their  loss.  The  real  wound  was  the  wound  of  self- 
respect,  the  lurking  fear  that  there  has  been  a  \ 
depreciation  in  Englishmen.     The  fear  is  empha- 


J 


PATRIOTISM,  BUSINESS,  DIPLOMACY    79 

sized  by  the  public  opinion  of  the  world  which 
judges  by  trade  efficiency  and  asks  heartrending 
questions  like:  Is  England  decadent?  Friendly 
critics  rub  salt  into  the  wound  by  commenting  on 
the  obsolete  machinery  of  British  manufacture,  the 
archaic  habits  of  British  merchants.  Is  it  any 
wonder  that  what  starts  as  a  loss  of  dollars  and 
cents  is  soon  transfigured  into  a  loss  of  the  Eng- 
lishman's importance  in  the  world?  But  when  you 
attack  that  you  attack  the  sources  of  his  patriot- 
ism, and  when  he  starts  to  reassert  his  importance, 
the  proceeding  has  ceased  to  appear  as  a  commer- 
cial enterprise.  It  has  become  a  defense  of  British 
civilization. 

This  is  the  mood  for  a  strong  foreign  policy, 
which  means  a  policy  that  uses  political  power  to 
increase  national  prestige.  The  way  to  increase 
national  prestige  is  to  win  economic  victories  by 
diplomatic  methods.  British  diplomacy  has  been 
winning  them  for  fifteen  years — in  Egypt,  Persia, 
Africa.  While  Germany  was  capturing  trade, 
Great  Britain  was  scoring  the  diplomatic  victories 
— the  greatest  of  them  being  that  in  Morocco. 
From  an  economic  point  of  view  England  had  more 
to  lose  than  to  gain  by  a  French  dominion  in 


80  THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

Morocco.  The  real  economic  interest  probably  lay 
in  that  internationalization  of  Moroccan  oppor- 
tunity for  which  Germany  contended.  But  Eng- 
land's interest  was  not  primarily  economic.  Her 
interest  was  the  defeat  of  German  aggrandizement. 
She  fought  German  prestige,  and  by  threatening 
war  in  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  Mansion  House  speech 
she  won.  She  sent  German  diplomats  home  to  re- 
ceive the  jeers  of  the  German  people. 

The  actual  trade  of  Morocco  was  insignificant 
in  the  melee.  Morocco  became  the  bone  on  which 
Germany  and  England  tested  the  sharpness  of 
their  teeth.  The  two  populations  cared  very  little 
for  any  particular  iron  mine,  but  they  cared  enor- 
mously about  the  standing  of  Englishmen  and 
Germans  in  settling  world  problems.  The  conse- 
quences of  the  Moroccan  affair  have  been  terrible 
beyond  words.  National  feeling  was  unloosened 
which  overflowed  the  original  dispute.  Morocco 
meant  not  money,  but  bad  will,  suspicion,  fear,  re- 
sentment. To  the  British  it  was  evidence  of  Ger- 
man aggression ;  to  the  German  it  represented  the 
tightening  of  the  iron  ring,  the  policy  of  encircle- 
ment. The  strongest  passions  of  defense  in  both 
countries  were  called  into  the  European  arena,  and 


PATRIOTISM,  BUSINESS,  DIPLOMACY    81 

wHen  both  sides  claim  to  be  defensive  I  see  no  rea- 
son for  questioning  their  sincerity.  It  is  perfectly 
possible  for  two  nations  both  to  feel  attacked  at 
the  same  time. 

(^In  some  such  way  as  this  patriotism  becomes  in- 
volved in  business.  Specific  disputes  over  specific 
trade  opportunities  become  the  testing  points  of 
national  pride.  Just  as  a  man  will  fight  a  law- 
suit at  tremendous  cost  for  a  trivial  sum,  so  na- 
tions will  risk  war  to  score  a  diplomatic  victory. 
They  feel  that  a  defeat  on  one  point  will  exhibit 
weakness  and  carry  in  its  train  defeat  on  other 
points.  So  they  throw  into  the  scales  of  decision 
their  armaments.  Navies  and  armies  are  prepared 
for  peace  as  well  as  war.  They  are  prepared  to 
underline  and  emphasize  diplomatic  negotiation. 
They  are  a  kind  of  initiation  fee  to  the  diplomatic 
corps.  The  weak  threat  of  a  strong  Power  counts 
for  more  than  the  strong  threat  of  a  weak  one. 
When  two  diplomats  meet,  the  decisive  thing  is 
not  their  good  manners  nor  the  justice  of  their 
pleas,  it  is  the  potential  power  of  the  nation  for 
which  they  speak.  Costa  Rica  may  have  envoys 
at  European  capitals,  but  they  are  not  listened  to 
eagerly.     Imagine  Costa  Rica  with  a  great  navy, 


82  THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

and  her  minister's  view  would  be  consulted  with 
real  interest. 

(There  are  in  the  world  to-day  not  more  than 
eight  Powers  which  really  count — Great  Britain, 
France,  Russia,  Italy,  Germany,  Austria-Hungary, 
Japan,  and  the  United  States.  When  I  say 
"  count,"  I  mean  that  the  effective  force  of  the 
world  is  in  their  hands,  and  that  the  decision  of 
world  affairs  is  for  them.  The  other  nations  lie  in 
the  orbit  of  the  Great  Powers.  They  follow  but 
do  not  lead.  Central  America  can  have  no  foreign 
policy  without  consulting  the  United  States.  The 
immediate  cause  of  the  war  was  over  the  question 
of  whether  Serbia  should  become  a  satellite  of  the 
Germanic-Magyar  combination  or  of  the  Russian 
Empire.  Turkey  in  the  last  few  years  has  fol- 
lowed a  German  lead.  England's  prime  interest  in 
Belgium  was  that  it  should  not  fall  within  the 
German  sphere. 

JThere  is  an  incessant  competition  between  gov- 
ernments to  attach  these  smaller  states  to  them- 
selves. At  no  point  can  one  say  that  specific  trade 
opportunities  are  the  prize.  The  real  prize  for  the 
diplomats  is  an  increase  of  power,  a  greater  em- 
phasis to  their  word.     Their  nations  rally  behind 


PATRIOTISM,  BUSINESS,  DIPLOMACY        83 

them — the  interested  business  men  see  it  as  dollar 
diplomacy,  the  mass  of  the  people,  hardly  aware 
of  the  concrete  issues,  see  it  as  a  gigantic  com-  q 
petition  involving  their  own  sense  of  importance. 
The  diplomatic  struggle  is  played  in  Morocco,  at 
Constantinople,  in  Pekin,  wherever  there  are  stakes 
for  which  to  play.  At  home  there  is  joy  in  vic- 
tory, anger  at  defeat.  Armament  is  added  as  an 
"  insurance  "  for  diplomacy,  and  of  course  mili- 
tary preparation  always  calls  forth  military  prepa- 
ration. Every  international  incident  is  seen  then, 
not  on  its  "  merits,"  but  in  its  relation  to  the  whole 
vast  complicated  game,  forever  teetering  on  the 
edge  of  war.  | 


PART  II 


CHAPTER  VII 

ARENAS  OF  FRICTION 

This  whole  business  of  jockeying  for  position  is 
at  first  glance  so  incredibly  silly  that  many  liberals 
regard  diplomacy  as  a  cross  between  sinister  con- 
spiracy and  a  meaningless  etiquette.  It  would  be 
all  of  that  if  the  stakes  of  diplomacy  were  not 
real.  Those  stakes  have  to  be  understood,  for 
without  such  an  understanding  diplomacy  is  in- 
comprehensible and  any  scheme  of  world  peace  an 
idle  fancy. 

/The  chief,  the  overwhelming  problem  of  diplo- 
macy seems  to  be  the  weak  state-r-the  Balkans,  the 
African  sultanates,  Turkey,  China,  and  Latin 
America,  with  the  possible  exception  of  the  Argen- 
tine, Chile,  and  Brazil.  These  states  are  "  weak  " 
because  they  are  industrially  backward  and  at  pres- 
ent politically  incompetent.  They  are  rich  in  re- 
sources and  cheap  labor,  poor  in  capital,  poor  in 
political  experience,  poor  in  the  power  of  defense. 

/The  government  of  these  states  is  the  supreme 
^-^  87 


o 


88  THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

problem  of  diplomacy.  Just  as  the  chief  task  of 
American  politics  to  the  Civil  War  was  the  organi- 
zation of  the  unexploited  West,  so  the  chief  task 
of  world  diplomacy  to-day  is  the  organization  of 
virgin  territory  and  backward  peoples,„  I  use 
backward  in  the  conventional  sense  to  mean  a 
people  unaccustomed  to  modem  commerce  and 
modern  political  administration. 

This  solicitude  about  backward  peoples  seems  to 
many  good  democrats  a  combination  of  super- 
ciliousness and  greed.  I  have  heard  wise  old  Hin- 
dus grow  tense  with  rage  at  the  thought  of  some 
cockney  Kiplingesque  bureaucrat  bringing  "  civili- 
zation "  to  the  saturated  civilization  of  the  East. 
I  have  walked  through  Boston  slums  with  an 
Indian,  and  it  was  I  who  did  the  apologizing.  We 
laughed  together  over  the  white  man's  burden. 
"  I'd  rather  be  in  hell  than  in  the  British  Em- 
pire," said  the  Hindu.  "  How  about  being  in  the 
Russian  or  German  Empires?  "  I  inquired.  "  I've 
thought  of  it,"  he  repKed ;  "  that's  why  I  am  a 
loyal  subject  of  the  British  Crown." 

He  went  on  to  explain  that  he  had  given  up  the 
dream  of  his  youth,  which  was  to  see  India  an  inde- 
pendent nation.     "  It   can't  be  done,"  he  said ; 


ARENAS  OF  FRICTION  89 

"  we'd  fight,  and  our  princes  would  intrigue,  and 
before  long  some  Europeans  would  be  killed.  If 
the  British  didn't  come  back,  the  Russians  would 
come,  or  even  the  Japanese,  and  we  couldn't  defend 
ourselves.  We  know  how  to  fight  in  the  old- 
fashioned  way,  but  modern  war,  which  is  so  much  a 
question  of  factories  and  machinery  and  discipline, 
that's  not  the  kind  of  thing  we  can  carry  on — 
now.  We  can't  build  submarines  and  dreadnoughts 
and  all  the  other  things  you  people  call  civiliza- 
tion. So  we'll  have  to  live  under  your  *  protection  ' 
— that's  the  way  they  describe  it — while  our  people 
learn  to  sweat  in  factories  and  putter  around  on 
the  stock  exchange.  Yes,  we'll  read  newspapers, 
and  learn  the  names  and  dates  of  the  English 
kings,  and  when  the  upstarts  who  govern  us  are 
harsh  we'll  know  how  to  make  it  hot  for  them. 
The  white  man  won't  swallow  us,  and  we'll  go  on 
and  learn  to  have  pride  and  to  organize,  and  who 
knows  but  our  great-grandchildren  may  be  able  to 
ride  in  Pullman  cars  with  the  lords  of  the  earth." 
To  the  dogmatic  anti-imperialist  it  seems  ab- 
surd that  white  people  do  not  stay  at  home  and 
civilize  themselves,  leaving  the  Indians  and  Moors 
and   Hottentots    and   Yaquis   to  work   out  their 


90  THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

own  salvation.  The  whole  business  of  expansion 
by  the  western  peoples  is  hateful  to  these  liberals. 
Thej  remember  the  caste  system,  the  arrogance, 
the  unspeakable  horrors  of  the  Congo  and  Puto- 
mayo,  the  ravishing  and  despoiling  and  debauching 
of  natives  by  the  European.  It  is  a  hideous  story. 
And  yet  the  plain  fact  is  that  the  interrelation  of 
peoples  has  gone  so  far  that  to  advocate  interna- 
tional laissez-faire  now  is  to  speak  a  counsel  of 
despair.  Commercial  cunning,  lust  of  conquest, 
rum,  bibles,  rifles,  missionaries,  traders,  conces- 
sionaires have  brought  the  two  civilizations  into 
contact,  and  the  problem  created  must  be  solved, 
not  evaded. 

The  great  African  empires,  for  example,  were 
not  created  deliberately  by  theoretical  imperialists. 
Explorers,  missionaries,  and  traders  penetrated 
these  countries.  They  found  rubber,  oil,  cocoa, 
tin;  they  could  sell  cotton  goods,  rifles,  liquor. 
The  native  rulers  bartered  away  enormous  riches 
at  trivial  prices.  But  the  trading-posts  and  the 
concessions  were  insecure.  There  were  raids  and 
massacres.  No  public  works  existed,  no  adminis- 
trative machinery.  The  Europeans  exploited  the 
natives  cruelly,  and  tlie  natives  retaliated.     Con- 


I 


ARENAS  OF  FRICTION  91 

cession  hunters  and  merchants  from  other  nations 
began  to  come  in.  They  bribed  and  bullied  the 
chiefs,  and  created  still  greater  insecurity.  An 
appeal  would  be  made  to  the  home  government  for 
help,  which  generally  meant  declaring  a  protecto- 
rate of  the  country.  Armed  forces  were  sent  in  to 
pacify,  and  civil  servants  to  administer  the  coun- 
try. These  protectorates  were  generally  sanc- 
tioned by  the  other  European  governments  on  the 
proviso  that  trade  should  be  free  to  all. 

The  record  of  government  by  Europeans  Is 
varied.  The  Belgian  Congo,  for  example,  was  un- 
til recently,  at  least,  desperately  mismanaged; 
British  Nigeria  seems  to  have  been  the  maturest  ex- 
perience of  British  imperialism.  The  contrasts  are 
extraordinary.  In  the  Congo,  before  the  Belgian 
government  took  It  over,  the  administration  was 
corrupt  and  cruel.  "  It  Is  very  evident,"  wrote 
Consul  Nightingale  to  Sir  Edward  Grey  In  1906, 
"  that  an  idea  prevails  that  the  native  Is  as  much  a 
part  and  parcel  of  the  concessionary  companies' 
property,  as  If  he  were  a  bundle  of  rubber  or 
gum."  ^    In  Nigeria  the  British  seem  to  have  gone 

'  Nov.    30,    1906,    Brit.    Pari.    Papers,   1906,   Congo,    Ed. 
3450,  No.  28,  p.  57,  quoted  in  Intervention  and  ColonizO' 


92  THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

as  far  as  it  was  humanly  possible,  not  only  to 
protect  the  native,  but  to  preserve  his  civilization 
under  the  new  conditions.  For  example,  revenue 
was  needed  for  governmental  purposes.  But  "  the 
people  were  unaccustomed  to  regular  taxes ;  and 
many  of  the  chiefs  had  been  deprived  of  their  main 
source  of  income  by  the  abolition  of  slave  trading. 
.  .  .  The  new  scheme  of  taxation  was  simple  and 
based  upon  the  old  method  employed  by  the  Emirs 
of  the  Mohammedan  states,  who  had  farmed  out 
the  taxes  to  certain  favored  headmen  and  levied 
them  on  the  basis  described  in  the  Koran."  ^  The 
system  was  modified  later,  but  the  interesting  point 
about  the  experiment  is  the  humane  wisdom  by  which 
an  effort  was  made  to  adjust  modern  necessities  to 
ancient  habits.  The  same  policy  was  pursued  in 
the  courts.  The  first  attempt  was  to  substitute 
English  common  law  for  the  native  legal  system; 
"  but  in  1904)  the  local  criminal  law  was  very  wisely 
substituted  for  the  British.  In  1906  detailed 
proclamations  were  published  reestablishing  the 
Alkalis   Court,  authorizing  the  Judicial  Council, 

Hon  in  Africa,  by  Norman  Dwight  Harris,  p.  4i4i,  Houghton 
Mifflin  Co. 

Udein,pp.  152-3. 


ARENAS  01"  FRICTION  93 

and  empowering  the  provincial  courts  to  punish 
for  disobedience  to  the  native  authorities  or  courts 
within  their  spheres."  No  attempt  here  to  make 
imitation  Englishmen  out  of  the  Nigerians.  When 
schools  were  erected,  the  instruction  was  in  the 
Hausa  language,  and  in  the  Church  Missionary 
School  no  child  is  allowed  to  learn  English  until  he 
can  read  his  native  language.  Granting  all  human 
limitations,  what  the  British  have  attempted  is  to 
introduce  Nigeria  into  the  administrative  structure 
of  the  modem  world  without  thwarting  its  native 
growth  or  destroying  its  local  integrity. 

/It  is  essential  to  remember  that  what  turns  a 
territory  into  a  diplomatic  "  problem  "  is  the  com- 
bination of  natural  resources,  cheap  labor,  markets, 
defenselessness,  corrupt  and  inefficient  government.  J 
The  desert  of  Sahara  is  no  "  problem,"  except 
where  there  are  oases  and  trade  routes.  Switzer- 
land Is  no  "  problem,"  for  Switzerland  Is  a  highly 
organized  modern  state.  But  Mexico  Is  a  problem, 
and  Haiti,  and  Turkey,  and  Persia.  They  have  the 
pretension  of  political  Independence  which  they  do 
not  fulfill.  They  are  seething  with  corruption, 
eaten  up  with  "  foreign  "  concessions,  and  unable 
to  control  the  adventurers  they  attract  or  safe- 


94  THE  STAKES  UF  DIPLOMACY 

guard  the  riglits  which  these  adventurers  claim. 
More  foreign  capital  is  invested  in  the  United 
States  than  in  Mexico,  but  the  United  States  is 
not  a  "  problem  "  and  Mexico  is.  The  difference 
was  hinted  at  in  President  Wilson's  speech  at 
Mobile.  Foreigners  invest  in  the  United  States,  and 
they  are  assured  that  life  will  be  reasonably  safe 
and  that  titles  to  property  are  secured  by  orderly 
legal  means.  But  in  Mexico  they  are  given  "  con- 
cessions," which  means  that  they  secure  extra  privi- 
leges and  run  greater  risks,  and  they  count  upon 
the  support  of  European  governments  or  of  the 
United  States  to  protect  them  and  their  property. 
'  The  weak  states,  in  other  words,  are  those  which 
lack  the  political  development  that  modem  com- 
merce requires.  To  take  an  extreme  case  which 
brings  out  the  real  nature  of  the  "  problem,"  sup- 
pose that  the  United  States  was  organized  politi- 
cally as  England  was  in  the  time  of  William  the  Con- 
queror. Would  it  not  be  impossible  to  do  business 
in  the  United  States,?  There  would  be  an  everlast- 
ing clash  between  an  impossible  legal  system  and  a 
growing  commercial  development.  And  the  in- 
ternal affairs  of  the  United  States  would  consti- 
tute a  diplomatic  "  problem." 


ARENAS  OF  FRICTION  96 

/This,  it  seems  to  me,  is  the  reason  behind  the 
outBurst  of  modern  imperialism  among  the  Great 
Powers.  It  is  not  enough  to  say  that  they  are 
"  expanding  "  or  "  seeking  markets  "  or  "  grab- 
bing resources."  They  are  doing  all  these  things, 
of  course.  But  if  the  world  into  which  they  are 
expanding  were  not  politically  archaic,  the  growth 
of  foreign  trade  would  not  be  accompanied  by  po- 
litical imperialism.  Germany  has  "  expanded  " 
wonderfully  in  the  British  Empire,  in  Russia,  in 
the  United  States,  but  no  German  is  silly  enough  to 
insist  on  planting  his  flag  wherever  he  sells  his 
dyestuffs  or  stoves.  It  is  only  when  his  expansion 
is  into  weak  states — into  China,  Morocco,  Turkey, 
or  elsewhere  that  foreign  trade  is  imperialistic. 
This  imperialism  is  actuated  by  many  motives — 
by  a  feeling  that  political  control  insures  special 
privileges,  by  a  desire  to  play  a  large  part  in  the 
world,  by  national  vanity,  by  a  passion  for  "  owner- 
ship," but  none  of  these  motives  would  come  into 
play  if  countries  like  China  or  Turkey  were  not 
politically  backward. 

Imperialism  in  our  day  begins  generally  as  an 
attempt  to  police  and  pacify.  This  attempt  stimu- 
lates national  pride,  it  creates  bureaucrats  with  a 


96  THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

vested  interest  in  imperialism,  it  sucks  in  and  re- 
ceives added  strength  from  concessionaires  and 
traders  who  are  looking  for  economic  privileges. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  certain  classes  in  a  nation 
gain  by  imperialism,  though  to  the  people  as  a 
whole  the  adventure  may  mean  nothing  more  than 
an  increased  burden  of  taxes. 

Some  pacifists  have  attempted  to  deny  that  a 
nation  could  ever  gain  anything  by  political  con- 
trol of  weak  states.  They  have  not  defined  the 
"  nation."  What  they  overlook  is  that  even  the 
most  ad-.anced  nations  are  governed,  not  by  the 
"  people,"  but  by  groups  with  special  interests. 
These  groups  do  gain,  just  as  the  railroad  men 
who  controlled  American  legislatures  gained.  A 
knot  of  traders  closely  in  league  with  the  colonial 
office  of  a  great  Power  can  make  a  good  deal  of 
money  out  of  its  friendships.  Every  government 
has  contracts  to  be  let,  franchises  to  give;  it 
establishes  tariffs,  fixes  railroad  rates,  apportions 
taxes,  creates  public  works,  builds  roads.  To  be 
favored  by  that  power  is  to  be  favored  indeed. 
The  favoritism  may  cost  the  motherland  and  the 
colony  dear,  but  the  colonial  merchant  is  not  a 
philanthropist. 


ARENAS  OF  FRICTION  97 

The  whole  question  of  imperialism  is  as  complex 
as  the  motives  of  the  African  trader  who  sub- 
sidizes the  African  missionary.  He  does  not  know 
where  business  ends  and  religion  begins ;  he  is  able 
to  make  no  sharp  distinction  between  his  humani- 
tarianism  and  his  profits.  He  feels  that  business  is 
a  good  thing,  and  religion  is  a  good  thing.  He 
likes  to  help  himself,  and  to  see  others  helped.  The 
same  complexity  of  motives  appears  in  imperialist 
statesmen. 

"  France  must  make  herself  loved  as  well  as  re- 
spected," said  M.  Raymond  Poincare  in  explaining 
the  protectorate  treaty  of  1912  over  Morocco. 
"  In  the  examination  and  defense  of  her  interests 
and  her  rights,  France  has  not  separated  her  own 
cause  from  that  of  Europe.  She  has  remembered 
that  it  was  her  duty  to  aid  the  march  of  civiliza- 
tion," said  M.  Pichon  in  discussing  Moroccan  af- 
fairs. We  are  inclined  to  smile  at  these  fine  words 
when  we  remember  the  exploitation  which  generally 
accompanies  these  protectorates.  And  yet  the 
speech  of  M.  Pichon  is  candid.  When  he  speaks 
of  "  interests  "  and  the  "  march  of  civilization  " 
he  pictures  the  twin  motives  which  actuate  imperial- 
ism.    It  is  neither  disinterested  service  nor  sheer 


98  THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

grabbing.  It  is  an  effort  to  make  civilization 
march  so  that  interests  are  protected.  For  modem 
nations  have  learned  that  interests  thrive  best 
where  civilization  in  the  Western  commercial  sense 
has  been  introduced.  They  cannot  milk  the  cow 
without  feeding  her,  and  after  a  while,  if  the  milk 
is  good,  they  develop  a  considerable  affection  for 
the  cow. 

The  whole  situation  might  be  summed  up  by  say- 
ing that  the  commercial  development  of  the  world 
will  not  wait  until  each  territory  has  created  for 
itself  a  stable  and  fairly  modern  political  system. 
By  some  means  or  other  the  weak  states  have  to  be 
brought  within  the  framework  of  commercial  ad- 
ministration. Their  independence  and  integrity, 
so-called,  are  dependent  upon  their  creating  con- 
ditions under  which  world-wide  business  can  be 
conducted.  The  pressure  to  organize  the  globe  is 
enormous.3 

i  How  enormous  it  is  can  be  seen  by  studying  the 
action  of  those  great  Powers  which  have  had  no 
colonial  ambition.  In  the  early  eighties  Germany 
under  Bismarck  set  its  face  against  expansion  in 
Africa.^    But  back  in  1842  a  German  missionary 

^Idem,  p.  64. 


ARENAS  OF  FRICTION  99 

society  had  acquired  twelve  mission  stations  and 
considerable  property  in  what  is  now  German 
Southwest  Africa.  In  1863  there  was  a  civil  war 
between  the  Herreros  and  Hottentots,  and  sev- 
eral missions  were  destroyed.  In  1868  the  Prus- 
sian government  petitioned  the  British  to  establish 
a  protectorate  over  Walfish  Bay  and  the  Herrero- 
land.  The  British  Foreign  Office  declined  to  do 
this,  but  it  sent  out  a  Commissioner  who  estab- 
lished peace  between  the  tribes.  Trouble  continued. 
Finally,  nine  years  later,  in  1877,  the  protectorate 
was  created.  The  British  did  not  care  for  the  job. 
It  was  expensive  and  dangerous.  In  1880  another 
war  broke  out,  and  this  time  the  British  refused 
to  intervene  with  military  force.  The  Germans 
again  asked  protection,  and  the  British  refused 
any  special  aid.  In  1883  Count  Herbert  Bismarck 
asked  Great  Britain  whether  she  would  protect  a 
Bremen  merchant  named  Liideritz  who  wished  to 
set  up  a  factory  on  the  coast.  The  English  said 
they  would  do  their  best.  Herr  Liideritz  sent  out 
his  expedition,  and  purchased  150  square  miles 
near  Angra  Pequena  Bay  from  the  Hottentot 
chief.  The  price  was  two  hundred  rifles  and  one 
hundred  dollars  in  cash.    Then  Herr  Liideritz  pro- 


100         THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

ceeded  to  enlarge  his  domain.  He  bought  an  im- 
mense tract  for  three  thousand  doDars  and  sixty 
guns.  But  it  happened  unluckily  that  he  had 
bought  places  already  preempted  by  British  trad- 
ers. The  British  appealed  to  their  government, 
Herr  Liideritz  to  his.  The  British  sent  a  warship 
to  Angra  Pequena  Bay  to  keep  the  German  and 
British  traders  from  exploding. 

There  were  communications  between  the  govern- 
ments, and  protestations  from  Germany  that  she 
had  no  intention  of  acquiring  political  rights.  The 
British  hesitated,  and  could  not  decide.  Finally,  in 
1884,  Bismarck  announced  that  Herr  Liideritz  and 
his  business  were  under  the  protection  of  the  Ger- 
man Empire.  There  was  some  intrigue,  and  the 
Germans  sent  a  warship  to  take  possession  of  the 
territory.  The  negotiations  were  carried  out,  and 
Germany  was  an  African  Power  with  215,000 
square  miles  of  territory. 

Another  illuminating  example  of  how  European 
Powers  become  "  interested  "  in  weaker  states  is  to 
be  found  in  Italy's  relations  to  Tripoli.  Mr.  Mor- 
ton FuUerton  introduces  the  story  as  follows:* 
"  Signor  Guglielmo  Ferrero  has  pointed  out  that 

'  Cf.  Fullertonj  Problems  of  Power,  p.  249. 


ARENAS  OF  FRICTION  101 

*  if  Turkey  has  lost  Tripoli,  it  is  because  the  belli- 
cose enthusiasm  of  a  new  nationalistic  Italy  has 
forced  the  hand  of  the  Government.'  The  rapid 
rise  and  the  effective  activity  of  the  young  Italian 
nationalists  is  one  of  the  most  interesting  socio- 
political phenomena  of  our  time.  But,  behind  this 
remarkable  movement,  a  curious  series  of  invisible 
financial  causes  prepared  Italian  public  opinion  for 
the  conquest  of  the  ancient  Roman  province  of 
Lybia."  Mr.  FuUerton  then  quotes  an  extract 
from  an  article  by  M.  Pinon,^  which  I  take  the 
liberty  of  reproducing : 

"  At  the  beginning  of  the  reign  of  Leo  XIII,  the 
Banco  di  Roma  was  a  financial  house  of  relatively 
slight  importance,  established  by  private  individuals. 
Its  manager,  Ernesto  Pacelli,  succeeded  in  winning 
the  confidence  of  the  Pope's  entourage,  and  Leo  XIII 
intrusted  to  him  the  funds  of  the  Holy  See.  The 
addition  of  this  new  capital  made  it  possible  for  the 
Banco  di  Roma  to  develop  its  business.  But  its  rela- 
tions with  the  Vatican  prevented  it  from  penetrating 
into  the  business  world  connected  with  the  Quirinal, 
and  notably  to  get  its  bills  discounted  by  the  Bank 
of  Italy.  Eager  to  force  that  door,  the  Banco  di 
Roma   sought    advice    in    Government   circles.      The 

* "  L'Europe  et  La  Guerre  Italo-Turque,"  by  Ren6  Pinon 
— the  Bevue  des  deux  Mondes,  June  1,  1912. 

SA^TA  8AheKHA.CALlFi>ni<IA 

ac^.^*^-^4 - 


102         THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

President  of  its  Board  of  Directors  was  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  Chamber  of  Commerce,  brother  of  the 
then  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Signor  Tittoni.  It 
was  the  period  when  the  Italian  Government  was 
signing  with  M.  Delcasse  the  agreements  declaring 
that  France  repudiated  her  interests  in  the  Tripoli- 
taine,  and  that  Italy  repudiated  hers  in  Morocco. 
The  Italian  Government  wished  to  secure  in  the 
Tripolitaine  economic  interests,  which  would  permit 
it  to  develop  Italian  industry  and  commerce  there, 
which  would  virtually  amount  to  securing  a  mortgage 
on  the  province,  and  might,  were  the  case  ever  to 
arise,  provide  an  opportunity  for  armed  intervention. 
The  Banco  di  Roma  secured  the  coveted  business 
connection  with  the  Bank  of  Italy,  promising  in  re- 
turn to  participate  in  Italian  enterprises  in  the 
Tripolitaine  and  in  Cyrenaica.  A  whole  series  of 
undertakings  and  ventures  'were  then  founded  in 
Tripoli  and  along  the  coast,  with  the  capital,  and 
under  the  direction  of  an  agent  of  the  Banco  di  Roma, 
Signor  Bresciani,  an  ex -official  of  Erythrea;  oil  in- 
dustries, soap  manufactures,  grain  elevators,  fishr 
eries,  the  sponge  trade,  the  purchase  of  land,  electric 
works  at  Benghazi,  a  shipping  line  subventioned  by 
the  Government,  and  possessing  at  present  four 
steamers.  Missions  were  sent  inland  to  enter  into 
relations  with  the  influential  chiefs  and  marabouts. 
The  Banco  di  Roma  increased  its  capital  to  80,000,- 
000  francs,  and  recently  augmented  it  still  further. 
Notwithstanding  these  efforts  trade  remained  stag- 
nant; business  did  not  develop;  the  capital  expended 


ARENAS  OF  FRICTION  103 

remained  unproductive;  the  financial  obligations  be- 
came more  and  more  serious.  The  Ottoman  officials 
put  all  kinds  of  obstacles  in  the  way  of  the  economic 
development  of  the  province,  seeking  particularly  to 
thwart  the  Italian  ventures ;  at  Benghazi,  for  instance, 
the  electric  power  works  for  the  lighting  of  the 
town  were  not  authorized.  The  Banco  di  Roma, 
having  engaged  a  considerable  capital  in  Africa,  in 
the  interest  and  almost  at  the  suggestion  of  the  Gov- 
ernment, with  the  assurance  that  one  day  the  Tripoli- 
taine  and  Cyrenaica  would  pass  under  Italian  domina- 
tion, and  that  the  expectations  of  the  shareholders 
would  eventually  be  recompensed,  found  itself,  it  is 
said,  in  difficulties.  Last  year,  its  manager  informed 
the  Government  that  he  was  on  the  point  of  being 
driven  to  a  liquidation  of  his  interests  in  the  Tripoli- 
taine,  and  that  he  was  preparing  to  enter  upon  pour- 
parlers with  an  English  group  and  a  German  group. 
It  would  appear  that  the  prospect  greatly  contributed 
to  the  determination  of  the  Government  to  intervene, 
if  necessary,  by  arms.  Once  hostilities  began,  the 
Banco  di  Roma  obtained  the  contract  for  the  com- 
missariat operations  and  the  clothing  of  the  troops 
of  the  expeditionary  corps.  It  remains  associated 
with  the  Government  for  the  development  of  Italian 
interests  in  the  Tripolitaine.  Thus,  the  Bank  which 
has  the  confidence  of  the  Vatican  happens,  at  the 
same  time,  to  be  the  first  and  foremost  promoter  of 
Italian  enterprises  in  the  Tripolitaine:  an  elegant 
covihinazione ,  uniting,  for  a  work  of  Italian  expan- 
sion and  Christian  propaganda,  the  two  historic  forces 


104         THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

of  Rome  which  ofBcially  ignore  each  other  and  sev- 
erally combat  one  another." 


What  are  the  factors  of  this  situation?  They 
are  what  might  be  called  a  scab  bank,  a  government 
desiring  increased  political  power,  a  class  of  traders 
associated  with  the  government  and  desiring  new 
markets  and  resources,  an  agreement  with  Euro- 
pean Powers  virtually  turning  Tripoli  over  to 
Italy,  a  hostile  and  no  doubt  inefficient  and  cor- 
rupt Turkish  administration,  the  sinking  of  much 
money  which  had  to  be  retrieved,  an  expanding 
Italian  pride  spinning  dreams  of  ancient  Rome, 
a  natural  Christian  contempt  for  infidels.  Given 
that  situation,  the  Italian  enterprise  finds  itself 
balked.  "  The  Turks  are  hampering  Italians." 
Nothing  easier  than  to  regard  it  as  a  point  of 
honor.  News  that  Englishmen  and  Germans  may 
have  to  replace  the  bankrupt  Italians.  Nothing 
easier  than  to  regard  that  as  a  point  of  honor.  A 
general  feeling  that  to  beat  the  Turks  is  for  the 
glory  of  God  anyway.  Church  money  risked  in  a 
country  of  unbelievers.  Influential  and  worried 
shareholders,  who  perhaps  control  sympathetic 
newspapers.    Socialist  agitation  at  home  which  re- 


ARENAS  OF  FRICTION  105 

quires  the  sedative  of  patriotism.  Large  numbers 
of  unemployed  orators,  poets,  and  oflBcers  who  feel 
that  a  little  military  glory  would  help.  Perhaps 
some  French  and  English  diplomatic  nudging  in 
order  to  push  Italy,  which  is  Germany's  ally,  into 
a  war  with  Turkey,  which  is  also  Germany's  ally. 
The  prospect  of  war  contracts,  of  administrative 
jobs  in  the  conquered  province.  The  people  who 
have  something  to  gain  play  upon  the  national 
pride  of  those  who  think  they  have  nothing  to  lose. 
The  electric  power  plant  at  Benghazi  becomes  a 
point  in  a  Holy  War,  a  crusade,  a  defense  of 
Italian  sovereignty,  a  safeguarding  of  Christian 
sufferers,  an  interest  of  civilization,  of  Latin 
genius,  of  Papal  power,  of  the  Roman  eagles,  of 
Caesar,  Augustus,  Vergil,  Dante,  of  Jesus  Christ 
against  Mohammed.  Nobody  talks  about  the 
Banco  di  Roma. 

,The  formula  of  modem  imperialism  seems  to  be 
that  financial  groups  enter  a  weak  state  and  create 
"  national  interests,"  which  then  evoke  national 
feeling.  The  corruption  and  inefficiency  of  the 
weak  state  "  endanger  "  the  interests ;  patriotism 
rises  to  defend  them,  and  political  control  follows.  . 
The  prestige  of  a  Power  in  the  councils  of  the 


106         THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

world  depends  upon  the  weight  of  "  interests  " 
and  the  patriotic  fervor  with  which  they  are  "  pro- 
tected." I  am  told  that  it  was  the  State  Depart- 
ment at  Washington  which,  in  order  to  secure  a 
diplomatic  "  foothold,"  invited  the  American 
financial  group  to  enter  China.  A  government 
which  hesitates  very  long  at  intervention,  as  the 
United  States  has  done  in  Mexico,  depreciates  the 
value  of  its   diplomatic  power  everywhere. 

/  Out  of  this  complexity  of  motive  there  is 
created  a  union  of  various  groups  on  the  imperial 
programme :  the  diplomatic  group  is  interested  pri- 
marily in  prestige;  the  military  group  in  an  op- 
portunity to  act ;  the  bureaucratic  in  the  creation 
of  new  positions ;  the  financial  groups  in  safe- 
guarding investments ;  traders  in  securing  protec- 
tion and  privileges,  religious  groups  in  civilizing 
the  heathen,  the  "  intellectuals,"  in  realizing 
theories  of  expansion  and  carrying  out  "  manifest 
destinies,"  the  people  generally  in  adventure  and 
glory  and  the  sense  of  being  greajLj  These  inter- 
ested groups  severally  control  public  opinion,  and 
under  modern  methods  of  publicity  public  opinion 
is  easily  "  educated." 

'.  Who  should  intervene  in  backward  states,  what 


ARENAS  OF  FRICTION  107 

the  intervention  shall  mean,  how  the  protectorate 
shall  be  conducted — this  is  the  bone  and  sinew  of 
modern  diplomacy.  The  weak  spots  of  the  world 
are  the  arenas  of  friction. .  This  friction  is  in- 
creased and  made  popular  by  frontier  disputes 
over  Alsace-Lorraine  or  Italia  Irredenta,  but  in  my 
judgment  the  boundary  lines  of  Europe  are  not 
the  grand  causes  of  diplomatic  struggle.  Signor 
Ferrero  confessed  recently  that  the  present  genera- 
tion of  Italians  had  all  but  forgotten  Italia  Irre- 
denta, and  the  Revanche  has  been  a  decadent 
French  dream  until  the  Entente  and  the  Dual  Alli- 
ance began  to  clash  in  Morocco,  in  Turkey,  in 
China.  Alsace-Lorraine  has  no  doubt  kept  alive 
suspicion  of  Germany,  and  predisposed  French 
opinion  to  inflicting  diplomatic  defeats  in  Morocco. 
But  the  arena  where  the  European  Powers  really 
measure  their  strength  against  each  other  is  in  the 
Balkans,  in  Africa,  and  in  Asia. 

Our  Monroe  Doctrine  is  part  of  this  world- 
wide diplomatic  contest.  It  is  the  announcement 
that  this  hemisphere  is  not  to  be  made  part  of  the 
substance  of  European  diplomacy.  In  return  we 
virtually  agree  to  protect  by  force  the  interests  of 
modern  commerce  in  the  weaker  Latin-American 


108         THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

states.  We  forbid  European  intervention,  but  we 
guarantee  to  remove  the  cause  by  which  European 
intervention  would  be  justified  by  Continental 
Powers.  We  have  tried  to  establish  an  American 
oasis,  free  from  the  shiftings  of  European  power. 
So  far  circumstances  have  enabled  us  to  fulfill  our 
pretensions.  But  over  the  rest  of  the  world  this 
struggle  has  brooded  for  decades,  and  the  accumu- 
lated irritations  of  it  have  produced  the  great  war. 
Diplomacy  has  appealed  to  arms  because  no  satis- 
factory international  solution  has  been  found  for 
the  Balkan,  Turkish,  African,  and  Chinese  prob- 
lems. 

This  war  is  fought  not  for  specific  possessions, 
but  for  that  diplomatic  prestige  and  leadership 
which  are  required  to  solve  all  the  different  prob- 
lems. It  is  like  a  great  election  to  decide  who 
shall  have  the  supreme  power  in  the  Concert  of 
Europe.  Austria  began  the  contest  to  secure  her 
position  as  a  great  Power  in  the  Balkans ;  Russia 
entered  it  to  thwart  this  ambition ;  France  was 
engaged  because  German  diplomatic  supremacy 
would  reduce  France  to  a  "  second-class  power," 
which  means  a  power  that  holds  world  power  on 
sufferance ;  England  could  not  afford  to  see  France 


ARENAS  OF  FRICTION  109 

"  crushed  "  or  Belgium  annexed  because  British 
imperialism  cannot  alone  cope  with  the  vigor  of 
Germany  ;  Germany  felt  herself  "  encircled,"  which 
meant  that  wherever  she  went — to  Morocco,  Asia 
Minor,  or  China — there  a  coalition  was  ready  to 
thwart  her.  The  ultimate  question  involved  was 
this :  whenever  in  the  future  diplomats  meet  to 
settle  a  problem  in  the  backward  countries,  which 
European  nation  shall  be  listened  to  most  ear- 
nestly? What  shall  be  the  relative  prestige  of 
Germans  and  Englishmen  and  Frenchmen  and  Rus- 
sians ;  what  sense  of  their  power,  what  historical 
halo,  what  threat  of  force,  what  stimulus  to  admi- 
ration shall  they  possess?  To  lose  this  war  will 
be  like  being  a  Republican  politician  in  the  solid 
South  when  the  Democrats  are  in  power  at  Wash- 
ington. It  will  mean  political,  social,  and  economic 
inferiority. 

Americans  have  every  reason  to  understand  the 
dangers  of  unorganized  territory,  to  realize  clearly 
why  it  is  a  "  problem."  Our  Civil  War  was  pre- 
ceded-by  thirty  or  forty  years  of  diplomatic  strug- 
gle for  a  balance  of  power  in  the  West.  Should 
the  West  be  slave  or  free,  that  is,  should  it  be  the 
scene  of  homesteads  and  free  labor,  or  of  planta- 


110,         THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

tions  and  slaves  ?  Should  it  be  formed  into  states 
which  sent  senators  and  representatives  to  support 
the  South  or  the  North?  We  were  virtually  two 
nations,  each  trying  to  upset  the  balance  of  power 
in  its  own  favor.  And  when  the  South  saw  that 
it  was  beaten,  that  is  to  say  "  encircled,"  when  its 
place  in  the  Western  sun  was  denied,  the  South 
seceded  and  fought.  Until  the  problem  of  organ- 
izing the  West  had  been  settled,  peace  and  federal 
union  were  impossible. 

The  world's  problem  is  the  same  problem  tre- 
mendously magnified  and  complicated. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

A  LITTLE  REALPOLITIK 

One  of  the  most  puzzling  aspects  of  international 
politics  is  the  stubborn  way  in  which  the  ordinary 
citizen  refuses  to  bother  his  head  about  the  ques- 
tions which  really  trouble  the  diplomats.  He  will 
not  think  about  foreign  affairs  in  terms  of  mar- 
kets, concessions,  and  the  exploitation  of  weak 
peoples.  The  stakes  of  diplomacy  figure  hardly  at 
all  in  popular  thinking.  The  big  items  are  frontier 
disputes,  the  oppression  of  kindred  people,  racial 
mysticism,  and  a  huge  sentimental  interest  in  pres- 
tige. Now  these  preoccupations  no  doubt  count 
enormously  in  creating  the  explosive  energies  of 
international  affairs.  They  explain  the  existence 
of  hostile  feeling  among  the  masses  of  the  people. 
They  do  not  explain  the  direction  which  that  hos- 
tility takes. 

It  has  often  been  pointed  out  that  within  the 
memory  of  living  men  the  nations  of  Europe  now 
fighting  have  been  friends  with  their  enemies  and 

111 


112    THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

enemies  with  their  friends.  On  no  theory  of  racial 
antagonism,  nationality,  or  cultural  difference  and 
affinity  can  you  explain  the  fact  that  up  to  twenty 
years  ago  England  was  friends  with  Germany,  and 
deeply  hostile  to  France  and  Russia ;  it  isn't  "  Mus- 
covite barbarism  "  versus  "  Teutonic  Kultur " 
which  explains  the  dropping  of  Bismarck's  alli- 
ance with  Russia;  it  isn't  any  sentimental  theory 
which  explains  why  Germany  supplanted  England 
as  the  friend  of  Turkey;  why  Russia  and  Japan 
fought  ten  years  ago  and  have  become  allies  now. 
The  attempt  to  explain  the  world  war  in  terms  of 
Alsace-Lorraine,  Poland,  Italia  Irredenta,  and  so 
forth,  breaks  down  utterly  in  the  face  of  the  real 
issues  which  have  dominated  the  Armed  Peace  since 
1870.  The  world-wide  struggle  between  Great 
Britain  and  Germany  has  not  been  over  the  na- 
tional boundaries  of  Europe.  To  say  that  Great 
Britain  is  fighting  for  the  small  nations  of  the 
Continent  when  her  ally  Russia  is  the  oppressor 
of  Finns,  Poles,  and  Jews,  and  her  ally  Japan  is 
the  aggressor  on  Chinamen  and  Koreans,  when 
Great  Britain  herself  is  one  of  the  partitioners  of 
Persia,  is  nothing  but  the  talk  of  English  liberals 
who  make  a  pious  wish  father  to  a  pious  thought. 


A  LITTLE  REALPOLITIK  113 

The  mere  mention  of  recent  diplomatic  events 
ought  to  dispel  the  illusion  that  the  line-up  in 
Europe  is  cultural  or  national.  Fashoda:  in  1898 
France  and  England  were  on  the  verge  of  war  over 
it.  Where  is  Fashoda?  In  the  heart  of  Africa. 
The  Entente  Cordiale :  on  what  basis  was  it  made  ? 
Primarily  on  the  basis  of  an  agreement  about 
Newfoundland  fisheries,  West  African  boundaries, 
Siam,  Madagascar,  the  New  Hebrides,  and  above 
all  Egypt  and  Morocco ;  it  was  the  settling  of 
those  differences  in  order  to  present  a  united  front 
to  Germany.  Algeciras,  Casablanca,  Agadir:  all 
of  them  in  Africa.  The  Bagdad  Railway :  in  Asia 
Minor.  The  Balkan  crisis.  The  division  of  Persia. 
The  Russo-Japanese  War :  Manchuria.  The  Italo- 
Turkish  War:  Tripoli.  The  Bosnian  crisis.  The 
Spanish- American  War:  Cuba,  Porto  Rico,  the 
Philippines.  The  Venezuelan  affair  with  England, 
i  It  has  been  the  weakness  of  almost  all  pacifists 
that  they  have  never  grappled  with  these  problems 
from  which  the  shifting  antagonisms  of  nations 
receive  their  direction.  They  will  not  face  the 
fact  that  the  diplomatic  struggle,  the  armed  peace, 
and  the  war  itself  revolves  about  the  exploitation 
of  weak  territories ;  that  the  Balance  of  Power, 


114         THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

the  secret  alliances,  the  desire  for  prestige,  and  the 
rest  of  the  diplomatic  paraphernalia  are  for  use 
in  the  archaic  and  unorganized  portions  of  the 
globe;  that  the  anarchy  of  Europe  is  due  to  the 
anarchy  of  the  Balkans,  Africa,  and  Asia.  The 
diplomats  have  at  least  seen  the  reality,  as  a  read- 
ing of  their  negotiations  will  show.  They  have 
failed  to  solve  the  problem,  but  most  pacifists  have 
not  even  seen  the  problem. 

The  diplomats  have  even  had  a  programme  for 
the  peaceful  organization  of  backward  countries. 
Their  formula  has  been  "  the  preservation  of  their 
integrity  and  the  open  door  to  the  commerce  of  all 
nations."  Almost  every  recent  diplomatic  document 
dealing  with  Asia  or  Africa  contains  some  such 
announcement.  The  doctrine  is  intended  to  allay 
suspicion,  but  it  does  more  than  that.  In  a  half- 
hearted way  it  grasps  at  a  solution  of  the  world 
problem.  For  if  you  can  preserve  the  integrity  of 
a  country,  and  you  can  keep  the  door  open,  then 
you  preclude  any  one  nation  from  monopoly,  you 
give  all  nations  an  interest  in  preventing  aggres- 
sion, and  you  remove  the  prime  source  of  friction, 
which  is  the  attempt  of  traders  to  secure  control 
of  the  territory   and  discriminate   against  their 


A  LITTLE  REALPOLITIK  115 

competitors.  The  diplomats  diagnosed  the  malady. 
They  saw  that  the  weakness  of  these  countries  in- 
vited aggressive  competition,  so  they  proclaimed 
territorial  integrity.  They  saw  that  the  chief  in- 
terest of  all  nations  was  trade,  so  they  proclaimed 
the  Open  Door.  They  saw  that  only  one  nation 
could  gain  by  imperial  control  and  special  economic 
privilege,  and  they  hoped  that  the  interests  of  all 
the  others  would  prevent  the  absorption  of  weaker 
states.  The  ideal  they  stood  for  was  international. 
Taken  at  its  face  value,  it  meant  that  modern  com-  ^ 
merce  was  to  penetrate  without  destroying  the 
life  of  the  natives  and  without  preempting  the  ter- 
ritory for  the  business  men  of  any  one  nationality. 
The  only  trouble  with  the  ideal  was  that  it 
could  not  be  taken  at  its  face  value.  Integrity  and 
the  Open  Door  have  almost  never  been  realized,  and 
the  phrases  of  treaties  have  frequently  remained 
an  empty  aspiration.  Americans  ought  to  have 
no  difficulty  in  understanding  this  result.  We  too 
have  an  ideal  of  the  open  door  to  all  comers,  and 
we  know  how  hard  it  has  been  to  make  our  govern- 
ment live  up  to  that  ideal.  We  know  how  rail- 
roads have  discriminated  in  their  rates,  how  officials 
have  given  special  privileges  to  special  interests.^ 


116         THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

We  have  fought  a  long  fight  against  it.  Well,  the 
same  kind  of  forces  which  have  so  often  shut  the 
open  door  in  the  United  States  are  at  work  in 
these  weak  countries  where  governments  extend 
their  imperial  control.  Groups  of  business  men 
tend  to  secure  political  power  in  the  vassal  terri- 
tory, and  after  that  integrity  and  the  Open  Door 
are  likely  to  be  a  good  deal  of  a  mockery. 

A  rough  formula  of  what  happens  may  be  drawn 
up.  A  government  for  one  reason  or  another  ac- 
quires dominion  over  a  backward  people.  Nowa- 
days it  almost  always  does  so  with  the  consent  of 
the  other  Powers.  The  act  is  proclaimed  to  be  a 
European  stewardship,  a  disinterested  piece  of 
international  policing,  all  nations  are  promised 
equal  rights,  the  "  protected  "  people  are  promised 
a  benevolent  guardian.  This  work  is  done,  not  by 
angels,  but  by  colonial  officials.  These  human, 
all-too-human,  beings  become  associated  with  con- 
tractors, concessionaires,  bankers,  traders.  The 
officials  have  big  favors  to  give — franchises,  min- 
ing rights,  docking  privileges,  land  laws,  taxation, 
customs  administration,  public  works.  The  colo- 
nial officials  must  give  them  to  somebody  and  they 
have  to  translate  the  phrase  "  open  door "  into 


A  LITTLE  REALPOLITIK  117 

these  concrete  matters.  If  they  are  French  officials 
knowing  French  business  men,  what  is  more  natural 
than  that  these  decisions  should  go  against  the 
German  competitors  ?  With  the  best  intentions  in 
the  world  it  would  be  hard  to  maintain  equal  rights. 
And  their  intentions  are  not  always  the  best  in 
the  world. 

They  are  living  in  a  distant  country.  They 
are  homesick,  they  are  afraid  of  the  natives,  they 
form  clubs,  and  the  wives  of  officials  know  the 
wives  of  the  business  men.  There  is  an  interlock- 
ing of  interest,  friendship,  prejudice,  and  corrup- 
tion. The  Open  Door  disappears  in  the  shuffle. 
There  is  no  strong  public  opinion  to  maintain  it. 
The  disinterested  people  at  home,  if  there  are  any, 
cannot  watch  the  details  of  every  colonial  adminis- 
trative order.  They  have  no  adequate  way  of 
knowing  whether  their  officials  are  betraying  or 
fulfilling  the  pledge  given  to  the  world. 

Even  if  the  people  at  home  did  have  a  way  of 
knowing,  they  would  not  be  over-anxious  to  hold 
the  trust  sacred.  The  people  at  home  believe  that 
"  our  colonies  "  are  for  "  our  trade  " ;  they  want 
to  see  "  our  business  men  "  increase  "  our  wealth." 
The  popular  philosophy  of  the  world  is  that  trade 


^ 


118         THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

is  a  national  enterprise  to  be  advanced  by  national 
political  actions.  A  real  internationalism  of  com- 
merce is  still  Utopian  and  silly  to  public  opinion 
in  every  country.  People  believe  that  trade  fol- 
lows the  flag,  that  to  enlarge  political  control  is 
to  increase  prosperity.  This  philosophy  prevents 
the  home  government  from  checking  the  favoritism 
of  colonial  officials  even  when  that  favoritism  is 
turning  treaties  into  scraps  of  paper. 

Many  writers,  notably  Mr.  Norman  Angell,  have 
argued  that  this  philosophy  is  a  great  illusion.  A 
people  cannot  prosper,  they  say,  by  extending 
political  control.  They  claim  that  free  trade  is 
the  best  road  to  prosperity,  that  a  nation  cannot 
gain  wealth  for  itself  by  tariffs  and  discriminations 
and  privileges  in  its  colonies.  They  may  be  right, 
although  the  evidence  is  to  my  mind  far  from  com- 
plete. But  whatever  may  be  the  truth  about  the 
loss  or  gain  to  a  whole  people,  there  can  be  little 
doubt  that  there  is  a  real  possibility  of  gain  to  a 
group  of  capitalists. 

The  French  peasant  may  be  poorer  because  his 
government  administers  an  African  empire,  but 
that  certain  French  bankers  or  business  men  are 
richer  there  can  be  no  question.     If  those  capi- 


A  LITTLE  REALPOLITIK  119 

talists  can  secure  a  monopoly,  the  whole  world  may 
suffer  but  the  capitalists  gain.  Free  trade  may  j 
make  for  the  prosperity  of  the  masses,  but  tariffs, 
rebates,  and  monopolies  create  millionaires.  And 
it  is  not  the  masses  which  control  governments ; 
it  is  certain  economic  classes,  and  the  colonial  gov- 
ernments are  very  likely  to  be  controlled  by  colonial 
capitalists.  Those  capitalists  are  not  suffering  , 
from  the  Great  Illusion.  They  know  quite  defi- 
nitely that  it  is  more  profitable  for  them  to  secure 
a  privilege  than  to  have  someone  else  secure  it. 

The  Great  Illusion,  such  as  it  is,  must  be  in  the 
belief  of  French  peasants  and  artisans  and  shop- 
keepers that  they  have  something  to  gain  by  en- 
riching French  capitalists  in  Africa.  But  even 
here  I  am  not  altogether  sure  that  it  is  a  total 
illusion.  The  workingmen  in  a  tariff-protected 
industry  are  generally  protectionists ;  the  railroad 
workers  are  not  hostile  to  high  rates.  They  be- 
lieve that  they  can  either  share  the  profits  of  privi- 
lege, or  that  if  the  privilege  were  wiped  out  they 
would'  be  ruined.  Introduce  free  trade  in  the 
United  States  and  thousands  of  workingmen 
would  be  thrown  out  of  employment ;  reduce  rail- 
road  rates    too    drastically   and  the   railwayraen 


120         THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

must  abandon  hope  of  wage  increases.  In  like 
manner,  if  you  create  a  real  open  door  in  subject 
territory,  if  you  allow  fierce  competition,  the 
workmen  at  home  who  produce  for  the  colonial 
export  trade  will  suffer.  If  they  suffer,  the  shop- 
keepers from  whom  they  buy,  their  landlords,  and 
their  dependents  will  suffer.  Out  of  these  people 
there  arises  public  opinion  at  home  to  back  capi- 
talists abroad. 

It  may  still  be  true  that  the  people  in  general 
would  gain  by  free  trade,  which  is  only  another 
name  for  the  Open  Door.  But  the  people  in  gen- 
eral do  not  exist  except  in  the  minds  of  philoso- 
phers. The  people  who  are  heard  from  are  those 
whose  profits  and  livelihood  depend  upon  these 
privileges.  They  are  the  only  ones  sufficiently 
interested  to  care.  To  all  the  other  people  the 
problem  seems  thin  and  academic:  they  are  too 
busy  to  fight  privileged  groups  In  the  interest  of 
what  to  them  is  a  vague  ideal  of  internationalism. 
Moreover,  they  are,  on  the  whole,  convinced  that 
any  increase  of  colonial  wealth  will  help  rather 
than  hurt  them. 

There  is  rarely  an  interest  powerful  enough  in 
any  country  to  force  its  colonial  administration 


A  LITTLE  REALPOLITIK  121 

into  a  loyal  observance  of  the  spirit  and  letter  of 
the  promise  given  to  the  world.  There  is  almost 
never  a  political  power  at  home  sufficiently  active 
to  make  the  administration  of  a  weak  state  a  dis- 
interested service  to  the  international  community. 
The  groups  directly  interested  in  breaking  the 
promise  are  too  constantly  at  work.  They  appear 
as  "national  interests,"  evoke  patriotism ;  they 
corrupt  and  destroy  the  guarantees  given  to  the 
world. 

But  they  are  not  unopposed.  The  groups  in 
other  countries  in  whose  faces  the  door  has  been 
shut  protest  to  their  governments.  Their  govern- 
ments take  up  the  matter  diplomatically,  and  an 
issue  has  been  raised  between  the  nations.  The 
Germans  claim,  for  example,  that  the  French  did 
not  live  up  to  the  agreements  about  Morocco,  that 
the  visit  of  the  Emperor  to  the  Sultan  of  Tangiers, 
the  sending  of  the  Panther  to  Agadir,  were  at- 
tempts to  make  France  discuss  her  Moroccan 
policy  with  the  governments  of  Europe.  I  cannot 
pretend  to  know  the  real  facts  of  the  situation, 
but  it  is  difficult  not  to  believe  that  there  is  some 
truth  in  the  German  claim.  There  may  have  been 
less  truth  than  the  actions  of  Germany  warranted, 


122        THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

but  there  is  every  human  reason  for  suspecting 
that  Morocco  was  dominated  less  in  the  interests 
of  the  world  than  in  the  interests  of  French 
colonial  capitalists. 

For  the  purposes  of  this  argument  it  is  not  im- 
portant to  decide  the  exact  truth  of  the  issue.     I 
have  read  English  and  French  and  Belgian  com- 
ment which  agreed  with  Germany;  I  have   read 
German  comment  which  agreed  with  France.     But 
the  main  lesson  of  the  business  is  that  the  issue  is 
difficult  to  settle,  that  the  only  way  open  for  set- 
tling it  was   by  diplomacy   between   the   German 
government  and  the  Entente  Powers.     But  such 
diplomacy  could  never  be  limited  to  the  Moroccan 
problem  alone.      The  vexed   question   of  whether 
the  claims  of  the  Mannesmann  Brothers  were  fic- 
titious or  real  became  inevitably  a  European  prob- 
lem in  which  every  irritation,  every  blindness  of 
patriotism,  rose  up  to  cloud  the  issue.    The  Moroc- 
can affair  ceased  to  be  a  matter  of  determining 
claims ;  it  became  an  effort  to  test  the  solidity  of 
the  Entente,  a  question  of  prestige.    It  was  a  small 
match  which  on  two  occasions  almost  set  off  an 
immense  powder  magazine. 

Some  English  liberals  have  protested  vigorously 


A  LITTLE  REALPOLITIK  123 

against  the  idea  that  England  should  have  threat- 
ened war  with  Germany  to  support  the  French 
policy  in  Morocco.  They  dismiss,  quite  rightly, 
the  notion  that  England's  action  was  based  on  a 
^  conviction  that  the  French  had  abstract  justice  on 
their  side.  No  nation  risks  war  for  the  sake  of 
abstract  justice  in  some  corner  of  the  world. 
These  English  liberals  then  point  out  that  England 
stood  to  lose  economically  by  the  French  policy  in 
Morocco.    Why  did  England  do  what  she  did? 

She  did  it  for  what  we  Americans  call  "  log- 
rolling "  reasons.  She  supported  France  in 
Morocco  because  she  wanted  French  support  in 
Egypt  and  elsewhere.  She  did  it  to  preserve  the 
Entente,  to  resist  what  she  felt  was  German  ag- 
gression. The  English  liberals  often  point  to  the 
secret  pact  with  France.  Whether  it  was  moral 
or  immoral,  wise  or  unwise,  need  not  be  dis- 
cussed. The  significance  of  it  for  us  is  that  the 
Anglo-French  harmony  was  like  a  political  party 
in  which  one  congressman  agrees  to  vote  for  an- 
other congressman's  appropriation  in  exchange 
for  support  of  his  own.  The  Entente  and  the 
Teutonic  Alliance  were  the  two  political  parties 
of  the  world  which  made  non-partisan  government 


124        THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

of  weak  territory  impossible.  Yet  non-partisan- 
ship is  what  the  Open  Door  promises.  Just  as 
Democrats  and  Republicans  will  cover  each  other 
with  mud  in  a  quarrel  over  a  two-thousand-dollar 
appointment,  so  these  nations  of  Europe,  lined  up 
into  political  coalitions,  have  covered  each  other 
with  blood  over  a  series  of  quarrels  about  privi- 
leges in  backward  states. 

Let  me  make  myself  clear :  I  do  not  think  Europe 
is  fighting  about  any  particular  privilege  in  the 
Balkans  or  in  Africa.  I  think  she  is  fighting  be- 
cause Europe  had  been  divided  into  two  groups 
which  clashed  again  and  again  over  the  organiza- 
tion of  the  backward  parts  of  the  world.  Those 
clashes  involved  prestige,  called  forth  national  sus- 
picions, created  the  armaments,  and  after  a  while 
no  question  could  be  settled  on  its  merits.  Each 
question  involved  the  standing  of  the  Powers,  each 
question  was  a  test  of  relative  strength.  No 
nation  felt  it  couy_.afford  to  lose  even  if  it  hap- 
pened to  be  wrong.  Since  no  question  could  be 
settled,  every  question  continued  to  pour  its  poison 
into  the  European  mind.  It  was  the  memory  of 
diplomatic  defeats,  the  fear  of  future  defeats,  that 
in  July,  1914f,  had  made  European  diplomacy  in- 


A  LITTLE  REALPOLITIK  125 

capable  of  preserving  the  peace.  The  struggle  had 
hardened  the  governing  mind  to  a  point  where  stub- 
born insistence  and  uninventive  appeals  for  peace 
were  all  that  was  left. 

The  mind  of  Europe  collapsed.  The  appeal  to 
arms  was  the  result  of  that  criminal  recklessness 
which  decides  to  hack  its  way  through  when  no 
other  solution  presents  itself  to  the  mind.  We 
tinker  futilely  with  a  machine  until  in  exasperation  \ 
we  kick  it.  But  when  Europe  is  through  kicking  I 
itself  to  pieces  it  will  have  to  start  tinkering  again.  , 
The  problems  which  drove  it  to  the  war  will  still 
require  constructive  solutions.  Those  problems 
arose  out  of  the  chaos  and  backwardness  of  weak 
states.  This  war  will  have  increased  the  chaos  and 
the  backwardness.  It  will  leave  all  Europe  ex- 
hausted for  the  work.  It  may  change  the  Balance 
of  Power,  but  whatever  the  relative  position  of 
the  nations  at  the  end,  they  will  have  to  resume 
their  interrupted  work  of  making  the  whole  world 
politically  fit  for  modern  commerce.  They  may 
listen  to^  one  Power  more  and  to  another  less,  but 
the  bedazzled  and  flouted  task  of  internationalizing 
the  unorganized  earth  will  continue  to  demand 
their  attention.  They  may  fight  "  to  the  last  man," 


126        THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

but  they  will  not  escape  the  problem,  nor  by  fight- 
ing can  they  solve  it.  They  can  perhaps  exhaust 
themselves  so  thoroughly  that  Africa  and  Asia  will 
be  too  strong  to  be  "  civilized  "  by  Europe.  But 
the  chances  are  that  they  will  begin  again  to  re- 
build the  international  structure  which  they  built 
so  badly  and  wrecked  so  hideously. 


CHAPTER  IX 
A  PROPOSAL 


/  The  point  I  have  been  making  will,  I  fear,  seem 
a  paradox  to  many  readers, — that  the  anarchy  of 
the  world  is  due  to  the  backwardness  of  weak 
states;  that  the  modern  nations  have  lived  in  an 
armed  peace  and  collapsed  into  hideous  warfare 
because  in  Asia,  Africa,  the  Balkans,  Central  and  \j^' 
South  America  there  are  rich  territories  in  which 
weakness  invites  exploitation,  in  which  inefficiency  /J  ■ 
and  corruption  invite  imperial  expansion,  in  which 
the  prizes  are  so  great  that  the  competition  for 
them  is  to  the  knife. 

This  is  the  world  problem  upon  which  all 
schemes  for  arbitration,  leagues  of  peace,  reduc- 
tion of  armaments  must  prove  themselves.  ^  The 
diplomats  have  in  general  recognized  this.  It  was 
commonly  said  for  a  generation  that  Europe  would 
be  lucky-if  it  escaped  a  general  war  over  the  break- 
up of  Turkey  in  Europe.  The  Sick  Man  has 
infected  the  Continent.    Our  own  "  preparedness  " 

campaign  is  based  on  the  fear  that  the  defenseless- 

137 


128         THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

ness  of  Latin- America  will  invite  European  aggres- 
sion, that  the  defenselessness  of  China  will  bring 
on  a  struggle  in  the  Pacific.  Few  informed  people 
imagine  for  a  moment  that  any  nation  of  the  world 
contemplates  seizing  or  holding  our  own  territory. 
That  would  be  an  adventure  so  ridiculous  that  no 
statesman  would  think  of  it.  If  we  get  into  trouble 
it  will  be  over  some  place  like  Mexico,  or  Haiti,  or 
the  Philippines,  or  the  Panama  Canal,  or  Man- 
churia, or  Hawaii. 

Our  Monroe  Doctrine  has  meant,  in  a  rough 
way,  that  this  hemisphere  was  not  to  be  made  part 
of  the  stakes  of  diplomacy.  We  have  regarded  it 
as  an  announcement  to  Europe  that  if  any  force 
was  to  be  used  in  regulating  the  weak  American 
republics,  the  United  States  alone  would  use  that 
force.  We  almost  went  to  war  with  England  in 
1896  because  we  insisted  that  the  United  States, 
not  Great  Britain,  was  the  policeman  of  Venezuela. 
During  our  Civil  War  France  sent  an  army  into 
Mexico.  We  were  too  weak  to  stop  her.  We  were, 
in  fact,  for  the  time  being,  one  of  the  disorderly 
parts  of  the  world,  and  we  invited  aggression. 
But  when  the  Union  was  saved,  France  had  to  with- 
draw from  Mexico. 


A  PROPOSAL  129 

Experts  in  international  affairs  tell  us  that  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  has  really  been  nothing  but  a 
gigantic  bluff  made  possible  by  the  fact  that 
Europe  was  so  busy  it  did  not  dare  to  risk  war  with 
us.  Europe,  especially  Great  Britain,  has  let  us 
hold  the  Doctrine.  But  it  has  implied  that  we  must 
be  responsible  for  the  protection  of  trade  and 
capital  and  life.  In  other  Avords,  we  can  have 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  if  we  act  as  international 
guardian  of  the  weak  Americas.  If  we  failed  to  do 
that,  Europe  would  call  us  to  account.  She  would 
undoubtedly  have  called  us  to  account  long  ago 
over  Mexico  if  it  had  not  been  for  the  war. 

Just  now  President  Wilson  is  trying  to  re- 
organize Mexico.  He  plans  to  pacify  the  country, 
not  as  an  imperial  act,  but  as  a  Pan-American 
duty.  The  outcome  is  not  clear,  the  difficulties  are 
enormous.  But  the  point  which  needs  to  be  borne 
in  mind  is  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  Pan-American 
action,  and  the  rest  of  the  paraphernalia  are  the 
existing  machinery  through  which  Mr.  Wilson  can 
exercise'  some  of  the  functions  of  a  Avorld  govern- 
ment. If  an  actual  world  state  existed,  Mexico 
would  be  policed  by  international  force.  No  such 
world  state  exists,  but  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and 


130        THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

Pan- Americanism  are  attempts  to  fill  the  vacuum. 
The  need  is  so  great  that  these  substitutes  have  had 
to  be  invented. 

Europe  has  also  recognized  that  some  kind  of 
world  government  must  be  created.  The  phrase 
world  government,  of  course,  arouses  immediate 
opposition ;  the  idea  of  a  European  legislature 
would  be  pronounced  Utopian.  Yet  there  have 
been  a  number  of  European  legislatures.  The 
Berlin  Conference  of  1885  was  called  to  discuss 
"  freedom  of  commerce  in  the  basin  and  mouths  of 
the  Congo ;  application  to  the  Congo  and  Niger  of 
the  principles  adopted  at  the  Congress  of  Vienna 
with  a  view  to  preserve  freedom  of  navigation  on 
certain  international  rivers  .  .  .  and  a  definition 
of  formalities  to  be  observed  so  that  new  occupa- 
tions on  the  African  coasts  shall  be  deemed  ef- 
fective." The  Powers  represented  made  all  sorts 
of  reservations,  but  they  managed  to  pass  a 
"  General  Act  of  the  West  African  Conference." 
The  Congo  Free  State  was  recognized.  As  Mr. 
Harris  says :  ^  "  Bismarck  saw  in  this  a  means  of 
preventing  armed  conflict  over  the  Congo  Basin, 

of  restricting  the  Portuguese  advance,  and  of  pre- 

^  Intervention   and   Colonization   in   Africa,   by    Norman 
Dwight  Harris,  p.  28. 


A  PROPOSAL  131 

serving  the  region  to  free  trade."  What  was  it 
that  Bismarck  saw?  He  saw  that  the  great  wealth 
of  the  Congo  and  its  political  weakness  might  make 
trouble  in  Europe  unless  the  Congo  was  organized 
into  the  legal  structure  of  the  world. 

The  Conference  at  Algeciras  was  an  interna-  t> 
tional  legislature  in  which  even  the  United  States 
was  represented ;  the  London  Conference  after  the 
Balkan  wars  was  a  gathering  of  ambassadors  try- 
ing to  legislate  out  of  existence  the  sources  of 
European  trouble  in  the  Balkans.  But  all  these 
legislatures  have  had  one  great  fault.  They  met, 
they  passed  laws,  they  adjourned,  and  left  the 
enforcement  of  their  mandate  to  the  conscience  of 
the  individual  Powers.  The  legislature  was  inter- 
national, but  the  executive  was  merely  national. 
The  legislature  moreover  had  no  way  of  checking 
up  or  controlling  the  executive.  The  representa- 
tives of  all  the  nations  would  pass  laws  for  the 
government  of  weak  territories,  but  the  translation 
of  those  laws  into  practice  was  left  to  the  colonial 
bureaucrats  of  some  one  nation. 

If  the  law  was  not  carried  out,  to  whom  would 
an  appeal  be  made?  Not  to  the  Conference,  for  it 
had  ceased  to  exist.    There  was  no  way  in  which  a 


132         THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

European  legislature  could  recall  the  oflBcials  who 
did  not  obey  its  will.  Those  officials  were  respon- 
sible to  their  home  government,  although  they  were 
supposed  to  be  executing  a  European  mandate. 
Those  who  were  injured  had  also  to  appeal  to  their 
home  government,  and  the  only  way  to  remedy  an 
abuse  or  even  sift  out  the  truth  of  an  allegation 
was  by  negotiation  between  the  Powers.  This 
raised  the  question  of  their  sovereignty,  called 
forth  patriotic  feeling,  revived  a  thousand  memo- 
ries, and  made  any  satisfactory  interpretation  of 
the  European  Act  or  any  criticism  of  its  adminis- 
tration a  highly  explosive  adventure. 

Suppose,  for  example,  that  Congress  had  pow^r 
to  pass  laws,  but  that  the  execution  of  them  was 
left  to  the  states.  Suppose  New  York  had  its 
own  notions  of  tariff  administration.  How  would 
the  other  states  compel  the  New  York  customs 
officials  to  execute  the  spirit  and  letter  of  the 
federal  law?  Suppose  every  criticism  by  Penn- 
sylvania of  a  New  York  Collector  was  regarded  as 
an  infringement  of  New  York's  sovereignty,  as  a 
blow  at  New  York's  pride,  what  kind  of  chaos 
would  we  suffer  from-f*  Yet  that  is  the  plight  of 
our  world  society. 


A  PROPOSAL  133 

The  beginnings  of  a  remedy  would  seem  to  lie 
in  not  disbanding  these  European  conferences  when 
they  have  passed  a  law.  They  ought  to  continue 
in  existence  as  a  kind  of  senate,  meeting  from 
time  to  time.  They  ought  to  regard  themselves  as 
watchers  over  the  legislation  which  they  have 
passed.  To  them  could  be  brought  grievances,  by 
them  amendments  could  be  passed  when  needed. 
The  colonial  officials  should  at  least  be  made  to 
report  to  this  senate,  and  all  important  matters 
of  policy  should  be  laid  open  to  its  criticism  and 
suggestion.  In  this  way  a  problem  like  that  of 
Morocco,  for  example,  might  be  kept  localized  to 
a  permanent  European  Conference  on  Morocco. 
Europe  would  never  lose  its  grip  on  the  situation, 
because  it  would  have  representatives  on  the  spot 
watching  the  details  of  administration,  in  a  position 
to  learn  the  facts,  and  with  a  real  opportunity  for 
stating  grievances. 

The  development  of  such  a  senate  would  prob- 
ably be  towards  an  increasing  control  of  colonial 
officials.  At  first  It  would  have  no  power  of  ap- 
pointment or  removal.  It  would  be  limited  to 
criticism.  But  It  is  surely  not  fantastic  to  sup- 
pose that  the  colonial  civil  service  would  In  time 


134        THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

be  internationalized ;  that  is  to  say,  opened  to  men 
of  different  nationalities.  The  senate,  if  it  de- 
veloped any  traditions,  would  begin  to  supervise 
the  budget,  would  fight  for  control  of  salaries,  and 
might  well  take  over  the  appointing  power  alto- 
gether. It  would  become  an  upper  house  for  the 
government  of  the  protected  territory',  not  essen- 
tially different  perhaps  from  the  American  Philip- 
pine Commission.  The  lower  house  would  be  native, 
and  there  would  probably  be  a  minority  of  natives 
in  the  senate.  The  liberal  Powers  would  undoubt- 
edly clash  with  the  others  over  "the  policy  to  be 
presented  as  the  natives  rose  to  self-consciousness 
and  demanded  increasing  power  in  their  own 
country. 

An  organization  of  this  kind  would  meet  all  the 
difficulties  that  our  Continental  Congress  or  that 
any  other  primitive  legislature  has  had  to  deal  with. 
There  would  be  conflicts  of  jurisdiction,  puzzling 
questions  of  interpretation,  and  some  place  of 
final  appeal  would  have  to  be  provided.  It  might 
be  the  Senate  of  European  representatives ;  but  if 
the  Senate  deadlocked,  an  appeal  might  be  taken 
to  The  Hague.  The  details  of  all  this  are  ob- 
viously speculative  at  the  moment. 


A  PROPOSAL  135 

/The  important  point  is  that  there  should  be 
in  existence  permanent  international  commissions 
to  deal  with  those  spots  of  the  earth  where  world 
crises  originate.  How  many  there  should  be  need 
not  be  suggested  here.  There  should  have  been  one 
for  Morocco,  for  the  Congo,  for  the  Balkan  penin- 
sula, perhaps  for  Manchuria ;  there  may  have  to  be 
one  for  Constantinople,  for  certain  countries  fac- 
ing the  Caribbean  Sea.  Such  international  gov- 
erning bodies  are  needed  wherever  the  prizes  are 
great,  the  territory  unorganized,  and  the  com- 
petition active. 

The  idea  is  not  over-ambitious.  It  seems  to  me 
the  necessary  development  of  schemes  which  Euro- 
pean diplomacy  has  been  playing  with  for  some 
time.  It  represents  an  advance  along  the  line 
that  governments,  driven  by  necessity,  have  been 
taking  of  their  own  accord.  What  makes  it  espe- 
cially plausible  is  that  it  grasps  the  real  problems 
of  diplomacy,  that  it  provides  not  a  panacea  but  a 
method  and  the  beginnings  of  a  technique.  It  is 
internationalism,  not  spread  thin  as  a  Parliament 
of  Man,  but  sharply  limited  to  those  areas  of 
friction  where  internationalism  is  most  obviously 
needed. 


CHAPTER  X 

ALGECIRAS:   A  LANDMARK 

The  proposal  made  in  the  last  chapter  differs  in 
many  important  ways  from  the  peace  programmes 
now  being  discussed  in  England  and  America. 
The  differences  are  in  themselves  worth  discussing 
because  they  throw  into  relief  some  of  the  real 
issues  of  world  organization. 

The  magic  word  in  America  to-day  is  arbitra- 
tion. The  song  "  I  Didn't  Raise  My  Boy  to  Be 
a  Soldier  "  contains  the  sincere,  though  unmusical, 
lines, 


^„  "  Let  nations  arbitrate  their  future  troubles, 
It's  time  to  lay  the  sword  and  gun  away." 


On  a  Chautauqua  circuit  the  orator  can  almost 

always  draw  applause  by  insisting  that  war  is  as 

obsolete  as  dueling,  that  nations  sliould  settle  their 

differences   in   court    and   not   on   the   battlefield. 

The  idea  seems  to  be  that  diplomats  should  be  as 

reasonable  as  possible,  and  that  when  they  can- 

186 


ALGECIRAS:  A  LANDMARK  137 

not  come  to  agreement  the  case  should  be  taken 
to  the  Hague  Tribunal  and  settled  for  them. 

/The  fatal  flaw  of  the  scheme  is,  of  course,  that 
nations  will  arbitrate  only  their  unimportant  dif-  " 
ferences.  They  will  not,  and  cannot,  arbitrate  such 
matters  as  the  relative  prestige  of  Germany  and 
England,  the  right  of  the  Entente  to  fight  a  diplo- 
matic war  with  the  Dual  Alliance,  or  what  the 
balance  of  power  is  to  be  in  future  negotiations 
about  Africa  and  Asia.  There  is  no  court  which 
can  help  the  anger  of  Republicans  at  being  "  en- 
circled "  by  Democrats  in  the  solid  South.  Yet 
the  alignment  of  nations  is  more  like  the  alignment 
of  political  parties  than  it  is  like  the  opposition 
of  two  men  engaged  in  a  lawsuit.  Behind  most  of 
the  specific  differences  between  nations  looms  the 
conviction  that  the  quarrel  is  a  test  of  strength. 
They  are  afraid  of  losing  not  only  the  actual 
dispute,  but  their  prestige  in  future  disputes. 
Thus  Prince  Biilow,  in  explaining  the  German 
government's  position  to  his  ambassador  in  Lon- 
don (April  15,  1905),  writes:  "  We  are  acting  in 
regard  to  our  interests,  of  which  there  is  appar- 
ently the  desire  to  dispose  without  our  assent. 
The  importance  of  these  interests  is  in  this  con- 


138,        THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

Q  nection  a  secondary  matter.  ,  ,  .  We  possess  eco- 
nomic interests  in  Morocco.  .  .  .If,  by  our  si- 
lence, we  renounce  them,  we  shall  then  encourage 
the  world,  which  is  watching  us,  to  adopt  a  similar 
lack  of  consideration  to  our  detriment  in  other 
questions,  perhaps  more  important." 

Again,  on  April  28,  1905,  he  writes  to  his  am- 
bassador in  Paris :  "  If  a  great  Power  were  to 
admit  this  fashion  of  ignoring  its  existence,  the 
said  Power  would  be  incurring  inconvenience  in  the 
future,  not  to  say  dangers.  The  material  value 
of  the  threatened  interests  only  comes  in  here  as 
a  secondary  factor."  So  the  diplomats  describe 
their  interest  as  a  vital  interest  involving  honor 
which  is  not  justiciable.     They  mean,  as  Prince 

^  Billow  says,  that  the  merits  of  the  controversy  are 
less  important  than  the  loss  or  gain  of  influence. 

Moreover,  it  is  very  difficult  to  see  how  a  court 
could  arbitrate  the  important  matters.  A  court 
consists  of  judges.  These  judges  can  take  a  treaty 
and  "  interpret  "  it — that  is  to  say,  they  can  say 
what  they  believe  it  means.  They  can  make  a 
human  judgment  about  evidence  submitted  and 
issue  a  decree.  But  as  everyone  knows,  there  are 
more  ways  than  one  of  frustrating  any  legal  de- 


ALGECIRAS:  A  LANDMARK  139 

cision:  the  letter  of  the  law  can  be  observed  and 
the  spirit  denied.  The  Hague  Court  has  no  ma- 
chinery for  following  up  its  decree,  no  way  of 
controlling  the  administrative  effects  of  its  deci- 
sions. It  gives  a  static  interpretation  of  static 
treaties  and  hopes  they  will  apply  reasonably  to 
dynamic  conditions.  The'  Court  must  frankly 
enunciate  judge-made  law  for  new  conditions  or 
it  will  forever  be  trying  to  fit  antiquated  formulae 
to  the  complexity  of  life. 

All  this  means  that  the  Hague  Court  is  impo- 
tent without  legislation  and  without  executive,  ^i  It 
can  deal  with  minor  points  where  the  will  not  to 
fight  is  strong,  but  it  is  certain  to  break  down 
where  the  dander  is  up,  where  nations  feel  that  the 
law  is  archaic,  or  that  the  execution  of  it  is  unfair. 
Germany's  real  quarrel  with  the  Entente  has  been 
that  it  was  insisting  upon  the  sanctification  of 
international  laws  that  had  been  outgrown,  that 
those  laws  were  conservative,  and  were  fatal  to  her 
progress.  She  wanted  not  a  legal  interpretation  of 
existing  law,  but  a  revision  of  it.  In  that  desire 
the  Germans  say  they  were  blocked  at  every  point. 
Now  by  what  process  at  The  Hague  could  the  law 
have  been  altered.''     The  Court  could  hardly  do 


140        THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

much  more  than  interpret  the  very  law  to  which 
Germany  objected,  unless  the  Court  was  to  make 
itself  into  a  European  legislature.  But  the  na- 
tions would  not  to-day  tolerate  such  usurpation  of 
power  by  international  judges. 

i^These  difficulties  are,  it  seems  to  me,  supreme. 
Arbitration  will  fail  at  the  crucial  points,  because 
the  real  need  is  for  lawmaking  and  control  of 
administration.  As  a  great  American  statesman 
has  said :  "  I  was  willing  to  arbitrate  the  dispute 
over  such-and-such  because  I  knew  we  were  sure 
to  win."  He  would  not  have  submitted  the  matter 
to  arbitration  if  he  had  not  been  sure  of  the  re- 
sult. This  sentiment  among  governments  has  one 
result:  nothing  will  induce  them  to  arbitrate  an 
important  point  unless  they  feel  sure  the  Court 
will  be  with  them. 

Many  pacifists  have  seized  upon  this  defect  of 
the  Hague  idea  and  tried  to  find  a  remedy  for  it. 
They  say  that  there  must  be  international  force  to 
compel  arbitration  and  to  sanction  its  decrees. 
The  result  is  the  proposed  League  of  Peace,  an 
agreement  that  all  nations  will  fight  any  one  na- 
tion which  refuses  to  submit  its  quarrels  to  The 
Hague. 


ALGECIRAS:  A  LANDMARK  141 

(Such  a  league  might  keep  the  peace,  but  it  would 
be  a  very  unsatisfactory  peace..  It  would  mean 
that  small  countries  like  Holland,  Denmark,  and 
Switzerland  would  be  drawn  at  once  into  a  quarrel 
between  Great  Britain  and  Germany.  It  would 
mean  that  the  French  peasants  on  the  Meuse  lived 
in  fear  and  trembling  at  the  prospect  that  they 
would  have  to  take  part  in  a  war  between,  let  us 
say,  Germany  and  the  United  .  States.  Belgium 
and  Poland  would  be  the  battlefields  of  every  at- 
tempt to  compel  Germany  to  arbitrate  her  ambi- 
tions. The  League  is  really  an  Anglo-American 
idea,  a  rather  comfortable  proposal  on  our  part 
to  make  others  bear  the  brunt  of  our  troubles. 
It  is  a  plan  profoundly  unjust  in  its  distribution 
of  costs.  It  is  obviously,  though  unconsciously, 
of  course,  devised  in  the  selfish  interest  of  the  na- 
tions which  are  not  likely  to  be  invaded. 

/  Even  if  it  were  feasible,  it  would  not  meet  the 
situation.  When  a  nation  had  been  bullied  into 
arbitration,  the  Hague  Court  would  still  be  an 
inadequate  instrument  for  meeting  the  situation. 
It  would  still  be  unable  to  legislate  or  to  control 
administration. 

The  whole  idea  seems  to  be  based  on  a  false  con- 


C 


O 


142        THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

ception  of  the  world  problem.  It  contains  no 
method  for  organizing  the  world,  for  dealing  day 
by  day  with  the  weak  spots  which  are  the  areas 
of  friction.  When  the  fire  is  just  about  to  break 
out,  arbitration  arrives  with  a  teaspoonful  of 
water.  It  offers  no  technique  for  the  constructive 
elimination  of  the  causes  of  war;  it  merely  tries 
to  stop  war  when  the  causes  have  operated  to  the 
breaking  point.  It  has  hindsight  and  it  lacks 
foresight.  It  acts  on  the  mistaken  notion  that 
the  quarrels  of  nations  are  over  specific  points,  and 
fails  to  recognize  that  what  the  world  needs  is 
not  the  adjudication  of  deadlocks,  but  the  per- 
sistent, creative  administration  of  those  terri- 
tories where  deadlocks  are  likely  to  occur.  Arbi- 
tration is  always  too  late,  even  when  it  is  success- 
ful. It  is  applied  only  when  the  quarrel  has 
aroused  patriotism,  has  become  a  "  vital  interest," 
has  grown  to  proportions  where  defeat  is  more 
than  a  nation  will  endure. 

The  scheme  is  a  bashful  attempt  to  create  a 
world  state  out  of  courts  alone.  A  world  state 
is  meaningless  without  legislative  and  executive 
powers.  :  It  is  all  very  well  to  talk  of  going  to 
court  instead  of  fighting  a  duel,  but  if  there  were 


ALGECIRAS:  A  LANDMARK  143 

no  legislature  which  had  power  to  make  laws  and 
no  executive  to  enforce  them  we  should  continue 
to  fight  duels.  The  mere  fact  that  there  were  men 
called  judges  ready  to  decide  about  laws  which 
were  vague  in  the  minds  of  judges  and  unsatis- 
factory to  everyone  would  not  compel  much 
loyalty. 

Realizing  this,  many  people  dream  of  a  Federa- 
tion of  the  World,  with  a  Parliament  of  Man,  a 
World  Police,  World  Courts,  and  World  Officials. 
It  is  a  valiant  dream  which  will  be  realized  if  this 
planet  is  to  fulfill  man's  best  hopes.  It  is  clearly 
the  goal  of  humane  political  endeavor,  and  no 
civilized  man  can  afford  to  sneer  at  it  or  to  \uy  i 
it  altogether  outside  his  mind.  Its  difficulties  to- 
day are  obvious.  They  are  chiefly  these:  that  too 
few  people  desire  such  a  world  state,  that  such 
a  world  state  to-day  would  be  tyrannical  to 
weaker  peoples,  that  the  administrative  capacity 
of  the  peoples  of  the  earth  is  not  yet  ready  for  it,  ^ 
that  no  Parliament  of  Man  could  possibly  know 
enough  or  find  time  enough  to  deal  with  the  enor- 
mous complexities  of  the  earth.  The  British  Par- 
liament is  choked  with  the  mere  volume  of  business 
which  imperial  and  domestic  affairs  put  before  it. 


144         THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

A  World  Parliament  would  collapse  under  Its  tre- 
mendous burdens. 

The  Hague  plan,  with  all  its  ramifications,  fails 
because  it  lacks  the  essentials  of  government — - 
legislative  and  executive  power.  The  World  State 
is  at  present  too  ambitious.  The  proposal  I  have 
ventured  to  make  provides  for  a  series  of  local 
world  governments,  each  charged  with  some  one  of 
the  world  problems.  Developed  out  of  the  idea  of 
world  conferences  like  that  about  the  Congo  and 
Morocco,  it  would  construct  a  number  of  minia- 
ture world  legislatures,  with  the  hope  that  they 
would  become  localized  organs  of  a  world  state. 
No  step  proposed  goes  very  far  beyond  existing 
experience.  In  some  parts  of  the  world  the  cus- 
toms or  the  debt  is  internationally  administered 
(Turkey,  for  example,  and  China) ;  for  others 
there  have  been  European  legislatures  (such  as 
the  Berlin  Congress  of  1885)  dependent  upon  na- 
tional administration ;  in  some  places  the  courts  are 
extraterritorial  (China;  Turkey  till  recently). 
The  suggestion  is  that  the  legislature  be  made 
permanent,  that  the  administration  be  coordinated 
with  it.  There  would  thus  he  established  full- 
fledged    world    governments    limited    to    special 


ALGECIRAS:  A  LANDMARK  145 

areas.  They  would  demand  in  the  beginning 
no  more  relinquishment  of  national  sovereignty 
than  the  experience  and  sense  of  the  world  has 
already  fairly  well  agreed  to. 

The  case  of  Morocco  is  illuminating  because  it 
shows  the  older  diplomacy  experimenting  with  the 
rudiments  of  a  world  state.  Back  in  1880  Morocco 
was  seen  to  be  an  international  problem,  and  a 
convention  was  held  at  Madrid  to  discuss  her  af- 
fairs. Everybody  concerned  protested  loudly  his 
.unalterable  attachment  to  the  integrity  of  Morocco 
and  to  equal  trading  rights  for  all  nations.  There 
is  no  use  pretending  that  these  professions  were 
loyally  carried  out.  France,  Spain,  Great  Britain, 
and  Germany  were  involved  in  bargains,  demands, 
and  adventures  of  all  kinds  which  made  Moroccan 
independence  and  the  open  door  fairly  idle  words. 
Then  the  German  Emperor  paid  his  visit  to  Tan- 
giers,  and  some  months  later  the  European  nations 
and  the  United  States  met  at  Algeciras  and  cre- 
ated a  kind  of  world  charter  for  the  future  of 
Morocco. 

Some  of  the  details  of  the  Algeciras  Act  show 
very  clearly  that  the  need  for  international  gov- 
ernment was  felt  by  the  diplomats  in  1905  to  be  a 


146        THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

practical  consideration  for  statesmanship.  The^r 
would  not  have  called  it  a  bit  of  world  government, 
but  here  are  some  of  the  things  they  provided  for 
in  the  act,  which  was  itself  the  work  of  an  inter- 
national legislature: 

A  police  force  was  to  be  raised  under  the  "  sov- 
ereign "  ( 1)  authority  of  the  Sultan  and  dis- 
tributed among  the  eight  commercial  ports. 
From  forty-six  to  sixty  French  and  Spanish  offi- 
cers approved  by  the  Sultan  were  to  help  or- 
ganize the  force  for  five  years;  a  Swiss  was  to  be 
made  inspector-general  for  five  years.  He  was 
to  report  to  the  Moorish  government,  but  a  copy 
of  his  reports  was  to  be  handed  to  the  Diplomatic 
Body  at  Tangier. 

The  Morocco  State  Bank  was  to  be  established. 
It  was  to  be  disbursing  treasurer  and  financial 
agent  of  the  Moorish  Empire.  Spanish  money 
was  made  legal  tender ;  French  corporation  law 
was  to  apply  to  the  bank,  and,  finally,  it  was  pro- 
vided that  the  German  Imperial  Bank,  the  Bank 
of  England,  the  Bank  of  Spain,  and  the  Bank  of 
France  should  each  appoint  a  censor  to  watch 
over  the  administration. 

There  were  provisions  about  taxes,  acquisition 


ALGECIRAS:  A  LANDMARK  147 

of  property,  custom  duties,  navigation,  and. pub- 
lic works — the  execution  was  to  be  settled  by  agree- 
ment between  the  Moorish  government  and  the 
Diplomatic  Body  at  Tangier.  Super\'Ision  of 
fraud  and  smuggling  was  placed  in  the  hands  of  a 
mixed  Customs  Valuation  Committee  and  a  mixed 
Customs  Committee. 

The  awarding  of  contracts  for  public  works  was 
to  be  regulated  by  the  Moorish  government  and 
the  Diplomatic  Body.  Bids  "  without  respect  for 
nationality  "  were  to  be  made  on  all  public  works 
and  supply  contracts. 

It  was  clearly  an  attempt  to  create  an  interna- 
tional rather  than  an  Imperial  control  of  Morocco. 
Those  diplomats  at  Algeciras  were  trying  amidst 
enormous  difficulties  to  solve  the  problem  of  the 
weak  state  by  bringing  it  under  the  control  not  of 
one  empire  but  of  the  united  powers  of  the  west- 
ern world.  They  saw  that  the  only  way  out  of  the 
Issues  raised  by  defenseless  rich  territory  is  to 
make  them  dependencies  of  a  World  State.  They 
saw  that  no  one  nation  could  be  trusted  to  act  as 
International  steward,  so  they  gave  the  whole 
Diplomatic  Body  a  supervising  control  of  certain 
aspects  of  administration. 


148         THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

They  failed.  The  international  government 
they  set  up  was  torn  to  bits  by  intrigues  and  bar- 
gains, by  the  disrupting  forces  of  nationalism.  It 
is  no  new  experience  for  the  world.  Whenever  a 
government  is  constructed  which  calls  for  a  loy- 
alty larger  than  the  patriotism  to  which  men  are 
accustomed,  it  is  very  difficult  to  keep  that  gov- 
ernment going.  When  we  think  how  difficult  a 
task  it  was  to  bring  about  Italian,  German,  and 
American  union,  we  need  not  be  surprised  that  the 
experiment  with  a  World  State  to  control  Morocco 
should  have  ended  in  disastrous  failure.  French, 
Spanish,  British,  and  German  finance,  bureaucratic 
ambition  and  national  pride  played  the  same  part 
that  "  state's  rights,"  "  particularism,"  "  separa- 
tion "  have  always  played  in  the  world.  They 
were  unloyal,  uncontrollable,  and  destructive. 

But  just  as  no  vigorous  man  would  abandon  the 
idea  of  American  union  because  the  Articles  of 
Confederation  were  a  failure,  or  because  state's 
rights  threatened  to  break  the  government  in  1861, 
so  men  to-day  dare  not  turn  away  from  the  path 
marked  out  at  Algeclras.  If  the  world  is  to  be 
saved  from  the  hideous  clashing  of  empires,  It  must 
establish  a  world  control  in  the  territories  where 


ALGECIRAS:  A  LANDMARK  149 

the  clashes  occur.  Algeciras,  though  a  failure,  is 
a  great  precedent,  the  most  hopeful  effort  at  world 
organization  made  up  to  the  present.  I  venture  to 
say  that  if  the  spirit  of  the  Algeciras  Act  had 
been  realized  it  would  have  been  more  important 
than  all  the  Hague  rules  about  how  to  fight  in 
"  civilized  "  fashion,  all  the  arbitration  treaties, 
all  the  reduction  of  armament  proposals  with  which 
the  earth  is  deluged.  Algeciras  grasped  the  prob- 
lem of  diplomacy — the  conflict  of  empires  in  weak 
territory.  Algeciras  gallantly  tried  to  introduce 
a  world  government  to  control  it.  The  men  at 
Algeciras  failed.  If  we  cannot  succeed  where  they 
failed,  the  outlook  for  the  future  is  desperate. 


CHAPTER  XI 

THE  CORE  OF  IMPERIALISM 

Peace  foundations  and  universities  could  not  do 
a  more  useful  work  than  to  make  an  exhaustive, 
analytical  study  of  the  international  failure  at 
Morocco.  If  we  knew  with  any  certainty  why  the 
spirit  and  the  letter  of  the  Algeciras  Act  were 
frustrated,  why  imperialism  conquered  interna- 
tionalism, we  should  have  an  invaluable  experi- 
ence for  the  future.  At  present  the  whole  con- 
troversy is  in  the  hands  either  of  desperate  patriots 
or  desperate  anti-patriots,  the  facts,  the  interpre- 
tations, the  conclusions  are  a  seething  mass  of  un- 
certainty. Morocco  made  Europe  see  red ;  the 
literature  of  the  subject,  written  several  years  ago, 
is  blind  with  the  fury  and  apprehension  of  this  war. 
Though  it  is  impossible  now  to  arrive  at  any 
exact  judgment  of  this  infinitely  complex  situa- 
tion, it  is  useful,  I  think,  to  imagine  and  sketch 
out  a  working  hypothesis.    What  are  the  probable 

factors  which  defeat  the  attempt  to  internation- 

150 


THE  CORE  OF  IMPERIALISM         151 

alize  the  control  of  a  backward  state?    They  may 
perhaps  be  described  as  follows: 

Missionaries,  explorers,  adventurers,  prospect- 
ors come  back  home  with  tales  of  unbounded 
wealth.  The  tales  are  told  to  merchants  with 
goods  to  sell,  to  capitalists  with  money  to  invest, 
to  church  congresses  with  a  gospel  to  spread.  Pri- 
vate  companies  are  formed  to  exploit  the  new  mar-  ' 
ket  and  the  new  riches.  Their  directors  at  home 
consult  with  the  colonial  officials  and  receive  what 
are  rather  vague  promises  of  support.  The  news 
of  the  venture  spreads  to  the  trading  and  financial 
centers  of  other  nations ;  they  too  begin  to  form 
companies  and  send  out  capital  and  goods. 

Trouble  appears  in  the  country  which  is  being 
opened.  It  may  be  that  the  natives  put  exorbitant 
custom  duties  on  merchandise;  it  may  be  that  in 
transacting  business  the  invading  business  men 
outrage  local  superstitions ;  it  may  be  that  an  in- 
solent missionary  is  killed  in  a  riot ;  it  may  be  that 
business  rivals  stir  up  the  natives  against  one 
another.  The  newspapers  at  home  are  furnished 
with  lurid  accounts  of  anarchy  and  of  the  danger 
to  their  "  nationals."  At  the  same  time  some 
concessionaire  company  may  be  working  on  the 


152        THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

feeling  of  the  bureaucracy  at  home  with  the  object 
of  securing  some  important  monopoly — perhaps 
an  exclusive  franchise,  perhaps  the  control  of 
mines,  perhaps  harbor  rights  or  navigation  facil- 
ities on  a  river.  The  anarchy  in  the  country  fur- 
nishes not  only  a  justification  but  a  pretext,  too, 
and  some  kind  of  intervention  takes  place.  There 
are  visions  of  manifest  destiny  and  the  white  man's 
burden  among  those  who  have  read  too  much  Kip- 
ling or  smoked  too  many  cigarettes  in  their  edi- 
torial careers.  The  other  Powers,  also  having 
manifest  destinies  and  ambitious  financiers,  protest 
at  the  intervention  and  ask  an  accounting.  Then, 
after  much  gnashing  of  teeth  and  an  unlimited  out- 
flow of  careless  patriotism,  a  European  conference 
meets  to  deal  with  the  situation. 

The  well-known  psychology  of  a  horse  deal  is 
naive  and  trusting  compared  to  the  state  of  mind 
in  which  the  diplomats  take  up  the  international 
task.  They  bristle  with  dignity,  they  are  explosive 
with  prestige,  they  are  rigid  with  notions  of  sov- 
ereignty. The  problem  before  them  is  not  treated 
on  its  merits.  It  is  set  in  magnificent  and  in- 
definite theories  of  world  politics,  and  practically 
every  judgment  is  based  by  the  grand  strategy 


THE  CORE  OF  IMPERIALISM         153 

of  international  diplomacy.  Between  intrigue, 
secret  understandings,  and  a  morbid  national  van- 
ity, the  negotiations  are  carried  on  and  an  act  is 
framed.  The  act  is  passed  by  the  conference 
either  in  the  name  of  humanity  or,  as  at  Algeciras, 
"  in  the  name  of  God  Almighty."  The  act  is,  of 
course,  a  compromise,  and  so  far  as  the  machinery 
of  enforcement  goes,  it  is  in  large  measure  an 
evasion.  Nevertheless  it  represents  an  interna- 
tional effort  to  deal  with  an  international  problem. 

Unfortunately  the  act  provides  for  no  modifica- 
tion or  development  except  in  so  far  as  the  phrases 
of  it  are  vague  enough  to  be  interpreted  in  many 
different  ways.  The  act  becomes  a  set  of  verbal 
announcements,  which  it  is  hoped  will  cover  the 
new  situations  which  arise  or  are  created.  It 
doesn't,  to  be  sure.  Even  supposing  that  each 
nation  were  scrupulously  loyal  to  the  act,  the  act  _^ 
would  in  the  natural  course  of  events  soon  become 
antiquated.  An  act  which  is  antiquated  soon  ^ 
loses  the  little  respect  it  commanded,  and  the  way^ 
is  open -for  intrigue  and  adventure  to  destroy  the 
whole  intention  of  it. 

There  is  every  incentive  to  do  this.     The  trad- 
ing and  financial  groups  of  any  one  nationality 


154        THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

are  seduced  constantly  by  the  vision  of  the  money 
they  could  make  if  only  they  had  more  political 
power.  The  strongest  group  loses  no  opportunity 
to  get  the  better  of  weaker  ones ;  the  weaker  ones 
retaliate.  Under  cover  of  the  international  act 
governing  the  territory,  different  concessionaire 
groups  plot  and  fight  for  control.  They  use  na- 
tional pride  to  support  them;  they  work  them- 
selves into  the  confidence  of  the  imperialist  poli- 
ticians and  editors.  Their  own  motives  are  not 
always  clear  to  them,  and  to  the  people  at  home 
they  are  completely  hidden. 

The  tactics  by  which  the  international  act  can 
be  destroyed  are,  of  course,  many.  It  may  be  that 
usurious  loans  are  forced  upon  the  helpless  ruler 
of  the  exploited  country,  that  his  revenues  are 
mortgaged  to  serve  the  debt,  and  that  the  pro- 
tection of  those  revenues  becomes  the  excuse  for 
intervention.  It  may  be  that  border  raids  are 
instituted,  that  native  tribes  are  aroused,  that  mer- 
chants or  missionaries  are  declared  to  be  in  dan- 
ger. At  any  rate,  whatever  the  methods  used,  the 
object  is  to  create  a  new  situation,  meet  it  by  some 
aggression,  and  then  confront  the  other  Powers 
with  what  diplomats  call  a  fait  accompli,  a  phrase 


THE  CORE  OF  IMPERIALISM         155 

which  means  "  What  are  you  going  to  do  about 
it?  "  They  can  either  go  to  war  about  it,  or 
"  seek  compensation  elsewhere."  In  either  case 
the  international  experiment  is  destroyed. 

The  proposal  advocated  in  this  book  is  that  the 
international  control  should  be  turned  into  a  local 
international  government,  with  power  to  legislate 
and  to  hold  administrative  officials  accountable. 
This  would  at  least  give  internationalism  a  chance. 
For  instead  of  a  rigid  act  with  practically  no  ma- 
chinery of  enforcement,  there  would  exist  a  living 
legislature  with  some  means  for  carrying  out  its 
will.  The  scheme  would  make  it  possible  to  meet 
a  new  situation  as  it  arose,  instead  of  allowing  the 
world  to  be  faced  with  the  curse  of  a  fait  accompli. 
But,  clearly  enough,  the  scheme,  if  set  in  motion, 
would  be  still  the  prey  of  intrigue  and  disruption.  \ 
The  new  government,  just  because  it  might  be 
strong  and  efficient,  would  make  enemies.  What 
then  can  be  done  to  fortify  it.'' 

,  I  take  it  that  no  government  has  any  chance  of 
survival  unless  it  serves  the  interests  of  powerful 
economic  groups.  The  problem,  it  seems  to  me, 
is  to  transfer  the  allegiance  of  concessionaires, 
financiers,  missionaries,  and  merchants  from  their 


156        THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

own  national  government  to  this  international 
government.  If  they  support  it,  there  is  a  chance 
of  its  success.  If  they  fight  it,  failure  is  certain?! 
The  only  way  to  do  this  would  appear  to  be  by 
handing  over  the  protection  of  outgoing  traders 
and  capitalists  and  adventurers  to  these  local  in- 
ternational governments.  Unless  the  national 
governments  are  willing  to  say  that  investments 
and  markets  abroad  must  not  look  for  protection 
at  home,  there  is  no  incentive  to  strengthen  the 
international  government  in  the  backward  state. 
In  other  words,  the  people  at  home  must  say  to 
their  foreign  traders  and  capitalists :  "  When  you 
enter  territory  which  is  internationally  organized 
you  are  expected  to  obey  its  laws  and  look  to  it 
for  protection.  We  have  backed  you  up  hitherto 
because  no  adequate  government  existed  in  these 
backward  states.  Now  it  does  exist,  and  we  are 
no  longer  under  any  obligation  to  risk  wars  in 
order  to  protect  you.  If  you  are  not  satisfied 
with  the  treatment  accorded  you,  appeal  to  The 
Hague,  but  appeal  as  a  private  citizen  and  not  as 
one  of  our  *  nationals.'  We  may,  perhaps,  if  your 
case  is  good,  help  you  by  diplomatic  argument 
to  the  international  government.     But  you  must 


THE  CORE  OF  IMPERIALISM  157 

under  no  circumstances  feel  that  the  military  forces 
of  this  country  are  at  your  disposal." 

If  that  were  the  condition,  the  foreign  trader 
would  be  compelled  to  strengthen  the  international 
government,  to  acknowledge  citizenship  in  it,  and 
interest  himself  in  making  it  efficient  and  useful. 
So  long  as  he  trusts  in  his  home  government  for 
special  support  and  special  privilege  he  will  re- 
main an  enemy  of  internationalism.  Only  when  he 
is  thrown  upon  the  mercy  of  international  gov- 
ernment will  he  have  any  stimulus  to  loyalty. 

His  case  may  be  illuminated  by  imagining  the 
situation  if  no  federal  government  existed  in  the 
United  States,  and  if  capitalists  from  New  York 
or  Illinois  were  beginning  to  open  up  Alaska. 
They  would  be  forever  appealing  and  intriguing 
in  New  York  and  Illinois  politics.  But  with 
Alaska  under  federal  control,  New  York  can  wash 
its  hands  of  the  capitalist,  and  his  dealings  are 
with  the  federal  government.  He  may  still  plot 
for  special  advantages,  but  his  plots  cannot  em- 
broil the  states,  and  they  serve  as  an  object  lesson 
for  the  increasing  power  of  the  federal  gov- 
ernment. 

If  in  a  backward  state  men  of  all  nationalities 


158        THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

had  to  cease  running  home  to  mother,  if  they  were 
tied  up  securely  to  the  conduct  of  the  interna- 
tional state,  they  would  have  to  learn  to  manage 
that  state.  There  would  be  conflicts  of  interests, 
corruption,  bargains,  just  as  there  are  in  any  other 
government,  but  the  sheer  need  of  protection — 
the  primitive  want  of  "  law  and  order  " — would 
attach  the  more  substantial  economic  groups  to 
the  international  power.  Concessionaires,  bureau- 
crats, traders  would  discover  vested  interests  in 
it.  The  spoils  and  the  protection,  all  the  ad- 
vantages of  government,  in  fact,  would  be  cen- 
tered in  an  international  administration  and  fairly 
well  localized  to  one  area.  For  a  long  time  such  an 
administration  would  probably  be  a  spectacle  of 
capitalist  control,  native  oppression,  log-rolling, 
pork-barrel  legislation,  and  what  not.  But  all 
these  evils  now  accompany  imperialism,  which  car- 
ries with  it  always  the  hideous  possibility  of  im- 
perial wars.  To  set  up  international  states  in 
certain  territories  is  to  construct  the  only  possible 
substitute  for  imperialism.  And  we  must  neither 
be  too  surprised  nor  too  pained  if  international 
government  for  a  long  time  is  not  a  golden 
brotherhood   of  man.      Internationalism  will  not 


THE  CORE  OF  IMPERIALISM         159 

rise  much  higher  than  its  source.  If  it  comes, 
therefore,  from  nations  that  are  competitive,  capi- 
talistic, and  filled  with  corruption,  it  will  bear  all 
the  marks  of  its  origin.  Even  then  it  will  be  a 
comparative  blessing  to  the  world. 

The  crux  of  our  problem  is  whether  the  flag 
is  to  follow  trade.  The  task  of  internationalism 
depends  on  whether  it  can  destroy  the  theory  that 
a  man  must  rely  on  his  home  government  for  sup- 
port when  he  ventures  into  backward  countries. 
This  is  the  central  nerve  of  Imperialism,  and  our 
business  is  to  excise  it.  We  cannot  do  that,  how- 
ever, until  we  substitute  for  national  support  some 
kind  of  international  organization.  The  proposal 
to  organize  these  local  world  administrations  is  an 
attempt  to  create  an  agency  to  which  a  nation  can 
hand  over  the  protection  of  its  nationals  abroad. 
For  the  excuse,  the  power,  the  prestige  of  imperial- 
ism depend  upon  the  theory  that  the  flag  covers 
its  citizens  in  backward  territory.  I 


PART  III 


CHAPTER  XII 

THE  REACTION  AT  HOME 

"  Touch  me,"  says  the  hero  to  the  Hottentot 
chief,  "  and  to-morrow  morning  you  will  be  look- 
ing into  the  angry  eyes  of  a  hundred  million 
American  citizens."  No  audience  within  the  mem- 
ory of  the  oldest  theatrical  producer  has  ever 
failed  to  respond.  Nor  does  it  seem  to  make  much 
difference  what  the  "  Touch  me  "  means.  It  may 
relate  to  the  hero's  safety,  or  to  his  honor,  or 
to  his  just  rights,  or  to  what  he  thinks  are  his 
just  rights,  or  to  what  he  thinks  is  due  him  as  a 
good  fellow  and  a  superior  person.  The  people 
at  home  have  no  way  of  knowing  the  truth  about 
their  compatriots  abroad,  and  distance  invariably 
lends  enchantment.  The  abused  person  abroad 
may  be  a  dirty  scoundrel,  but  how  is  patriotism  to 
discriminate?  He  is  in  a  foreign  land,  he  claims 
to  be  abused,  he  wraps  himself  in  the  flag,  a  great 
nation  cannot  disown  her  sons. 

The  activities  of  some  of  these  sons  are  lurid 

163 


164        THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

and  hideous.  Thrusting  themselves  upon  some  un- 
worldly people,  they  often  debauch  it  with  cruel 
cynicism.  The  easiest  trade  is  firearms  and  spirits. 
They  ply  that  trade.  They  extort  concessions 
from  natives  who  do  not  realize  their  value;  they 
force  usurious  loans  upon  the  potentate  till  they 
have  got  him  sewed  up  beyond  all  possibility  of 
escape.  They  bribe  native  officials,  and  keep  the' 
finances  of  the  country  in  bankrupt  chaos.  To 
serve  the  debt  they  secure  mortgages  on  the  reve- 
nues, and  drive  the  rulers  of  the  country  to  tyr- 
annous taxation.  This  in  turn  produces  revolts, 
which  the  inefficient  government,  with  its  cor- 
rupted and  badly  paid  army,  is  unable  to  handle. 
Under  these  conditions  legitimate  commerce  suf- 
fers, and  innocent  people  are  endangered.  In  any 
one  of  these  activities  the  adventurers  can  claim 
to  be  acting  on  their  "  rights  "  and  "  upholding 
their  national  interests,"  and  in  most  cases  the 
government  at  home  will  back  them  up  with  ulti- 
mata and  a  parade  of  force. 

It  is  never  possible  to  say  how  much  of  the  dis- 
order is  due  to  trickery  and  intrigue,  how  much 
to  sheer  native  incompetence.  There  is  no  way  of 
knowing,  for  example,  whether  Persia  would  have 


THE  REACTION  AT  HOME  165 

been  reorganized  and  modernized  if  Russian  offi- 
cials, abetted  by  the  British,  had  not  adopted  one 
of  the  meanest  policies  of  destruction  in  modem 
history.  Perhaps  it  is  not  altogether  important 
to  distribute  the  blame  accurately.  These  back- 
ward countries  are  at  the  mercy  of  their  own  gov- 
erning cliques  and  the  foreign  adventurers  who 
are  attracted  by  easy  profits.  If  the  Powers 
merely  acted  on  the  principle  of  "  hands  off,"  the 
situation  would  not  be  much  better.  Filibustering 
expeditions,  bribery,  tricky  loans  will  not  cease  be- 
cause diplomacy  ignores  the  situation.  If  coun- 
tries like  Persia  or  Mexico  are  to  become  stable 
and  powerful,  their  neighbors  in  the  world  have 
got  to  pursue  a  policy  which  is  really  sympa- 
thetic. They  have  got  to  refuse  arms  and  sup- 
pHes  to  rebels,  they  have  got  to  control  the  terms 
of  loans,  they  have  got  to  protect  the  frail  gov- 
ernment from  insidious  corruption.  Mere  laissez- 
faire  is  an  invitation  to  the  adventurer  to  let  her 
rip.  There  is  no  way  in  which  we  can  dodge  the 
fact  that  we  are  deeply  involved  in  the  fate  of 
backward  countries. 

So  long  as  they  are  disorderly  and  weak,  they 
will  lure  in  the  concessionaire  and  the  exploiter, 


166        THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

who,  whenever  his  rights  or  his  Hfe  are  endangered, 
will  summon  patriotism  at  home  to  defend  him. 
And  no  government  will  under  those  conditions 
refuse  support.  /An  imperialist  policy  grows 
naturally  and  imperceptibly  on  defenseless  terri- 
tory. Out  of  the  clash  of  imperialist  policies 
modern  war  arises. 

For  if  once  these  territories  can  be  organ- 
ized, big  profits  cease,  concession-hunting  turns 
into  legitimate  investment,  a  more  decent  trade 
can  flourish,  the  provocations  to  intervention  dis- 
appear. You  do  not  have  to  wrap  the  flag  around 
trade  in  regions  where  a  fairly  modern  government 
exists*  There  must  be  a  flag,  which  represents 
order  and  power,  but  it  need  not  be  the  flag  under 
which  the  trader  was  born.  The  whole  status  of 
foreign  nations  is  diff'erent  in  a  small  country  like 
Denmark  than  it  is  in  a  small  country  like  Persia. 
The  difference  lies  in  the  fact  that  the  government 
of  Denmark  is  modem  and  stable,  and  that  of 
Persia  isn't.  The  question  is  not  one  of  size,  nor  of 
military  power,  nor  of  dark  races  or  white  races. 
Japan  is  small  and  yellow,  but  the  domestic  aff^airs 
of  Japan  are  not  an  international  problem.  China 
is  large  and  yellow,  and  it  is  the  most  serious 


THE  REACTION  AT  HOME  167 

question  in  the  future  of  the  world.  The  Scandi- 
navian countries  are  weak,  they  may  be  attacked, 
but  they  are  not  the  objects  of  constant  diplomatic 
meddling.  They  are  not  part  of  the  stakes  of 
diplomacy,  because  they  have  a  modern  political 
structure. 

A  few  people  have  remarked  that  the  world-  \ 
wide  sympathy  for  Belgium  was  extraordinary  in 
view  of  the  treatment  of  Persia  and  China.  Why, 
they  ask,  all  the  horror  at  this  violation  when  vio- 
lation is  not  uncommon  by  any  European  Power? 
The  answer  is  that  the  world  has  not  the  same 
attitude  of  mind  towards  a  modern  state  that  it  has 
towards  a  weak  and  bankrupt  one.  Had  Belgium 
been  a  chronic  disorder  in  the  heart  of  Europe,  it 
would  have  been  conquered  and  annexed  long  ago. 
It  was  the  high  organization  of  Belgium  which 
had  won  for  it  recognition  by  the  world.  It  was 
the  fact  that  Belgium  belonged  to  modernity  and 
fought  to  defend  its  place  that  secured  for  it  the 
affection  of  liberals  everywhere. 

/The  small  states  are  none  of  them  secure,  but 
the  well-organized  ones  are  perhaps  as  secure  as 
the  great  empires.  In  a  chaotic  world  they  are 
occasionally   trampled   upon.  /    So   are   the   Great 


168         THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

Powers.     But  the  disorganized  state  is  utterly  in- 
secure. 

How  to  organize  it  is  the  chief  task  of  diplo- 
macy. There  are  a  number  of  general  policies 
which  may  be  pursued.  One  is  to  conquer  it  and 
administer  it.  This  policy  is  falling  more  and 
more  into  disrepute,  in  part  because  the  masses 
in  civilized  countries  are  anti-imperialist,  but 
mainly  because  the  Powers  are  unwilling  to  have 
any  one  Power  aggrandize  itself  too  much.  An- 
other method  is  the  protectorate,  which  means 
generally  a  control  of  finances  and  police.  We 
are  pursuing  it  in  regard  to  Haiti.  It  has  the 
advantage  of  giving  a  kind  of  invisible  control 
without  the  oppressive  arrogance  of  military  oc- 
cupation. A  country  can  sometimes  be  put  on 
its  feet  by  reorganizing  its  revenues  without  the 
friction  which  comes  from  daily  interference  with 
the  private  lives  of  its  people.  Another  method 
is  that  of  sending  experts  to  a  country,  as  we 
did  to  Persia,  and  allowing  the  experts  to  be  serv- 
ants of  the  country  which  they  are  reconstructing. 
The  weakness  of  this  method  is  that  the  experts 
are  at  the  mercy  of  intrigue  when  they  have  no 
backing  from  a  great  Power. 


THE  REACTION  AT  HOME  169 

All  of  these  policies  have  been  tried  in  various 
places,  not  without  some  success.  But  there  are 
some  portions  of  the  globe  so  distracted,  so  eaten 
up  by  competing  imperialisms,  so  full  of  "  vital 
interests,"  so  corroded  with  suspicion  that  none  of 
these  methods  will  work.  Morocco  was  such  a 
country,  Constantinople  is  perhaps  such  a  place, 
and  China  may  well  become  one.  For  these  some 
more  heroic  treatment  is  required,  and  so  I  have 
ventured  to  suggest  what  amounts  to  an  interna-  x 
tional  protectorate.  Where  the  Powers  are  all 
so  desperately  interested,  the  only  solution  seems 
to  be  to  reorganize  the  country  under  joint  super- 
vision. Employing  experts  from  the  developed 
nations,  they  would  make  them  responsible  to  an 
international  commission,  consisting  perhaps  of 
the  Diplomatic  Body  in  the  country. 

There  are  two  great  objects  to  be  attained.  The 
first  is  the  creation  of  efficient  authority  In  the 
weak  states ;  the  second  Is  the  development  of 
international  political  agencies.  In  these  sore 
parts  of  the  world  would  arise  the  beginnings  of  a 
world  state. 

If  such  a  policy  were  successful,  we  should  be 
depriving   competitive   imperialism   of  Its   excuse 


170         THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

and  its  stimulus.  There  would  no  longer  be  the 
need  of  national  intervention  if  disorder  reigned. 
There  would  be  a  recognized  government  to  which 
men  could  look  for  protection  and  to  which  they 
could  make  their  appeals.  And  while  no  Power 
would  have  to  announce  that  it  would  no  longer 
back  up  its  citizens  abroad,  the  need  for  backing 
them  up  would  have  been  organized  out  of  exist- 
ence. 1 

Then  the  democracies  at  home  would  have  a 
chance  to  assert  themselves.  They  would  no 
longer  be  harassed  by  the  troubles  of  their  citizens 
abroad;  they  would  not  be  stirred  constantly  by 
the  question  of  whether  Americans  or  Germans  or 
Englishmen  were  being  given  a  chance  to  exploit 
Persia  or  Morocco.  When  a  man  went  out  to  in- 
vest or  to  trade  in  one  of  these  international  pro- 
tectorates, his  position  would  be  similar  to  that 
of  a  man  going  to  do  business  in  Alaska  or  in 
Chile.  He  would  be  going  to  a  place  where 
government  existed.  And  while  he  might  be  en- 
couraged from  home,  he  would  no  longer  be  the 
embodiment  of  his  country's  honor  and  prestige. 

In  my  opinion  this  is  the  only  cure  for  the 
morbid  conceptions  of  nationality  and  sovereignty 


THE  REACTION  AT  HOME  171 

which  afflict  the  world.  Nationality  and  sover- 
eignty are  primarily  offensive  and  defensive  reac- 
tions to  fear.  They  appear  in  time  of  trouble. 
Psychologically,  they  are  a  way  of  rushing  to  I 
cover,  of  tightening  up  for  a  fight,  and  they  are, 
of  course,  most  evident  where  there  is  chaos  and 
danger.  They  subside  whenever  men  live  with 
ease  and  spaciousness ;  they  break  out  again  at 
the  threat  of  war  or  in  the  struggle  for  markets 
and  concessions.  That  is  why  it  is  so  supremely 
important  to  organize  the  backward  portions  of 
the  earth.  They  are  the  arenas  in  which  danger 
stimulates  a  primitive  patriotism  and  rich  prizes 
stimulate  a  primitive  adventure.  Reduce  the  dan- 
ger and  the  prizes  by  stable  government,  and  the 
whole  world  will  breathe  more  easily,  i 


] 


CHAPTER  XIII 

THE  FUTURE  OF  PATRIOTISM 

Theee  is  another  way  of  looking  at  this  matter 
which  will  appeal  to  those  who  are  speculating 
upon  the  future  of  mankind.  Anyone  who  thinks 
about  the  possibility  of  a  world  state  is  stopped 
to-day  by  the  fact  that  there  is  no  world  patriotism 
to  support  it.  How  are  we  to  transfer  allegiance 
from  the  national  to  the  international  state?   , 

The  answer  depends  upon  an  analysis  of  na- 
tionality. I  have  described  it  as  a  retreat  to  the 
authority  and  flavor  of  our  earliest  associations,  as 
a  defenslve-off'ensive  reaction  to  what  seems  to  us 
secure.  Our  loyalty  turns  to  what  we  associate 
with  our  protection  and  our  ambitions.  The  rea- 
son we  are  not  loyal  to  mankind  in  general  or  to 
The  Hague  or  to  Internationalism  is  that  these 
conceptions  are  cold  and  abstract  beside  the 
warmth  of  the  country  and  place  where  we  were 
born.    Impressed  by  the  fear  of  Russian  invasion, 

the  internationalism  of  German  socialists  vanished. 

172 


THE  FUTURE  OF  PATRIOTISM        173 

Internationalism  offered  no  protection.     The  Gcr-  ,^ 
man  army  did.    To  be  a  German  was  to  be  part  of 
a  tangible  group  with  power;  to  be  a  citizen  of 
the  world  was  to  be  homeless  everywhere. 

And  yet  we  find  Canadians  and  Australians 
and  New  Zealanders  fighting  and  dying  for  a  thing 
called  the  British  Empire,  a  vague,  formless  or- 
ganization  of  one-quarter  of  the  human  race. 
What  is  it  that  has  produced  this  super-national 
patriotism?  Nothing  less,  it  seems  to  me,  than  a 
realization  that  the  protection  and  growth  of  the 
Dominions  is  bound  up  with  the  strength  of  the 
Empire.  Home  is  the  place  where  you  are  safe; 
loyalty  reaches  back  to  the  source  of  your  secur- 
ity. That  is  why  danger  has  welded  the  British 
Empire  instead  of  disintegrating  it. 

Imagine  the  Empire  shattered,  its  navy  gone, 
and  the  Dominions  left  to  fetch  for  themselves. 
What  would  Canada  and  Australia  do?  They 
would,  it  seems  to  me,  develop  a  great  loyalty  to 
the  United  States.  They  would  not  face  the  world 
alone.  They  would  have  to  find  some  larger  po- 
litical organization  in  which  they  could  feel  se- 
cure. 

In  other  words,  loyalty  overflows  the  national 


c 


174        THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

state  because  in  the  world  to-day  the  national 
state  is  no  longer  a  sufficient  protection.  People 
have  got  to  a  point  in  their  development  where  iso- 
lation terrifies  them.  They  want  to  be  members 
of  a  stronger  group.  In  Europe  they  turned  to  a 
system  of  alliances  because  no  nation  dared  to 
stand  alone.  We  have  turned  in  this  country  in 
part  to  an  understanding  with  Great  Britain,  in 
part  to  the  Latin-American  states.  All  of  which 
proves  that  patriotism  is  not  a  fixed  quantity,  that 
it  is  not  attached  to  the  map  as  it  was  drawn  when 
we  were  at  school,  and  that  it  is  not  only  capable 
of  expansion,  but  is  crying  for  it. 

Fear  has  almost  always  played  a  large  part  in 
welding  states  together.  The  fear  of  England  was 
a  great  argument  for  federal  union  under  our  Con- 
stitution ;  the  sense  of  weakness  in  the  presence 
of  unfriendly  neighbors  undoubtedly  helped  to 
break  down  the  separatism  of  the  little  German 
principalities.  Just  as  the  appearance  of  an 
enemy  tends  to  blot  out  political  differences  within 
a  nation,  so  it  will  often  unite  a  number  of  nations. 
The  rise  of  Germany  had  that  effect  on  the  Great 
Powers  of  Europe ;  the  fear  of  her  created  a  league 
almost   coextensive  with  western  civilization.     It 


THE  FUTURE  OF  PATRIOTISM        175 

covered  up  tlie  feud  between  France  and  England 
which  comes  down  through  the  centuries;  it  jolted 
together  an  understanding  with  Russia,  the  great 
bogy  of  liberals. 

It  is  not  pleasant  to  think  of  fear  as  one  of  the 
most  powerful  forces  that  unify  mankind.  It 
would  be  more  gratifying  to  think  that  coopera- 
tion was  always  spontaneous  and  free.  But  the 
facts  will  not  justify  this  belief.  The  inner  im- 
pulse to  compose  differences  seems  often  to  work 
most  actively  when  there  is  pressure  from  with- 
out. Forced  by  danger  to  cooperate,  men  seem  to 
discover  the  advantages  of  cooperation.  The  Ger- 
mans are  daily  discovering  good  qualities  in  the 
Turks ;  the  British  are  seeing  deeper  into  the  souls 
of  Russians. 

On  the  rim  of  the  Pacific  an  issue  has  appeared 
which  opens  up  difficulties  far  greater  than  those 
which  have  hitherto  troubled  diplomacy.  The  im- 
perial clashes  of  to-day,  the  intrigues  and  com- 
petitions and  wars  that  harass  our  world,  revolve 
about  the  spread  of  western  commerce  among 
backward  peoples.  But  a  new  problem  has  arisen 
in  California,  Canada,  Australia,  infinitely  more 
painful  than  the  struggle  of  empires.    It  is  a  real 


176         THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

friction  of  peoples  who  do  not  know  how  to  live 
together  and  are  forced  therefore  to  compete  for 
territory.  The  Hindus  who  cannot  settle  in  Can- 
ada, the  Japanese  and  Chinese  excluded  from  the 
United  States,  are  the  first  symptoms  of  a  world 
problem  to  which  no  man  has  proposed  a  satis- 
factory answer. 

As  the  pressure  of  the  East  upon  the  West  be- 
comes more  intense,  as  the  East  becomes  stronger, 
prouder,  and  better  organized,  men  may  wonder 
how  they  could  ever  have  fought  suicidal  wars 
over  the  present  stakes  of  diplomacy.  Differences 
which  once  seemed  "  vital "  may  appear  in  a  new 
perspective,  and  those  who  plead  for  a  unification 
of  western  civilization  be  listened  to  with  a  more 
urgent  interest.  Out  of  the  desire  to  preserve 
western  power  in  Asia,  and  out  of  the  fear  of 
Asiatic  aggression,  may  come  some  of  the  strongest 
incentives    to    the    creation    of    a    super-national 

state. 

It  is  useful  perhaps  to  try  to  realize  as  con- 
cretely as  possible  the  kind  of  Great  State  which 
is  at  present  humanly  possible.  It  will  not  be  a 
simple  organization  of  the  whole  world,  governed 
by  a  world  parliament,  elected  by  the  equal  suf- 


THE  FUTURE  OF  PATRIOTISM       177 

frage  of  the  Inhabitants  of  the  globe.  It  will  be 
some  kind  of  federation  of  the  existing  Powers,  and 
probably  not  an  equal  federation  at  that.  Its  cen- 
tral force  may  be  some  coalition  of  western  states, 
acting  towards  the  rest  of  the  world  a  little,  it 
may  be,  as  Prussia  has  acted  towards  the  other 
German  states,  or  England  towards  the  Empire. 
There  will  unquestionably  be  an  effort  to  keep  the 
power  in  the  hands  of  western  peoples,  but  among 
those  western  peoples  there  is  every  reason  to 
expect  jealousy  and  what  is  called  "  politics." 
They  will  hold  together  as  best  they  can  to  pre- 
serve their  dominion  and  prevent  aggression.  The 
greater  state,  as  it  is  likely  to  be  in  actual  life, 
will  at  the  utmost  probably  not  be  more  extensive 
than  western  commercial  civilization.  This  state 
will  face  attack  from  without,  disruption  within. 
In  any  candid  speculation  it  is  necessary  to  take 
these  possibilities  into  account. 

In  short,  the  larger  state  which  we  are  trying 
to  create  will  for  a  long  time  bear  slight  resem- 
blance to  the  Federation  of  Mankind.  It  is  likely 
to  be  unequal,  coercive,  conservative,  and  unsatis- 
factory. In  the  World  State  those  of  us  who  dream 
of  it  to-day  would,  I  fancy,  find  ourselves  for  a 


I 


178        THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

long  time  members  of  Its  Majesty's  loyal  oppo- 
sition. I  don't  know  whether  liberals  would  relish 
the  prospect  of  this  larger  state  if  they  conceived 
it  realistically.  They  picture  it  in  ideal  terms 
to-day — as  a  peaceful  democratic  federation — be- 
cause the  pictures  of  our  fantasy  are  rarely  made 
by  a  critical  imagination.  What  we  project  upon 
the  screen  of  the  future  is  what  our  hearts  desire, 
not  what  can  be  created  out  of  the  conflict  between 
desire  and  reality, 

jA  true  picture  of  the  greater  state  must  not 
whitewash  its  illiberal  character.  Even  if  we  suc- 
ceed in  unifying  the  western  peoples  in  one  state 
and  ending  the  likelihood  of  war  between  them,  we 
shall  be  a  long  way  from  elysium.  Yet  though  we 
be  a  long  way  not  only  from  elysium  but  from  ele- 
mentary human  decency,  though  oppression,  preju- 
dice, disorder,  and  the  waste  of  opportunity  con- 
tinue, we  have  every  reason  to  believe  that  a  more 
inclusive  grouping  of  men  will  be  a  great  gain. 
The  larger  the  number  of  people  who  can  practice 
cooperation,  the  more  the  civilizing  forces  are  re- 
leased. Whatever  our  quarrel  with  the  American 
Constitution  or  the  German  Empire,  few  will  doubt 
that  they  are  blessings  compared  to  the  evils  of 


THE  FUTURE  OF  PATRIOTISM        179 

disunion.  We  must  work  for  the  larger  state,  rec- 
ognizing its  dangers.  By  building  with  our  eyes 
open  we  may  even  in  some  measure  forestall  the 
dangers  we  see. 

The  only  way  in  which  world  organization  can 
command  a  world  patriotism  is  by  proving  its  use- 
fulness. If  it  affords  a  protection  and  produces  a 
prosperity  such  as  the  national  state  cannot  pro- 
duce, it  will  begin  to  draw  upon  the  emotions  of 
men.  If  they  are  capable  of  loving  anything  so 
abstract  and  complicated  as  the  British  Empire, 
or  even  the  United  States,  they  are  not  incapable 
of  attaching  themselves  to  a  still  larger  state.  For 
the  moment  it  was  evident  that  patriotism  could 
embrace  something  more  extensive  and  abstract 
than  a  village  which  a  man  might  know  personally, 
world  organization  ceased  to  be  an  idle  dream. 
If  men  could  be  citizens  of  an  empire  scattered 
over  all  the  seas,  there  was  no  longer  anything 
inconceivable  about  their  becoming  citizens  of  a 
state  which  covered  modem  civilization.  The  idea 
has  ceased  to  be  a  psychological  impossibility. 

Our  problem  is  to  broaden  the  basis  of  loyalty^ 
And  for  that  task  we  have  considerable  experi- 
ence to  guide  us.     Within  a  hundred  and  twenty- 


180        THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

five  years  we  have  seen  the  welding  together  of  the 
United  States,  Germany,  Italy,  and  Austria- 
Hungary.  We  have  seen  small  rival  states  con- 
verted into  members  of  federal  unions.  We  have 
watched  patriotism  expand  from  the  local  unit  to 
the  larger  one.  We  have  seen  Massachusetts  pa- 
triots converted  into  American  patriots,  Bavarians 
into  Germans,  Venetians  into  Italians.  In  the  last 
few  years  we  have  been  witnessing  the  growth  of 
an  imperial  patriotism  within  the  British  Empire. 

There  is,  so  far  as  I  can  see,  not  the  least 
ground  for  supposing  that  the  broadening  of  loy- 
alty must  stop  at  the  existing  frontiers.  The  task 
of  the  great  unifiers,  like  Hamilton,  Cavour,  and 
Bismarck,  looked  just  as  difficult  in  their  day  as 
ours  does  now.  They  had  states'  rights,  sover- 
eignty, traditional  jealousy,  and  economic  conflicts 
to  overcome.  They  conquered  them.  Who  dares 
to  say  that  we  must  fail .'' 

We  might  sketch  the  elements  with  which  they 
built.  There  was  a  propaganda  behind  them 
which  had  made  the  idea  of  union  the  vision  of  en- 
lightened people.  The  thing  had  been  sung  and 
preached  until  it  had  ceased  to  be  an  unfamiliar 
notion.     They  were  certain  of  some  spiritual  re- 


THE  FUTURE  OF  PATRIOTISM        181 

sponse,  although  practical  people  hesitated  and 
locally  minded  people  raised  obstructions  at  the 
audacity  of  the  idea.  Behind  this  propaganda  was 
a  growing  experience  of  the  nuisance  of  little  fron- 
tiers, the  cost  to  trade  of  conflicting  sovereignties, 
the  danger  to  peace  of  rivalry  within  and  weak- 
ness abroad. 

In  arguing  for  the  federal  Constitution,  Ham- 
ilton made  points  which  apply  with  almost  equal 
force  to  the  nations  to-day.  "  In  the  wide  field 
of  western  territory,"  he  wrote,  "  we  perceive  an 
ample  theater  for  hostile  pretensions."  The  West 
was  to  the  American  states  what  Morocco  and 
China  are  to  the  world  to-day.  "  Each  state  .  .  . 
would  pursue  a  system  of  commercial  polity  pe- 
culiar to  itself.  This  would  occasion  distinctions, 
preferences,  and  exclusions,  which  would  beget  dis- 
content." He  argued,  too,  that  if  no  union,  or 
a  weak  union,  were  created,  the  states  would  be  at 
the  mercy  of  foreign  aggression.  Hamilton  and 
his  group  saw  more  clearly,  perhaps,  than  we  see 
to-day  the  danger  of  separatism  and  the  need  for 
union. 

But  to  see  this  and  to  say  so  is  not  enough. 
The  construction  of  a  greater  state  out  of  small 


182        THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY, 

ones  cannot  be  accomplished  by  wishing  it.  What 
the  successful  nation-builders  have  always  recog- 
nized is  that  they  must  found  their  union  on  the 
self-interest  of  powerful  groups ;  by  attaching 
these  to  the  idea  of  union  a  real  support  would  be 
created.  They  did  not  try  to  establish  an  ideal 
state  without  special  interests  on  the  model  of 
some  perfected  democracy.  They  played  a 
shrewder  game  than  that. 

As  Professor  Beard  shows,^  the  movement  for  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States  was  originated 
and  carried  through  by  four  groups  of  personalty 
interests  which  had  been  adversely  affected  under 
the  Articles  of  Confederation:  money,  public 
securities,  manufactures,  trade,  and  shipping. 
These  groups  made  the  Constitution,  and  arranged 
matters  so  that  they  had  everything  to  gain  by  its 
success.  This  gave  them  a  business  interest  in  the 
Union  and  secured  their  patriotic  allegiance.  In 
Germany  the  union  was  preceded  by  a  Customs 
Union,  in  which  large  groups  of  traders  through- 
out Germany  learned  the  advantages  of  breaking 
down  separatism.  And  when  Bismarck  consoli- 
dated the  Empire  he  gave  Prussia,  the  most  power- 
*  An  Economic  Interpretation  of  the  Constitution. 


THE  FUTURE  OF  PATRIOTISM        183 

ful  state,  a  special  position,  thus  assuring  its  sup- 
port and  leadership.  When  Great  Britain  began 
to  think  of  imperial  federation  the  first  steps 
proposed  were  preferential  tariffs  and  customs 
union.  Even  Austria-Hungary,  which  it  is  the 
fashion  to  regard  as  a  meaningless  collection  of 
nationalities,  is  held  together  by  powerful  eco- 
nomic interests.     As  Mr.  Arnold  Tonybee  says  :^ 

"  The  two  sections  of  the  Monarchy  which  meet  at 
Vienna  are  economically  complementary.  Coopera- 
tion with  the  South-East  assures  to  the  North- 
Western  worker  that  raw  materials  will  not  run 
short  and  that  the  cost  of  living  will  remain  low;  co- 
operation with  the  North-West  guarantees  the  South- 
Eastern  husbandman  and  shepherd  a  stable  market 
for  their  annual  surplus.  Isolated,  each  section  would 
be  exposed  to  all  the  dislocations  of  shortage  and 
over-production;  combined,  they  constitute  a  self- 
sufficient  economic  unit." 

These  unifying  economic  interests  are  the  forces 
which  any  state-builder  has  to  rely  upon.  /If 
enough  powerful  people  can  be  given  a  stake  m 
unionj  a  true  basis  for  it  has  been  laid.  Once  you 
have  laid  the  basis  in  self-interest,  once  you  have 
made  union  the  power  by  which  men  can  live  bet- 
i  Nationality  and  the   War, 


184         THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

ter,  feel  securer,  and  follow  their  ambitions  more 
easily,  union  begins  to  become  warm  and  personal 
to  them.    They  become  patriots  of  the  union.j 

It  is  possible  to  illustrate  this  point  from  many 
sources.  When,  for  example,  a  nation  hardens 
into  class  divisions,  when  labor  finds  the  govern- 
ment hostile,  trade  organizations  develop  around 
which  clusters  the  same  kind  of  loyalty  that 
we  usually  call  patriotism.  The  trade  union  is 
their  bulwark  and  it  commands  their  allegiance. 
When  a  nationality  is  oppressed,  as  the  Irish,  the 
Jews,  the  Balkan  peoples,  or  the  Hindus,  they 
give  their  allegiance  to  a  dream — Zionism,  Ireland 
a  nation,  Indian  nationalism.  They  dream  of  a 
government  in  which  they  shall  be  somebody,  a 
sovereignty  which  will  protect  and  advance  them. 
For  loyalty  is  a  jfluctuating  force,  not  attached  by 
any  necessity  to  some  one  spot  on  the  map  or 
contained  within  some  precise  frontier.  Loyalty 
seeks  an  authority  to  which  it  can  be  loyal,  and 
when  it  finds  an  authority  which  gives  security  and 
progress  and  opportunity  it  fastens  itself  there. 
IThe  problem  of  world  organization  is  to  attach 
enough  loyalty  to  the  immature  World  State  to 
enable  it  to  weather  the  inevitable  attacks. 


THE  FUTURE  OF  PATRIOTISM        185 

This  is  the  problem  I  have  tried  to  hold  con- 
stantly before  me  in  writing  this  book.  But  be- 
fore any  kind  of  answer  could  be  given  it  was 
necessary  to  analyze  the  nature  of  patriotism  and 
the  chief  issues  upon  which  it  is  expended.  The 
conclusion  reached  was  that  patriotisms  clashed 
most  of  all  in  the  backward  territories  of  the 
world,  and  the  suggestion  followed  that  the  or- 
ganization of  these  territories  was  the  great  task 
of  international  politics. 

In  that  organization  lies,  it  seems  to  me,  the 
entering  wedge  of  the  World  State.  The  areas  of 
imperial  friction  are  the  natural  and  easiest  place 
to  begin  our  construction.  If  there  is  one  field 
of  affairs  where  the  international  state  is  most 
obviously  needed  it  is  in  the  chaotic  regions  of 
the  globe.  There  exists,  moreover,  sound  prece- 
dent, for  Africa  and  China,  and  now  Latin-Amer- 
ica, are  recognized  as  international  problems. 
Even  conservative  diplomacy  has  experimented 
with  world  legislation  and  administration  to  deal 
with  these  territories. 

I  They  offer  the  best  opening,  because  the  least 
amount  of  national  vanity  is  involved.  Germans 
and  Englishmen  may  object  with  good  reason  to 


18G         THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

submitting  their  domestic  affairs  to  a  European 
or  to  a  world  legislature.  But  they  can  object 
with  far  less  enthusiasm  to  submitting  the  affairs 
of  Morocco.  Yet  if  international  government 
can  be  established  in  these  distant  regions,  there 
will  begin  that  whittling  away  of  sovereign  pre- 
tensions and  national  separatism  which  is  neces- 
sary to  any  cooperation  of  mankind. 

I  cannot  imagine  the  nations  agreeing  to  a  uni- 
versal free  trade  or  to  disarmament  or  to  unlim- 
ited arbitration.  The  forces  that  disunite  are  far 
too  strong  for  any  such  plan.  But  they  have 
already  submitted  to  world  conferences  and  regu- 
lations about  backward  countries.  If  that  expe- 
rience can  be  augmented  and  elaborated,  if  it  can 
be  made  to  serve  the  traders  who  are  interested  in 
peaceful  development,  there  could  be  no  better 
opportunity  of  showing  the  world  the  concrete 
value  of  international  government. 

Only  comparatively  small  groups  in  a  few 
nations  have  much  to  gain  by  the  old-fashioned 
imperial  aggression.  But  these  will  dominate 
foreign  affairs  so  long  as  the  backward  countries 
show  big  risks,  exorbitant  profits,  and  general 
insecurity.     By    making    these    countries    stable 


THE  FUTURE  OF  PATRIOTISM        187 

under  international  control,  we  should,  I  imagine, 
draw  to  them  the  interest  of  the  great  mass  of 
peaceful  traders.  It  is  in  them  that  the  embryo 
World  State  would  find  its  backing.  And  they 
could  count  on  the  support  of  the  workers  and 
farmers  who  die  in  imperial  wars  and  stagger 
under  the  taxes  for  armaments. 

In  other  words,  by  organizing  the  scenes  of  ex- 
ploitation we  should  open  up  the  world  to  foreign 
trade  and  investment  under  far  safer  conditions. 
Instead  of  concessionaires,  exploiters,  and  adven- 
turers seeking  quick,  high  profits,  we  should  draw 
in  the  merchants  and  investors  who  are  seeking 
stable  markets  and  orderly  development.  This 
would  have  an  enormous  effect  on  conditions  at 
home,  for  it  would  mean  that  foreign  affairs  be- 
came an  interest  not  of  an  imperialist  group  but 
of  the  far  more  extended  middle  class,  and  even 
working  class. 

To-day  these  people  take  almost  no  interest  in 
foreign  affairs,  with  the  result  that  their  man- 
agement goes  by  default  to  a  small  coalition  of 
aristocratic,  military,  bureaucratic,  and  exploit- 
ing interests.  This  is  Inevitable  so  long  as  the 
world  is  for  the  adventurer.    By  opening  It  up  to 


188         THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

conservative  business,  foreign  affairs  must  become 
the  interest  of  a  much  larger  group  of  people. 
This  seems  to  me  the  only  condition  under  which  a 
real  democratization  of  diplomacy  can  take  place. 
Enlarge  the  group  who  are  directly  interested  in 
the  stakes  of  diplomacy,  their  attention  and  activ- 
ity will  follow.  . 


o 


CHAPTER  XIV 

A  BROADER  BASE  FOR  DIPLOiVIACY 

On  first  consideration  it  seems  rather  curious  to 
hear  it  argued  that  the  establishment  of  success- 
ful government  in  backward  states  will  democratize 
the  control  of  diplomacy  in  the  so-called  civilized 
nations.  That  is  not  all,  however.  It  can  be  main- 
tained, I  believe,  that  the  effect  will  be  to  blur 
frontiers,  to  diminish  the  sense  of  sovereignty,  and 
weaken  separatism.  The  really  internationalizing 
forces  of  finance,  commerce,  labor,  science,  and 
human  sympathy,  distracted  and  distorted  to-day 
by  "  national  necessities,"  will  be  given  a  freer 
chance  to  assert  themselves. 

This  is,  I  realize,  a  large  hypothesis,  and  only 
as  an  hypothesis  would  I  wish  to  defend  it. 

Organized  behind  their  frontiers,  even  the  most 

advanced  democracies  deal  with  other  nations  as 

"  one  man."     Differences  of  interest  and  opinion 

are  sunk  in  order  to  present  a  united  front  to 

the  world.     The  sinking  of  differences  means  the 

189 


^ 


k 


t) 


190    THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

absence  of  effective  discussion  and  criticism  of 
diplomacy.  The  lack  of  criticism  creates  the 
sense  of  sovereignty,  the  feeling  that  a  nation  is,  on 
the  whole,  a  law  unto  itself.  The  result  of  this  is 
to  center  on  foreign  affairs  only  the  most  primi- 
tive emotions  of  offense  and  defense,  to  charge 
them  with  the  high  explosives  of  uncorrected  and 
unconscious  emotion.  Governments  face  each 
other  with  an  almost  savage  unity  of  feeling,  a 
unity  which  is  sovereign  in  its  pretensions,  unedu- 
cated. Impatient  of  criticism,  gullible,  and  panicky. 
The  places  where  governments  face  each  other 
are  the  lands  which  are  in  process  of  being  opened 
up  to  commerce.  The  competition  of  concession- 
aires and  exploiters  is  severe.  These  men  are 
backed  by  their  governments,  and  their  advance- 
ment becomes  a  national  concern.  The  people  at 
home,  living  blindly  behind  their  frontiers,  regard 
these  foreign  business  men  almost  as  their  repre- 
sentatives, and  when  the  struggle  is  acute  the  in- 
tensity of  it  radiates  to  all  the  governments  and 
people  represented.  The  nations  themselves  come 
to  regard  themselves  as  competitors,  as  living  or- 
ganisms which  can  win  or  be  defeated.  Of  course 
they  wish  to  win,  and  they  come  to  measure  victory 


A  BROADER  BASE  FOR  DIPLOMACY     191 

by  the  success  of  their  concessionaires  and  ex- 
porters in  the  new  markets.  Each  advantage  lost 
or  gained  becomes  part  of  the  score  in  which  the 
prestige  of  a  nation  is  counted.  The  people  take 
an  almost  childish  interest  in  whether  German  or 
British  capital  shall  finance  the  railway  to  Bag- 
dad. In  order  to  increase  their  prestige  they  in- 
crease their  armaments,  their  object  being  to 
weight  with  force  the  diplomatic  negotiation  for 
privileges. 

This  whole  situation  rests  upon  the  fact  that 
there  are  rich  undeveloped  countries  to  exploit. 
As  soon  as  a  territory  becomes  well-governed  and  | 
a  normal  commerce  begins,  that  territory  ceases  to  0 
be  part  of  the  stakes  of  diplomacy.  A  nation 
like  the  Argentine  differs  from  Persia  in  that 
Persia  is  a  field  for  imperialism  and  the  Argen- 
tine is  not.  When  a  country  reaches  the  maturity 
of  the  Argentine  the  diplomatic  tension  over  it 
is  relaxed.  The  adventurers  and  militarists  and 
usurers  turn  elsewhere  and  the  better  kind  of  mer- 
chant and  investor  comes  in. 

We  have  seen  this  process  in  our  own  history. 
When  our  West  was  undeveloped  it  was  the  scene 
of  grabbing  and  grafting  and  wildcat  exploita- 


192         THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

tion  which  came  near  to  poisoning  our  whole 
/'  national  life.  But  when  the  West  filled  up,  and 
the  chances  of  huge  profit  diminished,  the  various 
^  I  reform  movements  which  represented  the  middle 
class  became  dominant  in  our  politics,  and  our 
Western  empire-builders  transferred  their  atten- 
tions to  Mexico  and  China  and  Alaska.  At  the 
same  time  a  new  nationalism  began  to  pervade 
America.  It  meant  that  with  the  disappearance  of 
our  Western  empire  the  unifying  forces  had  come 
to  the  top,  and  in  the  last  ten  years  or  so  we  have 
taken  enormous  steps  towards  the  centralizing  of 
power  in  the  federal  government.  The  incentive 
to  stay  separate  was  disappearing.  The  new  na- 
tionalism, however,  had  another  aspect.  We  drew 
closer  together  within  our  boundaries  because  we 
were  entering  upon  an  imperial  competition  in  Asia 
and  Latin-America.  We  united  among  ourselves 
when  our  backward  regions  were  organized,  and  we 
united  against  other  nations  because  we  were  en- 
tering the  backward  regions  where  they  were 
competing.  We  shall  draw  closer  to  other  nations 
when  the  new  fields  of  imperialism  have  been 
brought  under  control. 

Why  shall  we  draw  closer  to  them  ?    Chiefly  be- 


A  BROADER  BASE  FOR  DIPLOMACY     193 

cause  the  organization  of  weak  territory  will  alter 
the  character  of  national  competition.    At  present 
it  is  an  unscrupulous  struggle  for  privileges  in 
which  no  one  dares  to  relax,  because  the  other 
man  will  monopolize   everything  if  he   does.      A 
nation    may    not    want    imperial    expansion,    but  f] 
neither  does  it  want  another  nation  to  close  mar- 
kets and  concessions  against  it.     It  is  a  competi- 
tion in  which  the  lowest  survives.     And  the  only 
choice  open  is  to  grab  yourself  or  to  have  some- 
one else  grab.     That  is  the  dilemma  which  draws 
enlightened    people    into    the    imperialist    camp. 
But  when  the  territory  becomes  strong  and  ably 
governed,  no  one  can  grab,  and  the  more  civilized 
Powers  are  freed  from  the  imperialist  nightmare. 
The  territory  ceases  to  be  a  place  where  prestige 
and  sovereignty  are  tested,  and  becomes  one  of  the 
peaceful  markets  of  the  world. 

The  people  who  go  into  it  then  represent  much 
wider  interests  in  the  community.     They  are  con- 
cerned in  having  the  country  efficiently  governed. 
They  profit  by  improvements,  by  the  education  of    \ 
the  natives,  by  sane  development  of  resources  and    /   n 
communication.     It  is  only  a  small  class  that  has    , 
much  to  gain  by  intrigue  and  corruption  and  dis- 


194    THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

order.  The  world's  commerce  as  a  whole  thrives 
best  under  efficient  and  progressive  government. 
The  first  imperialist  adventurers  can  make  high 
profits  by  debauching  a  country.  But  the  great 
mass  of  merchants  can  make  a  steadier  profit  in 
a  healthy  country  when  the  skill  of  labor  and  the 
wants  of  the  consumer  are  increasing.  The  people 
of  a  country  have  to  be  rich  to  afford  a  good  mar- 
ket to  a  wide  group  of  merchants.  , 

/  By  stabilizing  the  backward  countries,  then,  for- 
eign  trade  can  really  develop.  And  the  larger  the 
group  at  home  interested  in  foreign  trade,  the 
larger  will  be  the  interest  in  foreign  politics.  This 
will  bring  diplomacy  under  the  scrutiny  of  busi- 
ness men  instead  of  leaving  it,  as  to-day,  to  be  the 
exclusive  preserve  of  an  aristocratic  class  in 
cahoots  with  adventurers. 

By  increasing  the  number  of  people  concerned  in 
diplomacy,  publicity,  criticism,  and  discussion 
must  follow.  From  them  education.  The  real- 
ities of  diplomacy  which  are  hidden  to-day  under  a 
cloud  of  ambiguous  phrases  and  primitive  emotion 
will  be  revealed.  The  false  unity  of  nationalism 
will  be  superseded  by  complex  facts  about  which 
men  will  differ  and  argue.     And  because  people 


A  BROADER  BASE  FOR  DIPLOMACY     195 

differ,  their  sense  of  sovereignty  must  diminish ; 
their   isolation  behind   frontiers   must   disappear.  (j 

Agreements  and  disagreements  will  cross  frontiers.  ; 
Men  will  discover  that  they  are  more  in  sympathy 
with  a  group  in  some  foreign  country  than  with 
some  of  their  own  fellow-citizens.     Politics  will  no  ^ 
longer  cease  at  the  water's  edge,  and  nations  will    i 
no  longer  be  able  to  face  each  other  as  irritable   I  ^ 
monarchs.     The  people  will  be  less  easily  led  by 
the  nose;  diplomacy  will  become  more  and  more 
the  bargaining  of  groups,   and   cease  to  be  the 
touchy  competition  of  "  national  wills."    The  real 
effect  of  democracy  on  foreign  affairs  will  be  to 
make    them    no    longer   foreign.     For   democracy 
brings  out  the  real  alignment  of  classes  and  in- 
terests. 

/When  the  people  have  had  some  experience  of 
diplomatic  problems,  they  will  discover  what  far- 
seeing  democrats  have  always  known — that  the 
values  of  mankind  do  not  entirely  coincide  with^  >^ 
national  frontiers ;  that  mankind,  once  it  realized  j 
its  own  interests,  will  tend  to  reduce  the  frontier 
from  a  monstrous  chasm  to  a  convenient  adminis- 
trative division,  behind  which  local  autonomy  can 
protect  the  healthier  aspects  of  nationalism.; 


0 


CHAPTER  XV 

»■ 

PUBLIC  OPINION  IN  FOREIGN  AFFAIRS 

The  theory  I  have  been  advancing  is  that  the  way 
to  create  wide  interest  in  foreign  affairs  is  to  give 
a  wider  number  of  people  an  interest  in  them,  and 
that  this  can  be  accomplished  by  making  foreign 
trade  and  investment  in  backward  countries  a  less 
risky  and  more  normal  enterprise.; 

The  effect  of  this  enlarged  interest  would  be  to 
^  !  break  down  the  uncanny  pretentiousness  of  diplo- 
i  macy.  If  people  discussed  it  long  enough,  and 
mulled  around  through  it,  they  would  soon  dis- 
cover that  it  is  neither  more  mysterious  nor  more 
sacred  than  politics  at  Washington  or  Albany. 
Diplomacy  is  carried  on  now  by  aristocrats  in 
the  language  of  royalty,  and  at  first  sight  the 
democrat  is  inclined  to  feel  that  he  is  not  suffi- 
ciently well  dressed  to  talk  about  such  high  af- 
fairs. He  is  as  uncomfortable  as  a  man  in  a  soft 
shirt  among  the   starched  bosoms   at  the  opera. 

But  this  exclusiveness  is  an  illusion  which  collapses 

196 


OPINION  IN  FOREIGN  AFFAIRS       197 

when  anyone  goes  behind  the  etiquette  of  diplo- 
macy to  the  substance  of  it. 

People  will  not  go  behind  it,  however,  unless 
they  are  made  to  feel  that  the  subject-matter  of 
diplomacy  is  related  to  their  daily  lives.  Without 
some  direct  and  constant  interest,  public  opinion 
ignores  foreign  affairs  until  a  crisis  is  reached. 
Everyone  is  interested  in  a  dramatic  event  or  a 
possible  war.  But  the  tedious  negotiations  and 
jockeyings  which  prepare  the  situations  leading 
to  crises  and  wars  are  not  much  discussed,  because 
they  deal  with  distant,  shadowy  countries  in  Asia 
or  Africa  or  Central  America.  Few  people  could 
even  locate  on  a  map  the  places  where  most  of  the 
international  friction  occurs. 

But  if  trade  with  these  regions  were  extended, 
hundreds  of  firms  would  be  sending  buyers  and 
traveling  salesmen  to  them,  establishing  branch  of- 
fices, and  in  endless  ways  intensifying  communi- 
cation. Business  men  would  have  to  learn  Ian-  , 
guages,  study  history  and  political  conditions,  and 
some  knowledge  of  foreign  countries  would  be-  ^  q 
come  a  commercial  necessity.  The  schools  would 
have  to  meet  the  demand,  the  newspapers  would 
have  to  give  space  to  foreign  news,  there  would 


198         THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

be  a  growing  section  of  the  public  well  enough 
informed  to  ask  the  State  Department  pertinent 
questions.  Congressmen  would  have  to  show  that 
they  knew  not  only  that  there  was  urgent  need  for 
a  new  postoffice  in  Ashtabula,  but  what  was  the 
political  situation  in  China  or  in  Costa  Rica. 

In  brief,  to  have  public  opinion  there  must  be 
interest,  and  this  can  be  created  not  by  preaching 
but  by  making  the  subject  of  it  part  of  the  busi- 
ness of  life.  So  long  as  foreign  politics  is  re- 
served for  evenings  and  Sundays  democracy  will 
discuss  baseball  and  remain  perfunctory.  And  be- 
hind the  apathy  of  the  public  an  invisible  diplo- 
macy will  be  carried  on,  directed  by  a  small  class 
with  special  interests  and  abetted  by  the  routine 
complacency  of  old-fashioned  diplomats.  Just  as 
there  is  a  political  machine  which  governs  because 
the  voter  is  too  ignorant  and  too  lazy  to  govern 
himself,  so  there  is  a  diplomatic  machine  which 
counts  upon  the  apathy,  the  docility,  and  the  ex- 
plosive emotions  of  the  people.  In  this  darkness 
and  silence  the  world  is  rigged,  and  all  manner  of 
cruelty  and  selfishness  flourishes. 

The  great  healing  effect  of  publicity  is  that  by 
;  revealing  men's  motives  it  civilizes  them.    If  people 


OPINION  IN  FOREIGN  AFFAIRS       199 

have  to  declare  publicly  what  they  want  and  why 
they  want  it,  they  cannot  be  altogether  ruthless. 
It  takes  more  courage  than  most  men  have  to  be^ 
openly  selfish  and  regardless  of  the  judgments  of 
their  fellows.  A  special  interest  frankly  avowed  is 
no  terror  to  democracy.  It  is  neutralized  by  pub- 
licity. The  danger  democracy  has  always  to 
guard  against  is  the  identification  of  special  inter-  ' 
ests  with  the  national  will,  patriotism,  humanity. 
The  emotions  of  the  people  are  easily  tapped,  and 
therefore  easily  exploited.  And  since  the  begin- 
ning of  time  they  have  been  exploited  in  the  in- 
terests of  dynasties,  oligarchies,  priesthoods,  and 
economic  classes.  The  people  have  suffered,  | 
worked,  paid,  and  perished  for  ends  they  did  not 
understand.  They  have  gone  to  battle  with  noble 
words  in  their  hearts,  ignorant  of  the  true  mo- 
tives and  ambitions  which  arranged  the  battle.  ^ 
The  great  virtue  of  democracy — in  fact,  its  su- 
preme virtue — is  that  it  supplies  a  method  for 
dragging  the  realities  into  the  light,  of  summon- 
ing our  rulers  to  declare  themselves  and  submit 
to  judgment.  The  enemies  of  democracies  recog- 
nize the  importance  of  this  power,  for  they  pay 
it  the  tribute  of  hypocrisy.     They  always  put  on 


r^ 


'\ 


200        THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

a  good  face,  they  dress  up  their  plans  in  high- 
sounding  phrases,  they  touch  the  heart  when  they 
approach  the  pocket. 

There  are  certain  technical  difficulties  in  the 
way  of  a  democratic  control  of  foreign  affairs. 
The  chief  one  is  the  congestion  of  business  in  all 
legislative  bodies.  There  is  so  much  to  do  that 
nothing  can  be  done  well.  All  modern  states, 
moreover,  are  increasing  every  day  the  burden 
upon  their  governments.  The  attempt  to  socialize 
industry  is  adding  unheard-of  difficulties  to  the 
work  of  officials  and  representatives.  To  multiply 
them  by  intruding  the  affairs  of  distant  countries 
seems  like  an  attempt  to  break  the  camel's  back. 
Shall  we  not  collapse  under  the  sheer  multiplicity 
of  things  we  are  called  upon  to  consider.?  For, 
after  all,  important  as  foreign  affairs  are,  we  can- 
not afford  for  one  moment  to  relinquish  the  task 
of  civilizing  ourselves. 

The  answer  seems  to  be  that  the  effort  to  make 
democracy  technically  efficient  has  just  begun. 
The  development  of  administrative  commissions, 
the  unifying  of  government  departments  under  ex- 
ecutive leadership,  the  turning  of  the  legislature 
into  a  criticising  and  controlling  body,  is  a  recent 


OPINION  IN  FOREIGN  AFFAIRS      201 

enthusiasm.  Under  our  old  naive  notions  of  politi- 
cal machinery  public  opinion  could  not  possibly 
assert  itself  effectively.  To  have  added  the  control 
of  foreign  affairs  would  simply  have  been  to  com- 
pound chaos.  But  there  is  on  foot  a  highly  intel- 
ligent movement  to  reconstruct  political  machin- 
ery so  that  government  becomes  visible  and  simple 
and  responsible.  The  relief  which  this  brings  fur- 
nishes the  hope  that  the  technique  of  government 
may  be  far  enough  advanced  to  allow  wider  and 
wider  groups  to  take  part  in  the  affairs  of  diplo- 
macy. 

In  addition  to  the  complexity  of  government, 
we  suffer  to-day  from  the  false  unity  of  political 
parties.  It  is  false  because  men  may  agree  on 
foreign  politics  and  disagree  on  domestic.  But 
they  have  to  vote  wholesale  though  they  think  re-  ^  >. 
tail.  The  danger  of  this  has  been  made  evident  / 
by  recent  English  history.  For  it  is  safe  to  say 
that  the  best  Liberal  thought  was  friendly  to  the 
internal  policy  of  the  Asquif'h  government  and 
hostile  to  its  foreign  policy.  But  the  Liberals 
who  wanted  Lloyd-George  had  to  swallow  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey  and  Winston  Churchill.  They  could 
not  change  their  diplomacy  without  wrecking  their 


202         THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

social  reform.  I  believe  it  to  be  a  fact  that  in- 
telligent English  thought  is  trying  to  invent  some 
way  by  which  it  will  be  possible  to  separate  poli- 
cies, to  disentangle  the  Moroccan  situation  from 
the  British  landlords,  and  give  public  opinion  a 
chance  to  discriminate.  The  same  difficulty  exists 
in  this  country.  We  have  to  choose  not  between 
the  domestic  policies  of  Woodrow  Wilson  and 
Theodore  Roosevelt,  nor  between  their  foreign  poli- 
cies, but  between  a  muddle  of  the  two.  The  voter 
who  goes  to  the  polls  has  to  make  up  his  mind 
how  the  value  of  Mr.  Wilson's  diplomacy  com- 
pares with  his  views  about  business  and  labor. 
Under  these  conditions  public  opinion  cannot  help 
being  confused  and  uncertain. 

But  these  issues  carry  us  further  afield  than  this 
sketch  would  justify.  They  illustrate  how  closely 
interrelated  are  the  old  domestic  problems  with  the 
new  foreign  ones.  The  two  sets  of  interests  wait 
upon  each  other,  and  there  is  no  such  thing  as 
dealing  with  one  and  ignoring  the  other.  The 
whole  development  of  democracy  is  distorted  by  the 
international  situation,  and  this  in  turn  is  what 
it  is  through  the  social  conditions  within  the  dif- 
ferent frontiers.     A  relief,  an  improvement  any- 


OPINION  IN  FOREIGN  AFFAIRS       203 

where,  radiates  throughout  the  world  organiza- 
tion. The  imperial  rivalries  in  Morocco  and 
China  have  meant  high  taxes,  military  services,  and 
delayed  development  in  every  nation  of  Europe. 
The  menace  of  Prussian  oligarchy,  of  Russian 
backwardness,  of  Japanese  ambition,  broods  over 
the  whole  world.  A  victory  for  liberal  democracy, 
the  resurrection  of  a  weak  people,  makes  life  safer 
and  prosperity  more  certain  in  all  the  regions 
where  men  work. 

The  effect  of  democracy  is  justly  feared  by 
those  who  wish  to  achieve  national  power  by  sub- 
missive unity.  A  people  that  was  sophisticated 
about  foreign  affairs  would  be  hard  to  lead,  and 
its  diplomats  could  not  wield  it  with  the  same 
sense  of  sovereign  power.  But  this  loss  of  unity, 
dangerous  under  conditions  to-day,  would  be  a 
great  blessing  once  the  weak  spots  of  the  world 
were  organized,  for  then  the  fearful  tension  of 
imperial  competition  would  be  relaxed,  and  the 
need  for  drilled  submission,  for  presenting  an  un- 
broken front,  would  diminish.  The  effect  would  be  \ 
double.  The  organization  of  backward  countries 
would  draw  wider  interests  to  them,  and  these  i 
wider   interests,   assuming   control   of  diplomacy,  J 


204        THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

would  democratize  it  and  weaken  its  sovereign  pre- 
tensions. There  would  be  less  need  of  sovereignty, 
less  need  of  rigid  military  frontiers,  less  need  of 
docile,  uncritical  patriotism,  and  consequently  a 
vast  increase  of  human  cooperation.  The  great 
empires  will  cease  to  face  each  other  as  hostile 
rivals  when  the  sources  of  their  rivalry,  the  stakes 
of  modern  diplomacy,  have  been  organized  out  of 
existence. 

That,  you  may  say,  will  undoubtedly  take  a 
long  time,  and  many  bitter  wars  will  be  fought  be- 
fore it  is  achieved.  But  I  do  not  offer  it  as  a 
quick  panacea.  I  offer  it  simply  as  a  compass  by 
which  democrats  can  try  to  steer  their  course. 


PART  IV 

EPILOGUE 


CHAPTER  XVI 

,THE  STRATEGY  OF  PEACE 

There  is  something  unhappy  about  the  word 
pacifism.  It  irritates  great  numbers  of  people 
who  sincerely  hate  the  obscenity  of  war,  and  for 
some  reason  or  other  the  professional  pacifist  seems 
to  be  a  stultified  person.  Why  should  this  be? 
He  preaches  an  undeniable  truth — that  war  is 
hideous  and  insane,  that  peace  is  preferable  to  it. 
Yet,  though  almost  everyone  agrees  with  him,  the 
great  majority  of  active  people  feel  in  their  hearts 
that  he  is  either  irrelevant  or  considerably  in  the 
way. 

The  reason  for  this  attitude  towards  pacifism 
is  that  the  world  is  not  helped  much  by  being  told 
every  morning  that  two  and  two  are  four.  It  is 
not  helped  by  being  told  to  love  men  as  brothers. 
Men  have  been  told  that  for  ages,  and  their  in- 
variable retort  is :  "I  would  gladly  love  him  if 
only  he  weren't  so  cussed.     But  I  start  to  love 

him,  and  he  robs  me.     I  try  to  treat  him  as  a 

207 


208    THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

brother,  and  he  plots  to  burn  down  my  house. 
What  is  the  good  of  telling  me  not  to  fight  him, 
when  he  is  getting  ready  to  fight  me?  Preach 
peace  to  him.     I'm  all  right." 

The  feeling  that  war  is  always  defensive  wrecks 
the  peace  propaganda.  The  word  defensive  is 
capable  of  being  stretched  indefinitely.  It  is  not 
confined  necessarily  to  preventing  an  invasion.  A 
^  people  will  feel  that  it  is  fighting  a  defensive  war 
if  it  attacks  a  nation  which  may  attack  it  in  the 
future.  The  people  say  to  themselves :  "  Unless 
'  we  strike  now  before  that  army  is  reorganized  and 
the  strategic  railways  built,  we  shall  be  overrun 
five  years  from  now.     We  take  the  offensive  for 

\  defensive  reasons."  Or  the  people  may  feel  that 
what  it  regards  as  its  legitimate  expansion  is  being 
thwarted.     It  fights  to  defend  its  right  to  grow. 

1  It  defends  itself  against  encirclement  and  stran- 
gling.     It  may  feel  that  its  influence  in  the  world, 

J  "  its  standing  as  a  great  Power,"  is  endangered 
by  a  diplomatic  defeat.  It  fights  to  defend  its 
prestige.  So  by  imperceptible  gradations  every 
war  can  be  justified,  and,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  is 
justified  as  defensive.  There  is  nothing  extraordi- 
nary about  this.     Indeed,  it  is  a  platitude.     No- 


THE  STRATEGY  OF  PEACE  209 

body  thinks  of  saying  to  himself:  "I  want  more 
than  I  deserve.  I'm  the  aggressor."  Everybody 
says:  "  I  want  what  is  justly  due  me,  and  I'll  fight 
to  defend  it." 

Having  discovered  that  in  practice  no  one 
distinguishes  between  offensive  and  defensive  war- 
fare, the  radical  pacifist  simply  denounces  all 
fighting,  urges  disarmament,  and  says  that  no 
nation  should  have  weapons  of  attack  or  defense. 
But  this  doctrine  goes  to  pieces  completely 
before  the  determination  of  a  people  not  to 
be  invaded  or  to  have  its  country  overrun  by 
armies.  Against  that  determination  pacifism  is 
not  likely  to  make  much  headway.  In  fact,  when 
pacifism  confines  itself  to  the  propaganda  of  not 
fitting,  of  peace-at-any-price,  it  has  given  up  the 
ghost.  All  pretense  of  leadership  has  dropped 
away  from  it.  What  is  left  is  little  more  than  a 
pious  futility. 

It  is  a  futility  because  it  shirks  the  whole  prob- 
lem.   Everyone  knows  that  war  is  a  stupid  way  to    i 
deal  with  issues,  but  to  repeat  this  is  in  no  way 
to  deal  with  the  issues.     War  is  the  desperation   , 
which  follows  a  collapse  of  civilized  adjustments. 
It  is  recognized  everywhere  as  a  terrible  evil,  but  / 


210        THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY, 

it  is  almost  always  accompanied  by  the  question: 
"  What  else  was  there  to  do?  "  And  unless  the 
advocates  of  peace  can  throw  some  light  on  that 
question,  they  might  as  well  paint  coal  black  as 
insist  that  war  is  horrible. 

Thus  the  men  in  Europe  who  can  really  claim 
to  have  worked  for  peace  are  not  those  who  wanted 
to  disarm  their  own  country,  to  keep  it  neutral 
under  all  circumstances.  They  were  not  those 
who  talked  naval  holidays,  and  said  nice  things 
about  other  nations.  The  true  peacemakers  were 
those  who  grasped  the  real  struggle  between  the 
Entente  and  the  Alliance,  and  proposed  concrete 
improvements  in  the  diplomacy  about  Africa,  Asia 
Minor,  and  the  Far  East.  The  men  who  had  better 
solutions  of  the  Moroccan,  Congo,  and  Balkan 
problems  were  the  ones  who  can  claim  now  to  have 
done  their  share  of  thinking  for  civilization.  The 
constructive  critics  of  British,  French,  German, 
Austrian,  and  Russian  diplomacy  carried  in  them 
what  hope  there  was  for  peace.  Those  who  saw 
the  source  of  the  friction  and  tried  to  remedy  it 
were  the  real  internationalists.  But  the  people  who 
wanted  to  be  weak,  who  wanted  to  submit  at  all 
points,  who  bragged  about  General  Strikes  and  not 


THE  STRATEGY  OF  PEACE  211 

voting  military  credits,  were  deceiving  themselves 
and  the  world. 

For  peace  is  not  to  be  had  by  any  policy  so 
sterile  as  not  fighting.  Peace  is  to  be  had  as  a 
result  of  wise  organization.  It  prevails  not  where 
men  have  failed  to  act,  but  in  places  where  they 
have  had  the  sense  and  the  power  to  legislate  and 
administer  well.  This  country  would  be  a  bloody 
chaos  if  all  that  had  been  offered  to  the  Thirteen 
States  was  a  policy  of  non-resistance.  What 
saved  this  territory  of  ours  from  interstate  strug- 
gle was  the  establishment  of  a  federal  union 
strongly  enough  supported  to  resist  dissolution. 
Peace  will  not  come  to  the  world  on  easier  terms. 

It  will  come  not  by  declaiming  about  the  ab- 
surdity of  armed  compulsion,  but  by  enlarging  the 
areas  within  which  force  takes  a  more  civilized 
form.  For  what  has  happened  within  territories 
like  the  United  States  is  not  the  abolition  of  force^ 
but  its  sublimation.  We  do  by  elections  what  ; 
sovereign  states  do  by  war.  In  some  of  the  Latin--' 
American  countries  an  election  is  a  war.  The 
ballot  and  the  bullet  are  almost  indistinguishable. 
But  in  comparatively  advanced  countries  one 
group  prevails  over  another  by  voting  it  out  of 


( -> 


212         THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

ofBce,  not  by  shooting  it  out  of  office.  Where  no 
elections  take  place,  or  where  the  elections  are 
corrupt,  an  appeal  to  arms  is  always  an  open  pos- 
sibility. • 

The  grand  disputes  of  states  are  not  over 
the  interpretation  of  recognized  international  law. 
If  they  were,  the  future  of  arbitration  would  be 
brighter  than  it  is.  The  real  disputes  are  matters 
of  policy.  They  are  attempts  to  say  how  some- 
thing shall  be  done,  whose  word  of  command  shall 
be  recognized.  The  differences  are  political,  not 
juridical.  They  resemble  the  dispute  between  the 
high  protectionism  of  the  Republican  party  and 
the  tariff-for-revenue  theory  of  the  Democrats.  It 
is  a  clash  of  views  which  cannot  be  settled  by 
a  court.  Only  an  election  can  settle  it.  What 
does  an  election  mean.-*  It  means  that  there  is  a 
counting  of  electoral  strength,  followed  by  one 
party's  taking  possession  of  the  government.  The 
victors  move  in  to  the  Capitol  at  Washington,  put 
their  followers  in  the  administrative  offices,  and  see 
that  their  policy  Is  carried  out. 

When  no  such  political  organization  exists, 
where  there  are  no  satisfactory  elections,  the  peo- 
ple out  of  power  have  to  find  some  other  way  of 


THE  STRATEGY  OF  PEACE  213 

making  their  views  prevail.  They  may  send  a  war- 
ship to  overawe  a  city.  They  may  mobilize  on 
the  frontier.  They  may  declare  an  economic  boy- 
cott. They  may  actually  march  in,  throw  their 
opponents  out  of  their  office  chairs,  and  put  their 
own  officials  in  power. 

The  modern  substitute  for  war  is  not  arbitra- 
tion, but  election.  In  a  primitive  society  you  have 
to  drive  your  opponent  out  of  office  at  the  point 
of  the  sword.  In  more  advanced  societies  you  force 
your  opponents  out  of  office,  change  the  personnel 
of  the  government  by  patronage  and  what  is  known 
as  the  spoils  system.  In  the  most  mature  govern- 
ments we  know  the  body  of  administrators  is  so 
well  educated  and  so  sensitive  that  it  will  register 
the  result  of  an  election,  "  carry  out  the  will  of 
the  majority  "  with  a  minimum  of  physical  change. 
The  element  of  force  has  practically  disappeared, 
because  people  are  able  to  form  opinions,  express 
them,  and  trust  their  fellow-citizens  to  realize 
them  in  practice. 

The  difference  between  the  so-called  evolution- 
ary and  revolutionary  socialists  depends  chiefly 
upon  this  point.  The  revolutionist  has  lost  faith 
in  election,   and  believes   that  it  is  necessary  to 


r^ 


214         THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

seize  authority  by  force  and  carry  out  his  pro- 
gramme by  compulsion.  The  moderate  radical 
believes  that  democratic  governments  will  respond 
to  a  majority,  that  "  capitalist  officials  "  may  even 
be  ready  to  administer  socialist  policies.  It  is  a 
difference  of  opinion  (based  on  a  difference  of 
temperament  and  experience)  as  to  whether  strug- 
gle can  be  sublimated  into  politics. 

Industrial  statesmanship  to-day  is  not  con- 
cerned with  preaching  non-resistance  to  labor. 
Its  task,  as  we  begin  to  see  it,  is  to  translate  class 
warfare  from  the  plane  of  strike  and  lockout  to 
the  level  of  representative  government.  Our  ob- 
ject is  to  introduce  political  method  into  the  gov- 
ernment of  industry,  to  substitute  the  use  of 
democratic  machinery  for  the  existing  autocracy 
tempered  by  revolt.'  Instead  of  compelling  work- 
ingmen  to  use  the  costly  method  of  terrorizing  the 
employer,  the  aim  is  to  have  labor  secure  recog- 
nized industrial  power  in  the  management  of  in- 
dustry. 

Between  governments  no  adequate  machinery 
exists  by  which  one  policy  can  be  made  to  sup- 
plant another.  No  court  can  supply  that  machin- 
ery.   For  the  real  problem  is  to  legislate  and  have 


THE  STRATEGY  OF  PEACE  215 

the  laws  administered.  The  dispute  cannot  be 
settled  by  a  judicial  inquiry  based  on  accepted 
principles.  The  dispute  is  a  matter  of  clashing 
interests  and  beliefs,  and  the  solution  is  not  a 
judgment,  but  a  choice.  The  question  is  not 
which  of  these  two  groups  is  abstractly  right, 
but  which  of  these  two  groups  is  to  have  the  say-so. 

In  the  last  analysis  our  troubles  are  due  to  the 
fact  that  there  is  no  omniscient  tribunal  which 
makes  decisions  for  us.  We  have  beliefs,  opinions, 
interests  which  we  tend  to  proclaim  as  truth.  But 
as  human  beings  we  see  different  truths  in  the  same 
situations,  and  no  pope  exists  whom  we  are  ready 
to  have  pronounce  between  us.  That  is  why  we 
put  compulsion  behind  our  beliefs,  why  we  wish 
to  back  up  our  notion  of  right  with  a  good  supply 
of  might.  If  the  right  were  so  clear  that  all  could 
see  it  and  accept  it  gladly,  there  would  be  no  need 
of  force.  It  is  the  obscurity  of  truth  and  justice, 
the  finite  human  quality  of  them,  which  makes  them 
unable  to  prevail  alone. 

Within  a  nation  we  do  not  pretend  that  pro- 
tectionism is  "  absolutely  right  "  because  the  Re- 
publicans have  won  the  election.  We  say  simply 
that  the  Republicans  are  entitled  to  introduce  pro- 


O 


216        THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

tectioniam  and  experiment  with  it.  We  do  not 
claim  that  God  is  on  the  side  of  either  of  the  big 
guns  or  the  big  votes ;  we  merely  submit  to  having 
the  view  with  the  big  votes  prevail.  If  we  can 
test  the  strength  of  an  idea  by  votes  rather  than 
guns,  we  feel  we  have  made  an  enormous  advance 
in  civilization.  Now,  to  make  big  decisions  by 
counting  votes  may  be  only  a  little  less  absurd 
than  by  killing  men,  but  it  has  obvious  advantages. 
And  till  we  discover  some  subtler  way  of  trans- 
lating clashes  of  human  interest,  we  must  regard 
the  methods  of  politics  as  a  superb  advance  over 
the  methods  of  war. 

The  political  method,  however,  depends  upon  or- 
ganization. It  cannot  be  applied  between  two 
sovereign  states  or  between  two  warring  classes 
each  with  pretensions  to  sovereignty.  Before 
people  can  act  together  politically  they  have  to 
break  down  the  sovereign  frontier,  and  merge  in 
some  kind  of  larger  union.  Their  fundamental 
patriotism  has  to  include  the  whole  group  of 
which  their  opponents  are  a  part.  Political  oppo- 
nents have  to  have  a  common  loyalty  if  they  are 
to  settle  their  differences  by  political  methods. 

Peace  implies    not    only    the    construction    of 


■e    I 


THE  STRATEGY  OF  PEACE  217 

machinery  for  unifying  mankind,  but  the  readi- 
ness of  enough  men  to  defend  that  machinery. 
Such  readiness  is,  of  course,  a  risk.  We  may  be 
fooled.  But  a  war  fought  to  preserve  the  fabric 
of  international  order  would  be  worth  fighting, 
for  that  order  is  the  only  approach  we  have  to  the 
permanent  peace  of  mankind.  To  refuse  defense 
to  the  international  society  is  not  a  way  of  avoid- 
ing war.     It  is  an  invitation  to  many  wars. 

Indeed,  the  policy  of  peace-at-any-price  is 
peril  to  internationalism.  The  people  who  are 
most  likely  to  adopt  it  are  those  whose  influence 
is  most  needed  in  world  politics.  The  half-civilized 
aggressors  will  not  be  converted.  The  democrats 
may  be.  The  humane  people,  the  very  ones  who 
ought  to  be  influential,  are  most  susceptible  to  this 
teaching.  They  are  the  desirable  members  of  any  ^ 
international  society.  But  peace-at-any-price 
means  an  abdication  by  them.  They  resign,  and 
leave  the  world  to  harder  men.  Some  influence 
they  would  no  doubt  continue  to  have.  But  if  they 
succeed  in  convincing  the  conquering  empires  that 
they  will  not  resist,  pacifist  democrats  must  for 
the  present  give  up  hope  of  acting  eff*ectively  in 
world  politics.      They   will   not  be   heard    about 


218         THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

China,  Africa,  Central  America,  if  they  make  it 
known  that  under  no  circumstances  will  they  stand 
up  and  fight. 

The  only  policy  they  can  possibly  adopt  is  that 
of  isolation.  They  can  stay  at  home,  and  pass 
resolutions  against  the  evils  being  done  in  other 
parts  of  the  world.  They  may  not  be  invaded. 
They  may  escape  with  a  whole  skin.  But  they 
must  give  up  even  the  shadow  of  a  pretense  that 
they  are  working  for  the  world's  peace.  They  can 
be  good  monks,  and  perhaps  they  will  be  saved 
by  faith.  They  will  not  be  saved  by  works.  For 
they  are  leaving  mankind  and  the  future  in  the 
lurch. 

It  would  indeed  be  a  tragic  situation  if  the 
humane  and  enlightened  people  abandoned  their 
influence  in  world  politics.  It  would  resemble  the 
well-known  process  of  being  kicked  upstairs.  The 
more  spiritually  fit  a  people  was  for  international 
leadership,  the  more  it  would  withdraw  from  the 
I  turmoil.  The  nations  which  were  least  inclined  to 
exploit  and  subjugate,  which  had  the  highest  re- 
gard for  defenseless  peoples,  would  lose  their  pres- 
tige because  they  were  committed  to  the  dogma 
that  force  is  evil.     To  put  the  matter  concretely. 


THE  STRATEGY  OF  PEACE  219 

imagine  the  world  if  the  comparatively  liberal 
Powers — the  United  States,  France,  Great  Britain, 
and  even  Germany — were  to  isolate  themselves 
within  their  frontiers,  and  take  no  decisive  share 
in  the  outer  politics  of  the  world.  Would  the 
cause  of  peace  be  advanced  by  the  giving  of  a  free 
hand  to  Russian  and  Japanese  imperialism? 

The  more  serious  indictment  of  the  peace-at- 
any-price  propaganda  is  that  its  success  would 
mean  not  the  abandonment  of  force,  but  the  con- 
centration of  force  in  the  least  democratic  em- 
pires. The  weaker  western  civilization  became, 
the  stronger  the  despotisms  would  be.  For  though 
the  pacifists  may  possibly  in  the  end  convert  the 
despotisms  too,  they  will  convert  the  liberal  coun- 
tries first.  They  will  be  accomplishing  the  very 
result  which  every  lover  of  peace  ought  to  dread 
the  most — the  focusing  of  power  in  the  hands  of 
those  who  are  least  likely  to  use  it  well.  If  there 
are  to  be  armaments  in  the  world,  it  is  surely  better 
that  they  should  be  controlled  by  people  who  have 
been  civilized  in  democracy  than  by  oligarchies 
who  dominate  a  docile,  mystically  consecrated 
population.  Our  irreverent,  shirt-sleeved,  strag- 
gling people  is  a  far  safer  master  of  force  than  an 


220         THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

empire  in  which  a  Tsar  or  a  Mikado  is  not  only 
the  autocrat  of  the  state,  but  the  vicar  of  God. 

I  do  not  see  how  anyone  with  pretensions  to  in- 
ternational loyalty  can  contemplate  abandoning 
the  organization  of  the  half-developed  parts  of 
the  earth  to  the  illiberal  Powers.  Surely,  if  any 
of  our  finer  hopes  are  to  be  realized,  it  will  be  be- 
cause the  more  enlightened  democracies  assume  a 
decisive  position  in  world  politics.  Unless  the 
people  who  are  humane  and  sympathetic,  the  peo- 
ple who  wish  to  live  and  let  live,  are  masters  of 
the  situation,  the  world  faces  an  indefinite  vista 
of  conquest  and  terrorism.  Yet  the  people  who 
are  humane  are  the  ones  who  listen  to  the  propa- 
ganda of  non-resistance.  If  they  are  converted, 
they  put  themselves  in  a  position  where  they  can- 
not oppose  the  intrigue  and  brutality  of  the  ag- 
gressive empires.  Ask  an  imaginative  Chinaman 
whether  the  withdrawal  of  the  United  States  from 
his  country  has  worked  for  or  against  his  security 
and  happiness.  Ask  a  far-seeing  Brazilian  whether 
he  would  in  his  candid  moments  like  to  see  the 
United  States  scrap  its  navy. 

The  ideal  condition  for  the  world  would,  of 
course,  be  the  concentration  of  power  in  the  hands 


THE  STRATEGY  OF  PEACE  221 

of  those  whose  purposes  were  civilized.  Little 
force  would  actually  be  employed.  The  potential- 
ity of  it  would  then  be  enough  to  keep  the  ag- 
gressor in  check,  and  government  by  consent  and 
education  would  be  the  normal  process  of  affairs. 
Just  because  coercion  is  the  worst  instrument  of 
politics,  the  possibility  of  coercion  must  rest  with 
those  who  have  least  incentive  to  use  it.  We  have 
had  to  strengthen  the  power  of  our  government  in 
order  to  tame  the  power  of  corporations.  If  our 
government  had  remained  weak,  special  interests 
would  flourish  unchecked.  By  concentrating  supe- 
rior force  in  the  national  administration,  demo- 
cratic politics  can  operate.  But  if  we  said  dog- 
matically, as  the  anarchists  do  say,  that  state 
power  is  an  unmitigated  evil,  we  should  simply 
be  encouraging  corporations  to  govern  as  they 
please.  The  labor  movement  has  discovered  the 
same  truth.  It  is  beginning  to  know  that  its  only 
way  to  respectful  treatment  is  by  accumulating 
power  to  offset  the  employers.  Industrial  democ- 
racy begins  to  be  practiced  where  labor's  prestige 
is  great  enough  to  be  impressive. 

I  realize  that  this  sounds  suspiciously  like  the 
doctrine  known  as  the  Balance  of  Power.    That  is 


222         THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

just  what  it  is,  and  there  is  no  need  to  be  afraid 
of  a  bad  name.  Where  coercive  force  exists,  it 
must  either  be  neutrahzed  by  force  or  employed 
in  the  interests  of  what  we  regard  as  civihzationj 
Those  who  are  working  for  a  securely  organized 
democratic  world,  for  an  international  coopera- 
tion, have  got  somehow  to  meet  the  great  forces 
which  fight  against  them.  They  will  not  be  al- 
lowed to  construct  in  peace  according  to  their 
heart's  desire.  At  every  step  they  will  be  resisted 
from  without  by  governments  with  different  pur- 
poses, from  within  by  groups  of  people  with  dif- 
ferent philosophies  and  special  interests.  How 
they  are  to  overcome  this  resistance  without  bal- 
ancing off  its  power,  I  do  not  see.  To  be  sure, 
the  mere  fact  that  democrats  possess  force  may 
destroy  their  democratic  faith.  The  tool  may  be- 
come the  god.  But  if  democrats  ark  not  sure 
enough  of  themselves  to  keep  the  faith.  If  they  are 
in  mortal  dread  of  being  led  into  temptation,  they 
are  pretty  poor  servants  of  a  finer  world. 

This  dread  is  an  old  one  among  democrats.  It 
rests  on  some  experience.  Too  often  they  have 
seen  men  acquire  power  only  to  destroy  their  cause. 
The  result  is  that  all  liberal  movements  are  cor- 


THE  STRATEGY  OF  PEACE  223 

roded  by  distrust  and  a  fear  of  responsibility. 
They  prefer  to  stay  weak,  that  they  may  remain 
pure.  But  it  is  a  bhnd  alley.  When  they  are 
weak  the  purposes  of  their  movement  are 
thwarted.  They  purchase  their  integrity  at  the 
price  of  impotence.  This  is  just  what  the  pacifist 
is  inclined  to  do.  Rather  than  risk  the  danger  of 
seeing  his  own  country  become  aggressive  and  im- 
perialistic, he  prefers  to  see  it  take  no  part  in 
world  politics.  He  preaches  isolation  because  he 
fears  contact. 

To  be  sure,  contact  is  dangerous.     If  America   i 
enters  the  arenas  of  friction  it  will  be  exposed  to 
many   threats  not  only   from   other  nations,  but 
from  within  the   country.      The   danger   of  war 
will    be    increased,    and    the    danger    of   what    is 
known  as  militarism.     Now,  our  virtue  may  be  so 
poor  a  thing  that  it  will  vanish  with  temptation. 
We  may  be  like  one  of  those  teetotalers  who  does 
not  dare  to  pass  a  saloon.     Having  tasted  world 
power,  we  may  go  drunk  with  it.     But  if  that  is"\ 
the  kind  of  people  we  are,  how  impudent  of  us  to 
utter  one  word  in  criticism  of  the  military  empires.  ( 
If  experience  of  democracy,  if  a  century  of  com- 
parative order  and  prosperity  and  human  equality  / 


224        THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

have  made  no  difference,  if  we  are  bound  to  act 
like  all  the  rest  as  soon  as  we  touch  the  world's 
affairs,  then  we  might  as  well  humbly  retire  and 
cultivate  our  private  gardens. 

It  may  be  an  unwarranted  optimism,  but  there 
are  not  many  of  us  who  will  accept  this  counsel  of 
despair.  We  do  not  believe  that  the  world  can  be 
regenerated  by  our  assuming  a  passive  but  morally 
perfect  attitude  towards  it.     The  problem  of  or- 

f  ganizing  the  globe  against  competitive  exploitation 
is  an  immensely  intricate  positive  programme,  re- 
quiring power  and  ability  and  inventiveness  for  its 

^^  realization.  To  lay  all  our  emphasis  on  not  fight- 
ing and  being  amiable  is  to  divert  the  attention 
from  the  real  business  at  hand.  For  the  supreme 
task  of  world  politics  is  not  the  prevention  of 
war,  but  a  satisfactory  organization  of  mankind. 
Peace  will  follow  from  that.    That  is,  in  fact,  what 

\  peace  is.  We  shall  end  war  by  dealing  effectively 
with  our  problems,  not  by  reiterating  that  war  is 
horrible. 

Is  there  any  pacifist  so  dogmatic  that  he  can 
rejoice  because  the  defenselessness  of  China  made 
it  unable  to  resist  aggression?  Is  anything 
gained  for  the  world's  permanent  peace  by  the 


THE  STRATEGY  OF  PEACE  225 

prospect  of  a  conquered  or  disintegrated  China? 
Only  the  blindness  which  does  not  see  beyond  the 
immediate  present  can  feel  anything  but  sorrow 
if  China  is  on  the  road  to  chaos.  For  the  trouble 
being  prepared  by  the  weakness  of  China  will  trou- 
ble the  world.  It  will  haunt  its  peace.  And  no 
clairvoyance  is  needed  to  prophesy  that  if  China 
is  unable  to  stand  on  its  feet  and  assume  control 
of  its  own  affairs,  innocent  people  the  world  over 
will  pay  taxes  for  armaments,  and  those  who  are 
boys  to-day  will  perish  on  distant  battlefields. 
This  is  no  scaremongering.  The  Chinese  are  al- 
most a  quarter  of  the  human  race.  Let  them  sink 
into  helpless  disorder,  thwart  them,  oppress  them, 
and  they  will  become  to  the  world  what  Turkey 
and  the  Balkan  states  have  been  to  Europe — a  run- 
ning sore  which  infects  everyone. 

How  irrelevant  to  such  a  problem  is  the  doctrine 
preached  by  the  ordinary  pacifist.  As  if  not  fight- 
ing were  a  policy  which  touched  even  the  fringes 
of  this  problem  so  gigantic  that  it  darkens  the 
thought  of  anyone  who  looks  into  the  future.  For 
of  all  the  stakes  ever  offered  to  diplomacy  China 
is  the  richest  and  largest.  If  comparatively  in- 
significant territories  like  Morocco  and  Bosnia  can 


226         THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

bring  the  world  to  the  edge  of  war,  what  lusts  of 
imperialism  will  a  helpless  China  arouse? 

^If  we  are  to  grapple  with  the  issues  which  dis- 
tract the  world,  we  have  got  to  enter  the  theaters 
of  trouble.  If  the  United  States  is  to  be  a  leader, 
or  even  an  important  factor,  in  the  stabilizing  of  i 
mankind,  it  must  create  interests  which  will  jus- 
tify its  participation  in  world  politics.  It  must 
invest  and  trade  in  the  backward  countries.  This 
will  give  our  diplomacy  a  leverage  on  events.  And 
to  be  effective  that  diplomacy  will  have  to  be  4 
weighted  with  armaments  of  sufficient  power  to 
make  it  heard  by  the  Great  Powers.  Moreover, 
we  shall  have  to  abandon  our  traditional  dislike 
of  European  alliances.  If  we  enter  the  arena 
of  the  world,  we  cannot  stand  entirely  alone  i  we 
shall  have  to  work  in  coalition  with  the  Powers 
whose  policy  is  most  nearly  like  our  own. 

That  is,  I  realize,  a  terrifying  programme  to 
most  Americans.  It  terrifies  me,  and  disturbs 
every  prejudice  of  my  training.  We  have  all  of  us 
been  educated  to  isolation,  and  we  love  the  irre- 
sponsibility of  it.  But  that  isolation  must  be 
abandoned  if  we  are  to  do  anything  effective  for 
internationalism.     Of  course,  if  we  wish  to  let  the 


THE  STRATEGY  OF  PEACE  227 

world  go  hang,  we  may  be  able  to  defend  our  coasts 
against  attack,  and  establish  a  kind  of  hermit 
security  for  ourselves.  But  even  that  security  will 
be  precarious  in  a  world  arranged  as  this  one  has 
come  to  be.  Less  and  less  is  it  possible  to  remain 
neutral,  to  stay  out  of  the  conflicts.  Without  the 
slightest  intention  of  taking  part  in  the  great 
war  we  have  several  times  almost  been  dragged 
into  it.  And  though  we  may  have  escaped  fight- 
ing, we  have  suffered  tremendously  because  the  dis- 
location of  the  globe  aff'ects  all  its  parts. 

Real  isolation  has,  in  fact,  become  a  myth,  and 
our  only  choice  is  between  being  the  passive  vie-  ' 
tim  of  international  disorder  and  resolving  to  be 
an  active  leader  in  ending  it.  ^  It  is  not  an  easy 
choice.  As  Lord  Morley  has  said,  politics  is  the 
science  of  the  second  best,  and  in  surrendering  our 
isolation  we  shall  surrender  much  that  is  precious 
to  us.  But  one  thing  is  certain:  we  shall  be  safer 
by  surrendering  it  deliberately,  by  making  the 
choice  with  our  eyes  open,  than  by  allowing  our- 
selves to  be  dragged  unprepared  and  surprised  into 
the  melee  of  the  nations. 

Finally,  the  internationalist  to-day   cannot  be 
effective  as  an  unorganized  private  citizen.     He 


228         THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 

cannot  deflect  appreciably  the  course  of  world 
politics  from  the  platform  of  a  peace  society.  He 
must  work  through  some  agency  which  has  pres- 
tige with  the  governments.  The  only  available 
agency  is  his  own  government. 

The  strategy  of  peace  is  to  use  the  democratic 
governments  as  organs  of  leadership  in  world  poli- 
tics. The  pacifist  must  work  to  control  his  own 
government,  not  in  order  to  make  it  powerless, 
but  in  order  to  make  it  a  power  in  the  decent 
handling  of  what  are  now  the  stakes  of  diplomacy. 
If  a  world  state  is  created,  it  will  be  through  the 
initiative  of  national  governments.  They  are  to 
the  internationalist  what  the  trades  unions  are  to 
industrial  democracy — organs  of  power  through 
which  a  new  view  can  be  made  to  prevail. 

These,  as  I  see  them,  are  the  conditions  under 
which  an  internationalist  remains  a  patriot,  not 
in  order  to  support  his  country  right  or  wrong, 
not  in  order  to  aggrandize  it,  but  in  order  to  use 
it  as  a  lever  of  influence  in  world  politics.  I  By  be- 
coming an  anti-patriot  he  simply  cuts  himself  off^ 
from  the  only  organization  through  which  he  can 
hope  to  make  himself  effective  in  the  affairs  of 
nations.     The  failure  of  the  German  socialists  is 


THE  STRATEGY  OF  PEACE  229 

not  that  they  neglected  to  destroy  the  German 
Empire,  but  that  they  were  unable  to  control  its 
policy.  Had  they  succeeded,  they  might  have 
turned  the  power  of  Germany  into  an  incompar- 
able guardian  of  civilization. 

The  difference,  then,  between  the  true  interna- 
tionalist and  the  unreasoning  patriot  lies  in  the 
supremacy  of  his  conscious  purpose.  He  is  loyal 
for  reasons,  and  not  merely  by  habit.  He  holds 
his  local  patriotism  with  a  sense  that  it  is  tem- 
porary, knowing  that  he  must  be  ready  to  merge 
it  in  a  larger  devotion.  He  remains  a  nationalist 
in  practice  because  that  is  the  only  effective  way 
he  can  work  for  internationalism.  He  preserves 
his  country  in  trust  for  that  greater  state  which 
will  embrace  civilization.  He  regards  his  alle- 
giance as  a  stewardship.  It  is  true  that  he  may  for- 
get. He  may  sink  into  a  dangerous  patriotism. 
That  is  one  of  the  risks  of  an  active  life.  It  is 
always  possible  that  men  will  lose  sight  of  the 
end  and  become  fanatic  about  the  means.  There  is 
no  gug,rantee  against  this  insidious  danger.  Only 
constant  criticism  and  candid  discussion  can 
guard  against  it. 


INDEX 


Africa,  90;  Germany  in,  98, 

99,  100 
Algeciras,    131 ;    lesson,    148, 

149;  Morocco  charter,  145- 

147.     See  also  Morocco 
Alsace-Lorraine,  107 
American  abroad,  the,  68,  69 
American  country  town,  70 
Americanism,  42 
Angell,   Norman,   118 
Anglo-French  Entente,  123 
Arbitration,    136,    138,    139; 

failure  of,  140;  weakness 

of,  142 
Argentina,  191 
Army  mobility,  29,  30 
Art,  American,  67,  68 
Asia,  176 

Austria-Hungary,  183 
Australia,  173 

Backward  countries,  87,  88; 
difficulties  in  international- 
izing,  151-155;    exploiting, 
190,   191;   stabilizing,    194; 
trade  in,  163,  164;  war  in 
Europe  over,  124,  125 
Balance  of  Power,  221,  222 
Banco  di  Roma,  101-105 
Beard,  Charles  A.,  cited,  182 
Belgian  Congo.     See  Congo 
Belgium,  82,  167 
Berlin   Conference   of   1885, 

130  - 
Bernhardi,  28 
Bismarck,  130,  131,  182 
"  Breaks,"  38,  40 
British  Empire,  88,  173 
Bryan,  William  J.,  10,  21 


Billow,  Prince,  quoted,  137, 

138 
Business,      diplomacy,      and 

patriotism,  71-83 

Canada,  173 

Childhood,  60,  67 

China,  166,  167,  224-226 

Civil  War,  38,  109,  110 

Commerce,  42 

Commercial  development,  98 

Competition,  national,  193 

Concessions,  94 

Congo,  91,  130 

Congress,  distrust  of,  16,  32 

Constitution,  U.  S.,  182 

Copper,  76,  77 

Corporations,  221 

Country  town,  71 

Cowardice,  62 

Cultural  differences,  112,  113 

Democracy,  ceasing  at  wa- 
ter's edge,  34,  35;  efficient, 
200,  201;  essence  of,  47; 
fear  of,  203;  foreign  af- 
fairs and,  195;  virtue  of, 
199;  war  and,  24;  war- 
making  power  of,   15 

Denmark,  166 

Deutschland  in  Waffen,  43 

Diplomacy:  Algeciras  lesson, 
148,  149;  British,  79; 
broader  base  for,  189-195; 
decisive  thing  in,  81;  hid- 
den, 194,  198;  patriotism, 
business,  and,  71-83;  per- 
sonal side  of,  22;  popular 
thinking  about,  111;  prize, 


231 


232 


INDEX 


82;  chief  problem  of,  8T; 

secret,  6 
Diplomatic     events,     recent, 

113 
Diplomats:    lack    of   power, 

32,  33;  personal  conference 

of,  21 
Dogmatism,  51,  52 

Economic  interests,  183 
Economic  motive,  patriotism 

and,  72,  73 
Editors,  56,  57 
Elections,  211,  212,  213 
England:  decadent?,  78,  79; 
Germany    and,    33;     Mo- 
rocco   threat,    123 
European  concert,  3,  4,  108 
European    legislature.      See 

Legislatures 
Europeans,  government  rec- 
ord, 91 
Expansion,  90 

Fatherland,  31 
Fear,  172,  174,  175 
Firearms  and  spirits,  164 
Flag,  trade  and  the,  159,  166 
Foreign     affairs,     American 
people's      opinion,     18-20 ; 
democracy's     control,     25, 
34,   35,   46,   200;   domestic 
and,  50;  public  interest  in, 
187,188;   public  opinion  in, 
196-204 
Foreigners,  38,  53,  54;  sym- 
pathy for,  56 
France,    Morocco    and,    97; 

Mexico  and,  128 
Free  trade,  118,  119,  120 
Friction  arenas,  87-109 
Frontiers,   38,    195;    erosion, 
45;  government,  49;  neces- 
sity, 39 
Fullerton,    Morton,    quoted, 
100,   101 


German  Crown  Prince,  43 
German  propaganda,  65 
German    Southwest    Africa, 

99 
German-Americanism,    63-66 
Germany  as  the  Fatherland, 
63;  economic  development, 
43;  England  and,  33;  inter- 
ests and  prestige,  137,  138; 
real   quarrel,    139;    union, 
182 
Government,     publicity     in, 

201;  strong,  221 
Great  Illusion,  118,  119 
Great  Powers,  82 
Grey,   Sir  Edward,  91,  201; 
effort   for  European  con- 
cert, 3;  lack  of  power,  33 

Hague    Court,    139;    defect, 

140 
Haiti,  168 
Haldane,  Lord,  54 
Hamilton,  181 
Harris,      Norman      Dwight, 

quoted,  91,  92,  130 
Herreros,  99 

Humane   persons,  217-220 
Hyphen,  64,  65 

Imperialism:  cause  of  war, 
166;  central  nerve,  159; 
complexity,  97;  core  of, 
150-159;  evils,  158;  for- 
mula, 105;  groups  of  in- 
terests, 106;  outbreak,  95 
India,  88 

Industrial  democracy,  221 
Industrial  statesmanship,  214 
International      governments, 
148;    destroying,    153-155; 
evils,  158;  supporting,  155- 
157 
Internationalism,  135;  peril, 
217;    proposal    advocated, 
155 


INDEX 


233 


Isolation,  218,  223,  226,  227 
Italia  Irredenta,  107 
Italy  and  Tripoli,  100-105 

Japan,  20,  41 
Jews,  66 
Jingoism,  53 

King,  uses  of,  26-38 

Labor,  221 
Laissez-faire,  165 
League  of  Peace,  140,  141 
Legislatures:  European,  130; 
international,    131 ;    inter- 
national,   failure    of,    132; 
permanent  world,  133-135, 
144 
Lloyd      George,      80,      201; 

quoted,  61,  62 
Local  pride,  71-74 
London  Conference,  131 
Loyalties,  early,   61,  62 
Loyalty,  184;  broadening  the 

basis  of,  179,  180 
Llideritz,  Herr,  99,  100 
Lusitania,  15,  21,  22,  23,  24, 
31,  32 

McKinley,  President,  24 
"  Made  in  Germany,"  78 
Mexico,  93,  94,  165;  France 

in,   128,   129;   intervention, 

21;  Wilson's  policy,  129 
Militarism,   ideal    of,   42 
Monroe  Doctrine,  18,  19,  107, 

128 
Morlev,  Lord,  cited,  227 
Morocco,  77,  80,  97,  121,  122, 

145;  study  needed,  150 

Nation:  mystical  entity,  58, 
59;    thought   of,   28,'    See 
also  People 
Nation  (London),  quoted,  58 
National  interests,  137 


National  unity  in  danger,  36 

Nationality,  59,  60;  arousing, 
66;  essence,  67,  69;  mor- 
bid, 171;  thwarted,  62 

New  York  Evening  Tele- 
gram, 31 

Newspapers  in  wartime,  54, 
55 

Nigeria,  91,  92,  93 

Nightingale,  Consul,  quoted, 
91 

Non-resistance,  220 

One-man  power.  See  Presi- 
dent; King 

Open  door,   114-117,   120 

Opposition,  value,  51 

Organizing,  168.  See  also 
Peace 

Origins:  Haven  in  distress, 
7 ;  retreat  to,  61 ;  worthy, 
62 

Pacelli,  Ernesto,  101 
Pacific  Ocean  problem,  175 
Pacifism,  irrelevancy,  297 
Pacifists,    duty,    228;    weak- 
ness, 113,  114 
Pan-Americanism,   129 
Panic  in  thinking,  8-10 
Passion,  76 

Patriotism,  57;  business, 
diplomacy,  and  71-73; 
clashing,  185;  expanding, 
173,  174;  future,  172-188; 
in  the  rough,  58-70;  mean- 
ing, 36;  primitive,  171; 
true,  228,  229;  world,  172, 
179 
Peace,  agency  of,  228 ;  at  any 
price,  209,  217-219;  Euro- 
pean programmes  before 
the  war,  6;  organization 
the  basis  of,  211,  224; 
permanent,  5,  217;  pro- 
grammes, 136 ;  strategy'  of, 


234 


INDEX 


207-228.  See  also  Pa- 
cifism; Pacifists 

Peace-makers,  real,  210 

People,  American,  thoughts 
and  will,  26,  27 

People,  inertia,  28,  29;  nego- 
tiating, 26,  30-32 

Persia,  164,  165,  166,  168,  191 

Pichon,  M.,  quoted,  97 

Pinon,  M.,  quoted,  101 

Poincare,  M.  Raymond, 
quoted,  97 

Political  parties,  false  unity, 
201,  202 

Politics,  216 

Population,  mixed,  40,  41; 
solidified,  42 

Power.  See  Balance  of 
Power 

Powers,  Great,  82 

Preparedness,  basis,  127,  128 

President,  U.  S.,  opinions, 
17,  18;  war-making  power, 
15-25 

Prestige,  national,  77,  78,  79, 
108,   137 

Pride  of  race,  62 

Protection,  119 

Protectorate,  168;  interna- 
tional, 169,  170 

Prussia,  182,  183 

Public.     See  People 

Public  opinion.  President's 
control,  22,  23 

Public  spirit,  71,  72 

Publicity,  198,  199.  See  also 
Foreign  affairs 

Pure  races,  40,  45 

Real  estate,  patriotism  and, 

74,   75 
Realpolitik,   111-126 
Roosevelt,  Theodore,  24 

Senate,  world,  133 
Serbia,  82 


Shipping,  England's  control 
of  U.  S.,  44 

Small  states,  166,  167.  See 
also  Backward  countries 

Socialists,  evolutionary  and 
revolutionary,  213,  214; 
German,   228,   229 

Sovereignty  of  ideas,  53 

Sovereignty,  theory  of  na- 
tional, 48.  See  also  Na- 
tionality 

State,  dynastic  conception, 
36,  37.  See  also  Govern- 
ment; World  state 

Strikes,  pairing  off,  39 

Thinking  alike,  51 
"  Touch  me,"  163 
Toynbee,     Arnold,     quoted, 

183 
Trade,  flag  following,  159 
Trade  union,  184 
Tripoli,   100-105 
Turks,     42,      127;     Tripoli, 

Italy,  and,  101-105 

Ulster,  42 

Union,  178-184 

United  States,  94;  duty,  226, 

227 

Veblen,  Thorstein,  quoted, 
71,    72 

Vera  Cruz,  16 

Viereck,  G.  S.,  66 

Votes,  216.  See  also  Elec- 
tions 

War,  commerce  and,  42;  de- 
fensive, 208 ;  democracy 
and,  24;  escape,  23, 
25;  fusion  of  nations 
against,  45;  industry  and, 
43,  44;  modern  substitute, 
213;  platitudes  about,  207- 
210;  psychology  of,  35,  36. 
See  also  Militarism 


INDEX 


235 


War  in   Europe:  cause,  82,  Wilson 

127;     real     contest,     124,  World 

125  World 

War-making    power    in    the  World 
United  States,  15  144; 

Weak  states.    See  Backward  187; 

countries;  Small  states  ent 

West,  the,  191,  192  178; 

West,    Rebecca,    quoted,  58,  226 

59 

Western  peoples,  177,  178  Zabern,  4.3 


,  Woodrow,  15 
government,  130 
problem,  127 
State:  difficulties,  143, 
entering  wedge,   185- 
organizing,  224;  pres- 
possibility,    176,    177, 
United    States    and, 


^a 


S  S      4  ,. 


University  of  California 

SOUTHERN  REGIONAL  LIBRARY  FACILITY 

305  De  Neve  Drive  -  Parking  Lot  17  •  Box  951388 

LOS  ANGELES,  CALIFORNIA  90095-1388 

Return  this  material  to  the  library  from  which  it  was  borrowed. 


3   1205  00507  2119 


UC  SOUTHERN  REGIONAL  LIBRARY  FACILITY 


AA      000  283  362 


JgBSj^i^ 


Calif( 
egion 
acilit; 


( 


